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I. Introduction
Credit markets serve a vital function in capitalist economies:
evaluating the riskiness of a range of possible investments and
channeling resources toward those investments that investors
believe are most likely to prove successful. This process is known
as the “risk-based pricing” of credit. Ideally, risk-based pricing
should lead to lower cost of capital for lower risk investment
choices with larger rewards, and therefore more investment in
such promising activities. Conversely, risk-based pricing should
lead to higher costs of capital—and therefore less investment—in
high-risk activities with relatively low rewards. If creditors are
well informed and analytic, and borrowers respond to financial
incentives, then risk-based pricing—compared to uniform credit
pricing—leads to a more efficient allocation of society’s limited
resources.
Although risk-based pricing is standard in business-loan
markets, and may be increasingly common in consumer-credit
markets such as mortgages and credit cards, risk-based pricing is
seldom used in the market for student loans.1 Most student loans
are extended under Federal Student Loan programs
administered by the Department of Education. These federal
programs have historically offered loans at rates lower than those
offered by most private lenders, on terms that are more attractive
to student borrowers, and without adjusting the pricing on loans
1. See Wendy Edelberg, Risk-Based Pricing of Interest Rates in Household Loan
Markets 3–4 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2003-62, 2003),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200362/200362pap.pdf (analyzing data
from the 1980s and 1990s and documenting the growing use of risk-based pricing in
credit cards, auto loans, and mortgages, but not student loans); cf. infra Part V.C
(contrasting efficient risk-based credit pricing with “opportunistic” credit pricing).
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according to the risks inherent in different courses of study or
lending to different types of borrowers.
The Federal Student Loan programs—first established in the
mid-twentieth century to increase the supply of skilled labor,
promote economic and technological development, and provide
upward socioeconomic mobility—are broadly successful. They
have provided low-cost credit to millions of students, helped
increase educational attainment, held administrative costs lower
than those of the private sector, and generated a profit for the
federal government.
However, Federal Student Loan programs have not
incorporated many recent insights from financial, developmental,
and labor economics that distinguish between different types of
education. Because of this, Federal Student Loan programs, and
more broadly, U.S. labor markets, are not performing at their full
potential. There is a large mismatch between the skills workers
have and employers’ needs, and this mismatch contributes to
structural unemployment, reduced output, and student loan
defaults.
This Article argues that introducing risk-based pricing in
federal student loans would advance the interests and values
that Congress articulated when it first established federal
support for higher education. Risk-based pricing of student loans
would signal the long-term financial risks inherent in different
courses of study. This price signal would likely improve students’
ability to make informed decisions about the course of study that
would best balance their innate abilities and individual
preferences with postgraduate economic opportunities. Similarly,
price signals would enhance postsecondary educational
institutions’ abilities to adjust their programs to improve their
students’ postgraduate prospects.
Allocating educational resources more efficiently would not
only benefit individual students and their families. It would
enhance the productivity and competitiveness of the U.S. labor
force, with beneficial consequences for both the private sector and
public finances. Over the long term, such efficiencies could
increase the resources available for further investment in
education and research.
Transparent, risk-based student loan pricing could greatly
benefit students and educational institutions, particularly if it
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were data-driven and sensitive to the values of equal opportunity
and independent research that are central to the academic
enterprise. This Article discusses legal and policy reforms that
could facilitate risk-based student loan pricing, potential hazards
from a shift toward risk-based pricing, and safeguards that could
help protect students and educators from abuse.
This Article focuses primarily on the economic consequences
of education rather than on moral or philosophical views about
the ideal purpose of education or its proper role in society. The
economic focus of this Article is not intended to deny the
intellectual merit of philosophical views about education, but
rather to reflect the fact that government support for higher
education in the United States has primarily been driven by
economic considerations, particularly during the mid-twentieth
century when Federal Student Loan programs were established.
Part I of this Article discusses rationales for government
support for higher education, with an emphasis on Human
Capital Theory. Part II discusses the U.S. federal student loan
system. Part III discusses coordination, information, and
incentive problems in the higher education and skilled labor
markets. Part IV explains the theory of risk-based credit pricing
and how risk-based pricing of federal student loans could
ameliorate some of the coordination problems discussed in Part
III. Part V discusses predictors of income, employment, and
student loan default, and also considers ethical and moral
considerations that might limit or preclude the use of certain
predictors to risk-adjust student-loan pricing.
II. Government Support for Higher Education
In most developed economies, government provides some
form of public support for higher education, either through grants
or loans.2 Rationales for government support for higher education
2. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), EDUCATION AT A
GLANCE: 2011 OECD INDICATORS 163 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/edu/higher
educationandadultlearning/48631582.pdf; Gabrielle Demange, Robert Fenge & Silke
Uebelmesser, The Provision of Higher Education in a Global World—Analysis and
Policy Implications, 54 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 248, 253–54 (2008); Panu Poutvaara,
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generally relate to positive externalities beyond the direct
benefits to the individual student.3 These externalities may be
economic in nature, or may relate to more subjective values
espoused by a given polity. Values-based rationales in the United
States often cite the role of public investment in education in
reducing inequality or providing socioeconomic mobility.4
A. Higher Education as an Investment in Human Capital
Economic benefits of higher education are well known:
education increases wages5 and reduces the risk of
Educating Europe: Should Public Education Be Financed with Graduate Taxes or
Income-Contingent Loans? 50 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 663, 665 (2004).
3. See John A.E. Pottow, The Nondischargeability of Student Loans in
Personal Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CAN. BUS. L.J. 245,
258–59 (2006); Anthony Stokes & Sarah Wright, Measuring the Social Rate of
Return in Public Sector Labor Markets, 6 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 1, 4 (2008).
4. See E. DIGBY BALTZELL, THE PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT: ARISTOCRACY
AND CASTE IN AMERICA 351 (1964) (“[T]he campus community has now become the
principal guardian of our traditional opportunarian ideals.”); JOHN A. DOUGLASS,
THE CALIFORNIA IDEA AND AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: 1850 TO THE 1960 MASTER
PLAN 1–2 (2000) (“California was not alone in its efforts to nurture higher
education as both a tool for socioeconomic mobility and an engine for economic
growth.”); OECD, supra note 2, at 13 (“During the past 50 years, the expansion of
education has contributed to a fundamental transformation of societies in OECD
countries. In 1961, higher education was the privilege of the few . . . .”); Lani
Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Comment: Admissions Rituals as
Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV.
113, 137 (2003) (“I identify four important values associated with access to higher
education: individualism, merit, democracy, and upward mobility. Of these four,
the value that seems to integrate the other three with higher education is upward
mobility.”).
5. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 246 (1994) (“The rate of return
to an average college entrant is considerable, of the order of 10 or 12 percent per
annum”); id. at 247 (“[A]bility explains only a relatively small part of the [earning]
differentials [between high school and college educated workers] and college
education explains the larger part.”); Orley Ashenfelter & Alan Krueger,
Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling from a New Sample of Twins, 84
AM. ECON. REV. 1157, 1157 (1994) (estimating from a sample of identical twins
that an additional year of schooling increases wages by 12% to 16%, and reporting
that this is probably not due to differences in innate ability); Thomas Lemieux,
Postsecondary Education and Increasing Wage Inequality, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 195,
196 (2006) (“By 2003–2005 . . . the return to post-secondary education is much
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unemployment,6 presumably by increasing labor productivity.7 In
addition to benefiting the student by facilitating higher future
income, education may also lead to positive financial externalities
such as increased tax revenues,8 reduced burdens on public services,9
higher than the return to elementary and secondary education.”); id. at 199
(“[P]ost secondary education plays a crucial role in explaining [increasing wage
inequality]. By contrast, labor market experience, primary and secondary
education, and the position of workers without postsecondary education in the
wage distribution play a small role in explaining changes in the wage structure
over the last 35 years.”); OECD, supra note 2, at 13 (“Among the 34 OECD
countries, most of those in which college enrolment expanded the most over the
past decades still see rising earnings differentials for college graduates . . . .”).
6. See Jacob Mincer, Education and Unemployment 22 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w3838, 1991), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226736; W. Craig Ridell & Xueda
Song, The Impact of Education on Unemployment Incidence and Re-Employment
Success: Evidence from the U.S. Labor Market, 18 LABOUR ECON. 453, 462 (2011);
OECD, supra note 2, at 116–17, Chart A7.1 (“Higher education improves job
prospects, in general, and the likelihood of remaining employed in times of
economic hardship.”). The differences in unemployment between those with
postsecondary degrees and those without widens during times of financial
distress. Id. at 118–20.
7. See Mincer, supra note 6, at 22; David A. Wise, Academic Achievement
and Job Performance, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 350, 364 (1975) (providing evidence that
college education increases productive ability); cf. Samuel Bowles & Herbert
Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America Revisited, 75. SOC. EDUC. 1, 1 (2002)
(“[T]he contribution of schooling to individual economic success could be explained
only partly by the cognitive development fostered in schools. . . . [S]chools prepare
people for adult work rules by socializing people to function well and without
complaint in the hierarchical structure of the modern corporation.”); Joseph
Stiglitz, The Theory of “Screening,” Education, and the Distribution of Income, 65
AM. ECON. REV. 283, 298 (1975) (arguing that education acts to provide
information to employers about the innate abilities and characteristics of
prospective employees and that education may not in and of itself improve labor
productivity); Paul J. Taubman & Terence J. Wales, Higher Education, Mental
Ability, and Screening, 81 J. POL. ECON. 28, 43 (1973) (supporting the screening
hypothesis).
8. OECD, supra note 2, at 165 (“Investments in education also generate
public returns from higher income levels in the form of income taxes, increased
social insurance payments and lower social transfers.”).
9. See id. at 193
A large body of literature suggests that education is positively
associated with a variety of social outcomes, such as better health,
stronger civic engagement and reduced crime. A small but increasing
number of studies further suggest that education has a positive causal
effect on these social outcomes. There is also research suggesting that
education can be a relatively cost-effective means to improve health
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and more rapid technological innovation and economic growth.10

and reduce crime. (citations omitted).
Completion of postsecondary education is also associated with lower rates of
bankruptcy filing. Abbye Atkinson, Race, Educational Loans and Bankruptcy, 16
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 2 (2010). High levels of education for spouses is associated
with lower divorce rates, particularly if the education is completed prior to
marriage. Torkild Hovde Lyngstad, The Impact of Parents’ and Spouses’
Education on Divorce Rates in Norway, 10 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 121, 138 (2004);
Jessie M. Tzeng & Robert D. Mare, Labor Market and Socioeconomic Effects on
Marital Stability, 24 SOC. SCI. RES. 329, 343, 344 tbl.3 (1995).
10. See DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THE MODERN UNIVERSITY 138–39 (1982) (discussing the importance of university
research on technological innovations); DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 1 (“We almost
owe more of our economic gains in the last seven decades to investment in people
than to saving and the amassment of capital. And the margin in favor of people is
increasing.” (quoting John Kenneth Galbraith)); Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt,
A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction, 60 ECONOMETRICA 323, 324
(1992); Angel de la Fuente & Rafael Domenech, Human Capital in Growth
Regressions: How Much Difference Does Data Quality Make?, 4 J. EUR. ECON.
ASSOC. 1, 1 (2006) (noting that the counterintuitive results on human capital and
growth are partly due to inadequate data); Alan B. Krueger & Mikael Lindahl,
Education for Growth: Why and for Whom?, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 1101, 1102 (2001)
(arguing that studies that failed to find a connection between education and
growth suffered from poor-quality data, and that such relationships are evident
with better data); Paul Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL.
ECON. S71, S71 (1990) (“[T]he stock of human capital determines the rate of
growth [and] too little human capital is devoted to research in equilibrium.”);
Jacob Mincer, Human Capital and Economic Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 803, 1981), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w0803
Just as accumulation of personal human capital produces individual
(income) growth, so do the corresponding social or national
aggregates. . . . growth of human capital is both a condition and
consequence of economic growth . . . . [h]uman capital activities
involve . . . the production of new knowledge which is the source of
innovation and of technical change which propels all factors of
production.
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Figure 1.1: Educated Workers Earn More and Are
Unemployed Less

Educational attainment and median weekly earnings, 2011
2011 USD, workers age 25 or over
$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

Professional Degree

$2,000
$1,665

Doctoral Degree

$1,551

Master’s Degree

$1,263

Bachelor’s Degree

$1,053

Associate’s Degree

$768

Some college, no degree

$719

High school diploma

$638

Less than high school diploma

$451

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Census Bureau,
Current Population Survey

Educational attainment and average unemployment rates, 2011
Percent of workers age 25 or older who were unemployed
0%

5%

Professional Degree

2.4%

Doctoral Degree

2.5%

Master’s Degree
Bachelor’s Degree
Associate’s Degree
Some college, no degree
High school diploma

10%

15%

3.6%
4.9%
6.8%
8.7%
9.4%

Less than high school diploma
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Census Bureau,
Current Population Survey

14.1%
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Figure 1.2: Decades of Data Show that Educated Workers Are
Less Likely to be Unemployed

Average annual unemployment rates, age 25 or older, 1992-2011
Percent of workers age 25 or older who were unemployed

16%

14%

Less than high
school diploma

12%

10%
High School
8%

Some College

6%
Bachelor’s degree
4%

2%

Master’s degree
Doctoral degree
Professional
degree

0%

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Census
Bureau, Current Population Survey, Labor Force Statistics
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Figure 1.3: Decades of Data Show that Educated Workers Earn
More, and the Wage Premium Has Increased over
the Last Thirty Years
Median usual weekly earnings of full-time workers 25 years and over by educational
attainment, 1979-2011
Real 2011 USD
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Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics
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This perspective—known as “Human Capital Theory”11—is
the leading economic explanation for the higher wages of
educated workers. An alternate view that developed during the
1970s, “Signaling Theory,” claims that education leads to a more
efficient allocation of talent by sorting workers according to
innate ability.12 Risk-based pricing of student loans is compatible
with either a Human Capital or Signaling view, although the case
for subsidized education is stronger under Human Capital
Theory.
Empirical evidence in favor of Human Capital Theory has
mounted over the last thirty-five years, including many studies of
wage differences of identical twins who differed with respect to
the number of years of education.13 In addition to the twin
studies, there have been many careful econometric studies that
controlled for various measures of innate ability.14 These studies

11. Gordon Marshall, Human-Capital Theory, in A DICTIONARY OF
SOCIOLOGY 1998 (1998) (“Human capital arises out of any activity able to raise
individual work productivity.”).
12. See Stiglitz, supra note 7, at 283 (discussing a “screening” process that
allows individuals to be labeled by their productivity); Taubman & Wales, supra
note 7, at 43–49 (suggesting using education as a screening device). Under
Signaling Theory, education can create value because it enables the employers
who value skilled workers the most to identify those workers and bid for their
services, leading to a more efficient allocation of skilled labor. Signaling Theory
implies that labor market outcomes should not depend on what students study,
but only on how well they perform academically relative to other students with
similar standardized test scores, or perhaps whether they demonstrate a strong
work ethic by choosing a challenging major.
13. See, e.g., Ashenfelter, supra note 5, at 1157; Dorothe Bonjour et al.,
Returns to Education: Evidence from U.K. Twins, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1799, 1799–
1812 (2003); Colm Harmon & Ian Walker, Estimates of the Economic Return to
Schooling for the United Kingdom, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1278, 1278–86 (1995);
Paul Miller, Charles Mulvey & Nick Martin, What Do Twins Studies Reveal
About the Economic Returns to Education? A Comparison of Australian and U.S.
Findings, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 586, 586–99 (1995); Oddbjorn Raaum & Tom Erik
Aabo, The Effect of Schooling on Earnings: Evidence on the Role of Family
Background From a Large Sample of Norwegian Twins, 26 NORDIC J. POL. ECON.
96 (2000); Cecelia Elena Rouse, Further Estimates of the Economic Returns to
Schooling from a New Sample of Twins, 18 ECON. EDUC. REV. 149, 149–157
(1999); cf. David Neumark, Biases in Twin Estimates of Returns to Schooling, 18
ECON. EDUC. REV. 143–48 (1999) (discussing how within-twin estimates may
result in an upward bias).
14. See David Card, The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings, in 3
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suggest that a college degree on average increases wages by
40%.15
Figure 1.4: Education Boosts Wages After Controlling for
Student Ability
Economists’ estimates of increase in wages caused by one year of schooling
Percent increase in lifetime wages from an additional year of school, midpoint estimate

16%
14%
12%

U.S. Average,
11.8%

10%

Ex-U.S. Average,
9.2%

8%
6%
4%
2%
0%

Early Human Capital Theory focused on the number of years
of schooling or the completion of a degree, while more recent
studies have focused on differences between fields of study. These
studies generally conclude that choice of field of study affects
wages and employment, even after controlling for ability
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1801 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds.,
3d ed. 1999) (reviewing the empirical literature).
15. Id. at 1802.
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sorting.16 Figures 2.1 through 2.3 below show differences in
earnings and employment by college major, both at graduation
and later in life.
Figure 2.1: Some Academic Majors Have a Higher Initial Labor
Market Value Than Others

Recent graduates’ median starting salary offer by major, 2011
2011 USD thousands

Engineering

$59.1

Computer Science

$56.2

Mathematics

$49.2

Accounting

$48.4

Economics

$47.9

Healthcare

$42.2

Business Administration

$40.9

Liberal Arts/Humanities

$34.2

Communications

$32.9

Biology

$31.1

History/Political Science

$30.7

English

$30.3

Education
Psychology
Sociology/Social Work
Visual & Performing Arts

$29.7
$28.7
$28.5
$24.1

Source: National Association of Colleges and Employers, The Class of 2011 Student
Survey Report 36 Figure 30.
Note: Bachelor’s degree recipients only.

16. See Amanda Thorson, The Effect of College Major on Wages, 13 THE
PARK PLACE ECONOMIST 45, 48 (2005), https://www.iwu.edu/economics/PPE13/
thorson.pdf (“Every study on the matter . . . shows that at least some gap
remains even after controlling for human capital variables when looking at
either specific majors or aggregated major groups.”).
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Figure 2.2: Some Academic Majors Are More Likely to Lead to
Employment at Graduation Than Others
Job offer rate by major, 2011
Percent of recent graduates with job offers at graduation

Computer Science

56.2%

Accounting

53.8%

Economics

50.9%

Engineering

50.0%

Business Administration

46.3%

Mathematics

41.7%

Sociology

38.9%

Psychology

37.9%

Communications

37.6%

Liberal Arts/Humanities

36.2%

Biology

35.3%

Visual & Performing Arts

34.3%

History/Political Science

33.8%

Healthcare
English
Education

28.7%
23.5%
19.5%

Source: National Association of Colleges and Employers, The Class of 2011.
Student Survey Report 34 Figure 28.
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Figure 2.3: Over the Long Term, College Graduates in Some
Fields Earn More and Are More Likely to Work Full Time
Annualized median earnings by bachelor degree field, 2009
Population age 18 and over where highest degree is bachelor’s
2011 USD thousands
Full time workers
All workers with earnings
$0

$20

$40

$60

$80

Engineering

$80

$75

Computer

$70

Business

$58

$53

Mathematics

$49

Communications

$49

Health sciences

$48

Other

$48

Natural science

$47

Agriculture

$59
$52
$57
$56
$54
$52

$46

Architecture

$50

$43

Liberal arts

$42

Social science

$42

Philosophy

$39

Literature

$39

Education

$38

Foreign language

$37

Psychology

$37

$50
$48
$50
$52
$43
$45
$47

Source: US Census Bureau, Survey of Income and Program Participation,
2008 Panel, Table 4G.
Note: Bachelor’s degree recipients only; annualized earnings calculated by
multiplying monthly earnings by 12.

$72
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Human Capital Theory helps explain wage and employment
differentials between theoretical and applied majors.
For
example, although math majors on average have higher
standardized test scores than engineering or computer science
majors,17 math majors are less likely to be offered employment at
graduation and receive lower starting salary offers than students
who majored in computer science or engineering.18 Similarly,
business majors, who have relatively low average standardized
test scores,19 have better labor market outcomes than higherscoring social science or humanities majors.20

17. COLL. BD., 2010 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS TOTAL GROUP PROFILE 13
tbl.25 (2010); NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS
2011, tbl.155 (2011). Unfortunately, the data only provides average SAT scores
by incoming students’ intended majors, rather than by graduates’ completed
majors. Some studies suggest that students with relatively low abilities and
poorer academic preparation tend to switch from their intended majors in STEM
or economics to less rigorously graded and less demanding humanities and
social sciences fields. See, e.g., PETER ARCIDIACONO ET AL., WHAT HAPPENS AFTER
ENROLLMENT? AN ANALYSIS OF THE TIME PATH OF RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN GPA
AND MAJOR CHOICE 20 (2011), http://public.econ.duke.edu/~psarcidi/grades_
4.0.pdf.
18. NAT’L ASSOC. OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, THE CLASS OF 2011 STUDENT SURVEY
REPORT 34 fig.28, 36 fig.30 (2011); NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS 2005, at 620 tbls.374 & 375, 623 tbl.377; NAT’L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2011, at 591 tbl.403, 592
tbl.404; see also Dan A. Black et al., The Economic Reward for Studying
Economics, 41 ECON. INQUIRY 364, 375 (2003).
19. See supra note 17.
20. See supra note 18.
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Figure 3.1: Differences in Earnings by Major Do Not Appear to Be
Due Solely to Differences in Student Ability
2011 median starting salary offer and 2007 mean SAT score by college major
Real 2011 USD thousands

2011 Starting Salary

$60

SAT Score

2007 Math SAT Score

2007 Reading SAT Score

630
610
590

$40

570
550

$30
530
$20

510
490

$10
470
$0

450

Source: Digest of Education Statistics, 2006-2011; College Entrance Examination
Board, College-Bound Seniors: Total Group Profile [National] Report; National
Association of Colleges and Employers, The Class of 2011 Student Survey Report
36 Figure 30
Note: Differences in SAT scores may be underestimated because SAT scores are for
intended majors and salaries are for completed majors. There is some evidence
that lower ability students switch from challenging majors such as Engineering
and Computer Science into less challenging majors such as Business, English, and
other social science and humanities fields.

SAT Score

Starting Salary USD Thousands

$50
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Figure 3.2: Differences in Earnings by Major Do Not Appear to Be
Due Solely to Differences in Student Ability
Average SAT scores of high school seniors by intended college major, 2005-2008
Math Score
0

200

400

600

800

618

Mathematics
Physical sciences

Reading Score
1,000
536

589

560

English

541

598

Foreign languages, literatures, and linguistics

549

576

Social sciences

545

568

Philosophy/religious studies

541

563

Engineering
Biology

579

524

554

541

General/interdisciplinary

534

History

517

552

Area, ethnic, cultural and gender studies

518

551

Theology and religious vocations

525

543

Liberal Arts/ Humanities

521

543

Social sciences and history

521

540

Computer science

533

505

Communications
Architecture
Visual & Performing Arts
Business and commerce
Psychology

504

544

524

531
503
511
488

Healthcare

499

Education

484

Agriculture

483

Public affairs and services

464

1,200

491
518
486
505
487
481
481
473

Source: Digest of Education Statistics, 2006-2011; College Entrance Examination Board,
College-Bound Seniors: Total Group Profile [National] Report

Although these observations could be interpreted in
various ways,21 the differences appear to reflect the value of
21. It is possible that low-ability students are “signaling” commercialism
rather than developing practical skills, but presumably entering the work force
at a younger age would signal commercialism more forcefully than studying
something “commercial.”
Another possibility is that high-ability math, social science, and humanities
majors may opt out of the labor market by going to graduate school, and that
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field-specific skill development rather than differences in
ability levels. Even within engineering, there are large starting
wage differences by specialty.22
Human Capital Theory also helps explain higher average
per-capita productivity and wages in states and nations with
higher levels of educational attainment. If education only
sorted workers according to ability, it would presumably only
increase the variance of wages (i.e., income inequality), while
leaving the mean unaltered.23
Further, Human Capital Theory helps explain the
willingness of many employers to pay for professional degree
programs for successful employees.24 Employers’ willingness to
educate workers whom employers already know to be of high
quality suggests that employers believe that professional
education has skill-development value rather than mere
sorting value.
Just as corporations depend on the productivity of their
employees, workers’ productivity and wages are an extremely
important source of revenue for central governments. Labor is
less mobile than capital, and therefore easier to tax.25
only the students in these fields with relatively low abilities may enter the labor
market at college graduation, driving down reported wages and employment.
22. Colby Ardis, Top-Paid Majors for the Class of 2011, NAT’L ASS’N OF
COLLS. & EMP’RS (July 20, 2011), http://www.naceweb.org/s07202011/
top_majors_engineer/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
23. Signaling Theory can explain these findings either by assuming that
sorting creates collective as well as private benefits, or under strained
interpretations of the data—for example assuming that prosperity causes
education, or that a third unidentified variable consistently causes both high
levels of education and high levels of prosperity. See, e.g., Andrew Weiss,
Human Capital vs. Signaling Explanations of Wages, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 133,
145–46 (1995) (addressing objections to the “Sorting Approach”).
24. See, e.g., Jingying Yang, Finding a Sponsor to Pay for That M.B.A.,
INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/
education/15iht-SReducation-mba15.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Feb. 3,
2013) (discussing how many employers are still willing to pay for an M.B.A. for
their employees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
25. It is far more difficult to learn a new language and emigrate than to
convert capital to a new currency and invest across borders. See, e.g., OECD,
TAX POLICY REFORM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 19 (2010) (“Globalization may . . .
increase the opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion especially as concerns
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In a country such as the United States, which taxes wages
at much higher rates than capital, public expenditures that
increase wages are more likely to benefit public finances
through higher future tax revenues than public expenditures
that increase the return on private capital.26
Whereas the capital gains tax rate is typically fifteen
percent, the average effective tax rate on human capital—that
is, the tax on the increase in wages attributable to education—
will often be around thirty to fifty percent because the wage
premium will fall into high federal, state, and local income tax
brackets and will often also be subject to payroll taxes.27 In
addition, education is not treated as favorably under the Tax
Code as other forms of investment with respect to the ability to
recover investment costs, deduct interest on loans, or smooth
income across tax years.
In sum, a large proportion of the benefits of human capital
redound to public finances rather than to the educated worker.
Education is generally a profitable public investment, not a

mobile capital income tax bases.”); id. at 138–40 (describing increased capital
mobility leading to tax competition and lower capital gains and corporate taxes
in many developed countries).
26. Wages are subject to both federal income taxes and federal payroll
taxes, whereas capital gains and dividends are subject only to income taxes.
Income tax rates for capital gains and dividends are much lower than income
tax rates for wages. The difference in tax treatment of income from wages and
income from capital is so extreme that although the income tax is nominally
progressive, in practice extremely wealthy individuals who derive most of their
income from investments have much lower average federal tax rates than
middle class workers who derive most of their income from wages. See Martin A.
Sullivan, Economic Analysis: At the Helmsley Building, the Little People Pay the
Taxes, 130 TAX NOTES 855, 855–56 (2011) (discussing how tax rates are lower for
the very wealthy than for the average person). Some have countered that
corporate income taxes should be counted as additional taxes on capital, but
whether the incidence of corporate tax is primarily on investors, employees, or
customers remains hotly debated. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Elusive
Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax: The State Case, 9 PUB. FIN. Q. 395, 395–
98 (1981) (discussing the controversies and approaches to the corporate income
tax).
27. See, e.g., OECD, TAXING WAGES 2008–2009, at 109 (2010) (estimating
total 2009 marginal tax burden on labor in the U.S. to be between 30% and 60%
for workers earning at least 50% of the average wage, with the highest tax
burdens on singles).
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mere expenditure.28 In fact, the public benefits from higher
education in the United States are the highest in the developed
world, while public costs are among the lowest,29 suggesting
that public investment in higher education in the United
States could be profitably increased.
B. The Demand for Skilled Labor and Social Mobility
Whereas private higher education in the United States
was originally a form of luxury consumption—training for the
financially secure children of the upper class that emphasized
cultural refinement and social grace over technical skill30—
federal government support for higher education emerged with
a belief by business leaders that education can and should
promote economic development by training skilled labor and
supporting applied research.31 This emphasis on economic
development is evident in the requirements of the Northwest
Ordinances of 1785 and 178732 and the Morrill Act of 1862,33
28. OECD, supra note 2, at 158–60 (reporting that public and private
benefits of education in OECD countries, including the U.S., greatly exceed
public and private investment in education).
29. Id. at 165–67.
30. DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 2; OECD, supra note 2, at 13.
31. DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 2–3, 33–34. The strongest proponents of
practical education were Northeastern business interests, while the principal
opposition came from Southern conservatives. Id.
32. See the full text transcripts of Land Ordinance 1785, available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?ammem/bdsdcc:@field(DOCID+@lit(bdsdcc
13201)), and 1787, available at http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=8
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 20 (“The constitutions of existing states provided for
one or more state-supported institutions of higher learning as a means to
further social and economic progress and as a legal mechanism for securing
federal land grants for education under the Northwest Ordinances of 1785 and
1787.”).
33. Officially known as the Agricultural College Land Act. 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–
49 (2012). See BOK, supra note 10, at 62 (“Americans tended to look on higher
education as a means for providing the knowledge and trained man power that
a rapidly developing society required. In 1862, Congress embodies this spirit in
the Morrill Act . . . .”); DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 34 (“As a condition for
accepting Federal scrip, by 1866 each state would need to charter either existing
or new institutions to fulfill the purpose of the act: namely, to provide
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under which the federal government granted land to state
governments to fund public institutions of higher learning that
would teach labor-market-relevant skills.34
Similarly, Congress emphasized the need for a technically
skilled labor force, particularly in areas of science and
technology, when it implemented the first federal student loan
program through the National Defense Education Act of 1958
(NDEA).35 The need for greater central government support for
higher education was made salient in 1957 by the Soviet
Union’s launch of Sputnik I and II, the first man-made
satellites.36 These early Soviet technological triumphs over the
United States were generally attributed in the U.S. to the
Soviet Union’s seemingly superior system of education.37 The
Soviet educational system, compared to the U.S. system, was
believed to be more meritocratic, to focus more on science and
technology, and to more closely coordinate its efforts with
national economic and military priorities.38 During the space
agricultural, mining, and mechanical education in support of the state’s
economy.”).
34. DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 33–34.
35. See id. at 198; Atkinson supra note 9, at 14 n.44 (citing National
Defense Education Act of 1958, ch. 17, §§ 401–602, 72 Stat. 1589 (repealed
1970); Jonathan D. Glater, The Other Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow
College Students to Borrow More Through Federal Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 37 (2011)
The guaranteed student loan program [established by the Higher
Education Act of 1965] took as its model . . . loans offered under the
National Defense Education Act (NDEA), a law passed in 1958 in
reaction to the launch of the Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union. At
that time, lawmakers encouraged Americans to educate themselves
in scientific and technical fields.
36. See DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 198 (“[T]he substantial increases in
direct student aid under post-Sputnik federal legislation initiated a new era of
federal involvement in higher education.”); id. at 234 (“Sputnik was a
technological marvel. It was the first intercontinental missile, opened the space
age, and marked the beginning of satellite communications. It was also a
profound political event.”).
37. See id. at 234 (“American popular opinion credited the Soviet
Educational System with Sputnik’s success. Here was the source for its
scientists and research. Conversely, the reason for America’s apparent second
place position . . . was its faltering schools and universities.”).
38. See id. (“The quick conclusion of many was that America’s system of
education was disorganized, it failed to provide sufficient training in the
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race that followed, the U.S. shifted toward a centralized,
taxpayer-funded, and government-coordinated model of
university-based scientific and technical research, coupled with
increased education subsidies.
In approving subsequent federal student loan programs,
such as the guaranteed loan program established by the
Higher Education Act of 1965,39 Congress emphasized the need
for greater equality of opportunity and social mobility as well
as the need for a skilled labor force.40
Recently, state governments have renewed their insistence
that public support for higher education should be conditional
on higher education serving the needs of the labor market and
economic growth.41 And educational leaders have recognized
the legitimacy of government efforts to coordinate universities’
activities with economic priorities.42

sciences, and it catered to mediocrity at the expense of the promising student.”);
see also BOK, supra note 10, at 40 (“We should also not suppose that the
aggregate efforts of many hundreds of institutions and many thousands of
professors will automatically distribute themselves in a pattern that matches
the country’s needs.”).
39. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219.
40. Glater, supra note 35, at 20, 35–38.
41. See ERIN SPARKS & MARY JO WAITS, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N CTR. FOR
BEST PRACTICES, DEGREES FOR WHAT JOBS? RAISING EXPECTATIONS FOR
UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 40 (2011),
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1103DEGREESJOBS.PDF
(“Governors and state policymakers are increasingly recognizing the importance
of ensuring that students who graduate from institutions of higher education . . .
are equipped with the skills to fill good, high-paying jobs that are in high
demand by employers, thereby boosting the state’s economic growth.”).
42. See BOK, supra note 10, at 40
[W]e cannot assume that . . . market forces will automatically lead
colleges and universities to train physicians or doctoral students in
numbers corresponding to society’s needs. If the government is
subsidizing university programs or if these programs are important
enough to the public, officials will naturally wish to intervene
whenever the results stray too far from the nation’s interests.
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C. Values-Based Arguments for Higher Education Funding
In addition to financial benefits, many commentators have
argued that education provides some ethical, spiritual, or
political benefits, not only to the individual student, but also to
society at large.43 Purported benefits of education range from
promoting equality or social mobility, to safeguarding liberty, to
reinforcing moral and ethical behavior, to fostering informed
participation in democratic processes, to encouraging voluntarism
and civic virtue.44
In the nineteenth century, private colleges—in contrast to
state universities—often saw their role as the ethical and moral
development of good parishioners and good citizens. However, by
the mid-twentieth century, this moralistic view was largely
supplanted even at elite private colleges by a focus on the role of
higher education in promoting individual and collective economic
advancement.45
In the United States, social mobility, equality of opportunity,
and material progress were viewed not only as private goods, but
also as public benefits that legitimized the United States’ political
and economic systems, brought more talented individuals into
leadership positions, and dampened the appeal of communism.
Even as the Cold War has receded into distant memory, the
prospects of equal opportunity and social mobility continue to be
43. See OECD, supra note 2, at 192 (“Adults aged 25 to 64 with higher
levels of educational attainment are, on average, more satisfied with life,
engaged in society and likely to report that they are in good health, even after
accounting for differences in gender, age and income.”).
44. See Glater, supra note 35, at 12–13, 16–19; Guinier, supra note 3, at
115–33, 137.
45. See BOK, supra note 10, at 3–4
[In the early 1900s,] the American University was evolving from a
church-oriented college into a larger, more diverse institution with
stronger graduate and professional programs capable of serving the
needs of a developing economy. . . . [B]usinessmen and financiers
quickly replaced the clergy as dominant figures on the boards of
leading universities.
See also id. at 62–66; id. at 121 (“[B]y the mid-twentieth century, little remained
of the earlier efforts of colleges and universities. Catalogues continued to speak
of moral development as a prominent aim of the institution, but there was scant
evidence of any serious effort to pursue this objective.”).
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cited as justifications for inequality—in effect, the prospect of
social mobility is a substitute in U.S. political discourse for
equality.46
46. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & REINHARD BENDIX, SOCIAL MOBILITY IN
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 2–4, 11–12 (1991). See generally Thomas Piketty, Theories
of Persistent Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
INCOME DISTRIBUTION 429 (Anthony B. Atkinson & François Bourguignon eds.,
2000); Marco H.D. Van Leeuwen, Social Inequality and Mobility in History: An
Introduction, 24 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 399 (2009).
There is also a conservative justification for both high inequality and low
levels of social mobility, which rests on an assumption of very high heritability
of talent or ability, and assumes that those who are poor are deficient in ways
that are heritable and largely immutable. See, e.g., RICHARD HERRNSTEIN &
CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN
AMERICAN LIFE (2004) (arguing that genetically heritable intelligence
determines class structure in the United States).
Most labor economists, demographers, sociologists, and psychologists reject
this view as inconsistent with the data. See, e.g., MICHAEL HOUT ET AL.,
INEQUALITY BY DESIGN: CRACKING THE BELL CURVE MYTH (1996) (reanalyzing the
data used in the Bell Curve and arguing that the authors overestimated the role
of intelligence in setting wages and underweighted the role of manipulable
factors such as education); Lisa Barrow & Cecilia Rouse, The Economic Value of
Education by Race and Ethnicity, 2006 ECON. PERSP. 14, 23 (analyzing data and
concluding that returns on education do not differ by race); James J. Heckman,
Lessons from the Bell Curve, 103 J. POL. ECON. 1091, 1091–1120 (1995); Orley
Ashenfelter & Cecilia Rouse, Schooling, Intelligence, and Income in America:
Cracks in the Bell Curve (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
6902, 1999), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6902.pdf (reviewing the econometric
literature and concluding that the economic returns on schooling do not differ
significantly by family background or by measures of ability of the student);
Christopher Winship & Sanders Korenman, A Reanalysis of the Bell Curve 1,
21–22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 5230, 1995), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=225294 (arguing that the
measure of parental socioeconomic status used in the Bell Curve did not capture
important family characteristics such as single-parent family structure at age
fourteen, and therefore overestimated the effects of intelligence).
Psychologists continue to debate the extent to which intelligence is
genetically heritable. See, e.g., RICHARD E. NISBETT, INTELLIGENCE AND HOW TO
GET IT: WHY SCHOOLS AND CULTURES COUNT 211 (2010) (arguing for a strong
environmental role in shaping intelligence); cf. J. Philippe Rushton & Arthur R.
Jensen, Race and IQ: A Theory-Based Review of the Research in Richard
Nisbett’s Intelligence and How to Get It, 3 OPEN PSYCHOL. J. 9, 9–35 (2010)
(arguing for heritability).
However, whatever the heritability of intelligence, there is substantial
evidence from randomized controlled studies and quasi-experimental designs
that early childhood interventions, smaller class sizes, career training programs,
and college completion can improve educational and economic outcomes. See
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D. Higher Education Funding and Independent Research
Governments may also fund educational institutions because
of the benefits of unbiased research47 conducted by experts who
are insulated from political and market pressures. Notable
leaders of educational institutions have expressed concerns that
external funding can corrupt academic research.48 For example,
industry funding of research is affiliated with scientifically
questionable pro-industry conclusions in pharmaceutical
research,49 nutritional research,50 and environmental research.51
JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS
3–24 (2009) (discussing studies regarding how certain external factors affect
educational outcomes).
47. See Charles I. Jones, Sources of U.S. Economic Growth in a World of
Ideas, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 220, 228 (2002) (arguing that 30% of U.S. growth
between 1950 and 1993 is attributable to the rise in educational attainment and
50% is attributable to the rise in worldwide research intensity).
48. See, e.g., DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 76 (2003) (discussing how external
sources of funding may distort the results found).
49. See, e.g., Justin E. Bekelman, Yan Li & Cary P. Gross, Scope and Impact
of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 454, 455 (2003), http://jama.jamanetwork.com/data/Journals/
JAMA/4865/JRV20091.pdf; Joel Lexchin, Lise Bero, Benjamin Djulbegovic &
Otavio Clark, Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and
Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BMJ 1667, 1667 (2003), http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC156458/pdf/el-ppr1167.pdf; Sergio Sismondo,
How Pharmaceutical Industry Funding Affects Trial Outcomes: Causal Structures
and Responses, 66 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1909, 1909 (2008), http://post.
queensu.ca/~sismondo/ssm_6194.pdf.
50. See, e.g., Tommy Boone, Is Sports Nutrition for Sale?,
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF EXERCISE PHYSIOLOGY ONLINE (July 2004),
http://faculty.css.edu/tboone2/asep/IsSportsNutritionForSale.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Barrie
Margetts, Editorial, Stopping the Rot in Nutrition Science, 9 PUB. HEALTH
NUTRITION 169, 171 (2006), http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?
fromPage=online&aid=584696.
51. The hydrocarbon/energy industry has funded numerous attacks on the
science behind global warming, although virtually none of them have survived
peer review and virtually all peer-reviewed scientific research supports the
theory of man-made global warming. See ROSS GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON: THE
CLIMATE
CRISIS,
THE
COVER-UP,
THE
PRESCRIPTION
45
(1997);
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 30, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_
syr.pdf (“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal . . . .”); id. at 37 (“There
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When government funding comes with direct control by political
leaders, such funding also creates the risk of attempts to
politicize education or enforce a rigid ideology.52 Federal
is very high confidence that the global average net effect of human activities
since 1750 has been one of warming . . . .”); id. at 39 (“Most of the observed
increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely
due to the observed increase in anthropogenic [greenhouse gas]
concentrations.”); NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT:
HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO
SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 2–9 (2010) (addressing the doubt cast upon
scientific research in regard to the tobacco industry and global warming); JAMES
LAWRENCE POWELL, THE INQUISITION OF CLIMATE SCIENCE 64–65 (2011) (noting
the criticism of scientists who dissent from the findings of the IPCC); Riley E.
Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, Climate Change Denial: Sources, Actors, and
Strategies, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY 240, 240–
45 (Constance Lever-Tracy ed., 2010) (examining how uncertainty regarding
climate change has been manufactured over time).
In one notable incident, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a probusiness “think tank” funded in part by the oil industry, offered scientists
$10,000 to produce research that would cast doubt on the scientific consensus
regarding global warming. Juliet Eilperin, AEI Critiques of Warming
Questioned, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/04/AR2007020401213.html (last visited Feb. 3,
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Ian Sample, Scientists
Offered Cash to Dispute Climate Study, GUARDIAN (UK), Feb. 1, 2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/feb/02/frontpagenews.climatechan
ge/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
52. See, e.g., RAYMOND S. BRADLEY, GLOBAL WARMING AND POLITICAL
INTIMIDATION: HOW POLITICIANS CRACKED DOWN ON SCIENTISTS AS THE EARTH
HEATED UP (2011); DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 200–01, 206–13 (discussing
politically motivated firings of University of California professors and other
politically motivated attacks on academic freedom during the Red Scare and
McCarthyism); ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE LOST SOUL OF HIGHER EDUCATION:
CORPORATIZATION, THE ASSAULT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM, AND THE END OF THE
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (2010) (discussing historical challenges by political
leaders to academic freedom, particularly during the Red Scare and
McCarthyism eras, and renewed attacks in modern times). Politically motivated
purges of university professors are not a unique feature of right-wing populism
in the United States—similar politically motivated attacks on higher education
took place in Nazi Germany, Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and both
Nationalist and Communist China. ZHENGYUAN FU, AUTOCRATIC TRADITION AND
CHINESE POLITICS 281 (1993); IGAL HALFIN, STALINIST CONFESSIONS: MESSIANISM
AND TERROR AT THE LENINGRAD COMMUNIST UNIVERSITY 91–96 (2009); SAMUEL D.
KASSOW, STUDENTS, PROFESSORS, AND THE STATE IN TSARIST RUSSIA 29–30 (1989);
KRISTIE MACRAKIS, SURVIVING THE SWASTIKA: SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN NAZI
GERMANY 74–76 (1993); Douglas Stiffler, Resistance to the Sovietization of Higher
Education in China, in UNIVERSITIES UNDER DICTATORSHIP 213, 217–19 (John
Connelly & Michael Grüttner eds., 2005); see also BOK, supra note 10, at 21–24
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government control over education curricula and personnel
decisions is now restricted by statute.53 Tuition—and indirectly,
student loans—can provide a neutral source of funding for
unbiased research because students are unlikely to have a
personal financial or partisan interest in the outcome of their
professors’ research.
E. Higher Education Funding Options: Student Debt or General
Taxes
To the extent that one accepts the existence of one or more
positive externalities of education, education may be a natural
public good that should be subsidized by government.54
However, a government’s ability to benefit from educating its
citizens may be constrained when government-funded education
provides portable skills and workers can readily seek
employment across political borders.55 A government that
generously funds education with the expectation of higher
future tax revenues may fall prey to another government that
actively seeks educated immigrants and can charge lower taxes
because it does not provide as much public funding for
education.56 Governments can reduce the financial risk of
(discussing attacks on academic freedom in the United States by conservatives
in the 1950s and by the radical left in the 1960s).
53. Limits on U.S. government control over education are codified at 20
U.S.C. § 1232a.
54. Guinier, supra note 4, at 129–30 (“[The] shift in funding priorities
[away from education] was driven in part by an ideological shift during the
Reagan era. Higher education was presented as a private benefit to be financed
by the individual, instead of a public good to be funded by the government.”).
55. See Demange, Fenge & Uebelmesser, supra note 2, at 248 (arguing that
the mobility of students has made educational competition between countries
more intense); Poutvaara, supra note 2, at 663 (stating that the training
government does not fully realize return of educational investment for
emigrants).
56. The United States has been particularly successful at attracting
technically skilled immigrants educated in—and often at the expense of—other
countries, but not particularly successful at providing technical education to its
native population. See Frederic Docquier & Abdeslam Marfouk, International
Migration by Education Attainment, 1990-2000, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION,
REMITTANCES AND THE BRAIN DRAIN 151, 152–53, 187 (Caglar Ozden & Maurice
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emigration by structuring public funding for education as loans
rather than as outright grants.57
Higher education in the United States—a country where
relatively few graduates have internationally transferable
technical skills58 and out migration rates are relatively low59—is
unusual because of heavy reliance on private funding rather
than public funding.60 In much of the rest of the developed
Schiff eds., 2006), http://www.ime.gob.mx/2006/estudios/migracion/inter_
migration_remittances.pdf; infra notes 53, 61–62. The U.S. has also attempted
to poach skilled workers for political rather than purely economic reasons. For
example, the U.S. actively encourages medical doctors from Cuba to defect,
according to some, partly to disrupt Cuban economic and foreign policy. Joel
Millman, New Prize in Cold War: Cuban Doctors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203731004576045640711118766
.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
57. See Poutvarra, supra note 2, at 680–82 (proposing income-contingent
loans as one solution to problems facing European public education).
58. The percentage of U.S. graduates with science, math, computer science,
or engineering degrees is very low compared to the rest of the developed world.
See JEFFREY J. KUENZI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,
ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS (STEM) EDUCATION: BACKGROUND, FEDERAL
POLICY, AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION, at CRS-1 (2008) (“When compared to other
nations, the math and science achievement of U.S. pupils and the rate of STEM
degree attainment appear inconsistent with a nation considered the world
leader in scientific innovation.”); OECD, supra note 2, at 80 (showing that the
United States lags behind other countries in the number of tertiary graduates in
science-related fields). A disproportionately large share of awarded and
commercialized U.S. patents are authored by immigrants who were educated
elsewhere. See Jennifer Hunt & Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle, How Much Does
Immigration Status Boost Innovation? 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14312, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w 14312.pdf (“We
find that a college graduate immigrant contributes at least twice as much to
patenting as his or her native counterpart. The difference is fully explained by
the greater share of immigrants with science and engineering education.”).
59. See Docquier & Marfouk, supra note 56, at 168–72 (estimating that
North America had an emigration rate for skilled labor of only 0.9%, by far the
lowest of any region studied).
60. See OECD, supra note 2, at 165 (“Direct costs for education are
generally borne by the public sector, except in Australia, Japan, Korea, and the
United States, where private direct costs such as tuition fees constitute over
half of the overall direct investment costs.”); id. at 231–34 (showing the United
States as having a much greater reliance on private funding for higher
education than the average country); Demange, Fenge & Uebelmesser, supra
note 2, at 253–54 (stating that unlike in the European Union, private sources of
funding for education are more important than public sources in the United
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world, governments primarily finance higher education through
general tax revenues.61 Students are expected to pay minimal
tuition and fees while they are in school, and as a result, recent
graduates are burdened with minimal debt. Access to university
education may be allocated through competitive examination,62
but inequality in family financial resources generally has a
limited impact on educational attainment.63 Because the
government provides much of the funding for education, the
government can readily prioritize certain fields of inquiry by
devoting more resources to those subject areas, and can try to
match educational offerings to employment opportunities.
By contrast, in the United States, federal government
support to students is generally in the form of loans that must
be repaid with interest,64 and students therefore graduate with
high debt burdens.65 Although some state governments support
States).
61. See Demange, Fenge & Uebelmesser, supra note 2, at 253 (stating that
public funding based on tax revenues is dominant in European Union countries).
62. OECD, supra note 2, at 48 (“[I]n Finnish higher education . . . the
number of entry places is restricted.”); Demange, Fenge & Uebelmesser, supra
note 2, at 264–65 (discussing access restrictions in Germany and France).
63. See OECD, ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS: GOING FOR GROWTH 2010, at 194
[hereinafter OECD, ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS] (“In some countries, there exist
social transfer programmes that are specifically directed to paying part of
[parent costs in poor households of investing in the education of their children].
Such redistributive policies could thus reduce current income inequalities across
parents so that their descendants’ income would converge more quickly.”);
Charlene Marie Kalenkoski & Sabrina Wulff Pabilonia, Parental Transfers,
Student Achievement, and the Labor Supply of College Students, 23 J.
POPULATION ECON. 469, 494–95 (2010) (finding that students who receive less
support from their parents work longer hours while in school, and that longer
work hours reduce these students’ GPAs).
64. As of 2010, federal loans exceed federal grants by a factor of more than
two to one. Earlier in the decade, the proportion of loans was even higher.
COLLEGE BD., TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2011, at 10 tbl.1 (2011),
http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/Student_Aid_2011.pdf.
Total
grants and total loans—not just federal—each account for roughly half of the aid
to undergraduates, but for graduate students, loans exceed grants by a factor of
two to one. Id. at 17, tbls.8A & 8B. Government support has declined as a share
of U.S. educational institutions’ revenue since the early 1980s. Michael S.
McPherson & Morton O. Schapiro, U.S. Higher Education Finance, in
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 1403, 1403–34 (Eric Alan Hanushek &
Finis Welch eds., 2006).
65. See Elizabeth Warren, Sandy Baum & Ganesh Sitaraman, Service
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public universities that offer lower tuition to residents, state
support for higher education has been eroding for decades, and
public universities increasingly resemble private universities in
their dependence on tuition revenues.66 Parental financial
resources are a strong predictor of educational achievement,67
and intergenerational social mobility is low by developed-world
standards.68
Pays: Creating Opportunities by Linking College with Public Service, 1 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 127, 127 (“[S]tudents . . . are leaving college deep in debt.”); id. at
129 (stating that most United States college graduates take on debt to pay for
college); Guinier, supra note 4, at 130 n.67. In 2009–2010, 56% of students who
attended four-year public colleges borrowed money to do so, and they each
borrowed an average of $22,000. Sixty-five percent of students who attended
four-year private colleges borrowed, and they each borrowed an average of
$28,000. The percent who borrowed and the average dollar value of debt
(adjusted for inflation) have both increased over the last decade. COLLEGE BD.,
supra note 64, at 4, 19 figs.10A & 10B.
66. See Guinier, supra note 4, at 129 (“[S]tates shifted resources from
education to the criminal justice system, the federal government cut Pell
Grants, and state revenues plummeted, leading to higher tuition and reduced
financial aid.”); see also COLLEGE BD., supra note 64, at 9 (discussing high and
growing student debt levels at public colleges). The trend away from grants has
changed slightly since 2008—Pell Grants and grants to Military Veterans grew
dramatically, but are still dwarfed by loans. Id. at 10 tbl.1.
European governments have also slightly reduced the proportion of
public support for higher education, but public support still accounts for a much
larger share than in the United States. See Demange, Fenge & Uebelmesser,
supra note 2, at 265–66.
67. See OECD, ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS, supra note 63, at 183
Parental or socio-economic background influences descendants’
educational, earnings and wage outcomes in practically all countries
for which evidence is available. . . . The influence of parental socioeconomic status on students’ achievement in secondary education is
particularly strong in Belgium, France and the United States . . . .
Inequalities in secondary education are likely to translate into
inequalities in tertiary education and subsequent wage inequality.
See also Warren, Baum & Sitaraman, supra note 65, at 127 (“[A]lmost 20% of
low income-high school graduates with high test scores do not manage to enroll
in college at all within two years of graduating high school.”).
68. See OECD, ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS, supra note 63, at 185 fig.5.1,
187 (finding that intergenerational wage mobility as measured by father-son
pairs is lower in the United States than in Denmark, Australia, Norway,
Finland, Canada, Sweden, Germany, Spain, or France; only Italy and the U.K.
had less social mobility than the United States). The OECD notes that genetic
heritability of innate ability should be constant across countries, but wage
mobility seems to be higher in countries with more generous taxpayer funded
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Figure 4: Federal Student Loans Are an Increasingly Important
Source of Education Financing

Full-time, full-year undergraduates receiving federal student loans, 1993-2008
Percent of undergraduates, by type of institution
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40%
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20%
10%
0%

Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics
2011, Table 358; Digest of Education Statistics 2008, Table 340

social welfare and education policies. Id. at 186, 196. The OECD also notes
substantial evidence that early childhood education and care programs improve
labor market outcomes for children from poorer backgrounds. Id. at 193–94. It is
unclear if government funding of higher education has as large an impact on
mobility as funding early childhood education.
Relatively low social mobility in the United States may be surprising to
many; the statistical reality of a stable class structure starkly contrasts with
perceptions of the United States as a dynamic, open, and fluid society. However,
within the OECD, social mobility and equality appear to be complementary—
the least equal societies tend to have the least mobility. Id. at 195 fig.5.10. See
also supra note 46 for different perspectives on the desirability of mobility.
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III. U.S. Federal Student Loan Programs

The overwhelming majority of the U.S. student loan market
consists of federal government loans.69 Prior to the emergence of
federally-backed student loans, student loans were rare and
expensive, and higher education was generally only available to
the children of the wealthy.
Historically, the largest category of government-backed
loans was federal guaranteed loans, which were guaranteed,
subsidized, and regulated by the government, but originated and
owned by private financial institutions or sold to private
investors through securitization.70
However, Congress eliminated guaranteed loans in 2010
and shifted all lending to the government’s direct loan
program.71 Guaranteed loans were eliminated because of a widespread

69. As of 2011, 90% of new student loans were federal government loans.
Government loans have been a majority of the market for many years, but
increased dramatically after 2008 as private lending collapsed. Jonathan Riber
& Maxim Berger, U.S. Private Student Loan Landscape, 7 U.S. STRUCTURED FIN.
NEWSL. (DBRS, Toronto, Ont.), Oct. 5, 2011.
70. Technically, the loans were guaranteed by a guarantee agency and
reinsured by the Department of Education. CLAIRE J. MEZZONOTTE ET. AL., FITCH
RESEARCH, STUDENT LOAN FINANCE 101, at 1 (1997). Most securitized private loans
were federally guaranteed loans. See Kevin Drawbaugh, Securitizing Student
Loan Debt, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2007), available at http://www.reuters.
com/article/2007/08/28/idUSN2723050420070828 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Claire J. Mezzonotte et. al., Student
Loan ABS, 6 DBRS STRUCTURED FIN. NEWSL., Feb. 22, 2010. According to the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), there were over
$230 billion in student loan asset backed securitizations (SLABS) as of the end of
2011. New SLABS issuances peaked at $67 billion in 2006, plummeted during the
U.S. financial crisis in 2008 to $28 billion, and continued to fall thereafter. SLABS
issuance dropped below $14 billion in 2011. SIFMA, U.S. ABS Issuance and
Outstanding, available at http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/
StatisticsFiles/SF-US-ABS-SIFMA.xls (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
For an explanation of the process of securitization, its benefits, and its risks,
see Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND.
L. REV. 213 (2013) or Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of
2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253 (2009).
71. Jean Braucher, Mortgaging Human Capital: Federally Funded
Subprime Higher Education, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 462 n.111 (2011);
Glater, supra note 35, at 57.
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perception that the guarantees and subsidies—which reduced the
riskiness of the loans to only slightly higher than U.S. government
Treasuries, but enabled private lenders to profit by charging far
higher interest rates—represented a subsidy to private financial
institutions and their investors rather than a benefit to students or
taxpayers.72
Federal direct government loans are administered by the U.S.
Department of Education. The government retains ownership of
these direct loans, and can therefore profit when the interest rate
spread above Treasuries exceeds losses from defaults and
administrative costs. Federal student loans are generally less
expensive than private loans, but the federal direct loan program
is still a moneymaker for the federal government.73
A. Student Eligibility Criteria Are Generally Not Risk-Based
The borrower eligibility criteria for federal student loans are
fairly minimal, and generally not risk-based. A student must be
72. See Glater, supra note 35, at 39–40 (discussing the preferences of
Senator Edward Kennedy and President Bill Clinton for direct lending on
grounds of cost effectiveness and aggressive lobbying by private lenders against
direct lending); id. at 57 n.224 (discussing costs savings from ending the
guaranteed loan program); see also Deborah J. Lucas & Damian Moore,
Guaranteed versus Direct Lending: The Case of Student Loans, in MEASURING
AND MANAGING FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISK 163, 164 (Deborah J. Lucas ed., 2010)
[T]he guaranteed program appears to be fundamentally more
expensive than the direct program. . . . [G]uaranteed lenders are paid
more than is required to induce them to lend at statutory terms. . . .
To the extent that the market is not perfectly competitive,
guaranteed lenders presumably are able to retain some of the
surplus.
73. See DEBORAH KALCEVIC & JUSTIN HUMPHREY, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
CBO MARCH 2012 BASELINE PROJECTIONS FOR THE STUDENT LOAN AND PELL
GRANT PROGRAMS, tbls.2 & 3 (Mar. 13, 2012) (projecting a negative subsidy, i.e.,
profit, for federal student loans originated in 2013 of around 32% of lending
volume, or $36.5 billion in profit). After subtracting $1.6 billion in
administrative costs (equal to 1.4% of lending volume), projected 2013 profits
are $34.9 billion. Id. at tbl.4. The student loan program remains profitable in
every year projected, although profits decline to around $10 billion in later
years. See also DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 2013
BUDGET REQUEST, at R-11 to R-12 (providing similar profit estimates for 2012
and noting that the federal student loan program was profitable in 2009–2012).
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enrolled in a program at an accredited higher educational
institution “leading to a recognized educational credential” such
as a degree or certificate,74 must maintain “academic standing
consistent with the requirements of graduation”75 unless there
are “special circumstances,”76 must not currently be in default on
a federal student loan,77 must be a U.S. citizen or on the path
toward citizenship,78 and if previously convicted of defrauding the
federal student loan program, must have made restitution.79
Eligibility can be suspended or terminated for drug offenses.80
The use of more restrictive eligibility criteria than those provided
for by statute is generally prohibited.81
B. Only Exceptionally Poorly Performing Institutions Are
Excluded
Similarly, the eligibility criteria for educational institutions
are fairly minimal, with the Department of Education relying
heavily on state accreditation agencies.82 Two sets of regulations
have been established over the past two and a half decades to cull
some of the worst performing institutions from student loan
eligibility, but regulations do not seek to make fine performancebased distinctions among eligible institutions.
First, in response to high student loan default rates at some
“proprietary” or “for-profit” educational institutions in the 1980s,
Congress passed the Student Loan Default Prevention Initiative
Act of 1990 (SLDPA).83 Under the SLDPA, institutions lost their

74. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(1) (2012); id. § 1094.
75. Id. § 1091(c)(1)(B).
76. Id. § 1091(c)(3)(C).
77. Id. § 1091(a)(3).
78. Id. § 1091(a)(5).
79. Id. § 1091(a)(6).
80. Id. § 1091(r).
81. Id. § 1077A(e); id. § 1077A(f).
82. Braucher, supra note 71, at 446, n.19.
83. Student Loan Default Prevention Initiative Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1001).
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eligibility for student loans if their cohort default rate (CDR)84
exceeded twenty-five percent for three years in a row.85
The CDR measure helped eliminate some small and poorly
performing
institutions,
but
sophisticated
educational
institutions increasingly manipulated the CDR statistic by
moving recent students into deferment86 or forbearance87 so that
they would not count as defaulters.88 CDR had a positive but
limited effect.89
Recently, largely in response to another wave of high defaults
at some proprietary educational institutions, the Department of
Education established a Gainful Employment Rule (GER) that
again attempts to cull the worst performing institutions.90 GER
may be more difficult to manipulate than the older CDR measure

84. The CDR was the percent of students entering repayment in a given
year who defaulted during the subsequent year, and CDR was therefore roughly
a one-year default rate because students typically entered repayment in October
or November. In 2008, the CDR measure was extended by one year (so that it
captures students who enter repayment in one year and default by the end of
the subsequent two years), and the maximum CDR was increased to 30%.
Braucher, supra note 71, at 464–65 & n.121.
85. Id. at 464.
86. Deferment refers to a postponement of payment on a loan that is
allowed under certain conditions and during which interest does not accrue for
subsidized loans. Deferment is available for student borrowers who are enrolled
at least half time in an eligible postsecondary school or studying full time in a
graduate fellowship program or an approved disability rehabilitation program.
It is also available for up to three years of unemployment and economic
hardship, or for active duty military service. Direct Loans, Deferment and
Forbearance, DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.direct.ed.gov/postpone.html (last
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. Forbearance refers to a postponement of payment on a loan, typically if
the borrower does not qualify for a deferment and is unable to make payments
for a reason such as poor health. Interest continues to accrue during
forbearance. Id.
88. Braucher, supra note 71, at 465 n.127.
89. Id. at 464–65 (finding that CDR regulation helped shut down some, but
not all of the worst performers).
90. The Department of Education published its final Gainful Employment
Rule on June 13, 2011. The Rule was scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 2012,
and the earliest any educational institution might lose eligibility under the GER
Rule is 2015. Id. at 466.
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because GER measures performance based on repayment rates
rather than default rates.91
GER uses two tests—one that looks at whether former
students are in fact repaying their loans92 and another that looks
at debt-service-to-income ratios to determine whether graduates
have sufficient income to enable them to have a reasonable
chance of repaying their loans.93 An educational institution may
remain eligible for student loans if it passes either test in at least
two out of four consecutive years.
C. Borrowing Limits Depend on Grade Level and Dependent
Status
Federal student loan borrowing limits are set by statute.94
The loan limits are determined by the students’ grade level and,
for undergraduates, students’ status as dependents. Annual
Stafford Loan limits increase as undergraduates progress from
year one to year three, and are higher for students who are
“independent.”95 Stafford and Perkins Loan limits are higher for
graduate students than for undergraduates.96
The federal loan limits are less than the total cost of
attendance at most private colleges and many flagship public
91. Id. at 467–69.
92. A program can remain eligible if at least 35% of students are repaying
at least some portion of the principal on their federal loans. Id. at 467–68.
93. A program can remain eligible if either the mean or the median annual
student loan payment of graduates of their program is either 12% or less of
annual earnings or 30% or less of discretionary income. Id. at 468.
94. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(b)(1)(A)&(B) (2006) (setting forth loan limits for
Subsidized Stafford Loans); id. § 1078–8(d) (setting forth loan limits for
Unsubsidized Stafford Loans); id. § 1087dd(a)(2) (setting forth loan limits for
Perkins Loans); id. § 1087E(a)(1) (noting that limits on direct loans are the
same as limits on guaranteed loans).
95. Undergraduate students are “independent” if they meet any of the
following criteria: the student is at least age twenty-four, is married, is a
veteran or on active duty in the military, is an orphan or a ward of the state, or
has legal dependents other than a spouse. Direct Loans, Glossary, DEP’T OF
EDUC., http://www.direct.ed.gov/glos.html#anchor388090 (last visited Feb. 3,
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
96. See sources cited supra note 94.
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colleges, and students with financial need may therefore turn to
private loans to help make up the difference.97 Graduate students
and the parents of dependent undergraduate students with good
credit histories also have access to PLUS Loans, under which
borrowing is limited by the students’ financial need rather than a
fixed dollar amount.98
The federal student loan limits could at best be described as
crudely risk-based: as students exceed loan limits for less
expensive lending programs, such as subsidized Stafford Loans
and Perkins Loans, they will move on to more expensive
programs such as PLUS Loans and their borrowing costs will
increase. Students may also turn to higher cost private student
loans or credit card debt when federal student loans are
inadequate to finance their education.99
A fully risk-based approach to loan limits would focus on
expected debt-service-payment-to-income ratios. The relevant
question is not simply how much students borrow each year.
Instead, the relevant question is whether students’ incomes at
graduation and beyond will be sufficient to repay their debts over
the next ten to thirty years.
D. Federal Student Loan Pricing is Statutory, Not Risk-Based
In theory, rather than cut off access to credit entirely to poor
performing institutions and ignore risk differences above a
minimal threshold, the Department of Education could embrace a
more nuanced approach by incorporating risk levels into loan
pricing. However, in practice, federal student loan pricing is
largely uniform and not risk-based.
Interest rates on government loans are set by statute at the
same level for all eligible borrowers under a particular loan
program. Federal student loan rates are currently set at a fixed
rate between 3.4% and 7.9%, with lower rates available to
97. Glater, supra note 35, at 42–43.
98. 20 U.S.C. § 1078-2(a)(1) (discussing eligibility for PLUS Loans); id.
§ 1078-2(b) (limiting PLUS Loan borrowing to a student’s estimated cost of
attendance, minus other financial aid).
99. See generally Glater, supra note 35, at 42–46.
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undergraduates than to graduate students.100 The rates have
changed over time, but have historically been either a fixed
interest rate, or a capped variable rate determined by adding a
spread to a variable Treasury bill rate.101
The interest rates are not risk-based. A successful medical
student with virtually no risk of becoming unemployed or
defaulting on her debts would pay the graduate student rate—
between 6.8% and 7.9%—while a struggling art history major
with rather less secure employment prospects would pay the
undergraduate rate of 3.4%.

100. The interest rate for new loans made under the William D. Ford
Federal Direct Loan Program (DLP), made on or after July 1, 2006, is a fixed
rate, generally either 6.8% or 7.9%, depending on the loan program. 6.8% is the
rate for Federal Direct Stafford Loans and Federal Direct Unsubsidized Stafford
Loans; 7.9% is the rate for PLUS Loans. 20 U.S.C. § 1087E(b)(7) (2006).
Between July 1, 2008, and July 1, 2013, a lower interest rate was available for
undergraduate student borrowers under DLP Loans—this rate was 3.4% for
undergraduate DLP Loans originating between July 1, 2011, and July 1, 2013.
Id. § 1087E(b)(7)(D). The interest rate for Perkins Loans made after October 1,
1981, is 5%. Id. § 1087dd(c)(1)(D).
101. For example, the interest rate for Stafford Loans dispersed between
October 1, 1998, and July 1, 2006, was 2.3% plus a 91-day Treasury bill rate,
capped at a maximum rate of 8.25%. Id. § 1087E(b)(6).
The interest rate for federal Perkins Loans is established by 20 U.S.C.
§ 1087DD(c)(1)(D). The interest rates for DLP Loans are established by 20
U.S.C. § 1087E(b)(7). Maximum interest rates for federal guaranteed loans
made under the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP), including
PLUS Loans, were established under 20 U.S.C. § 1077A (“applicable interest
rates”). Lenders were permitted to charge less than the maximum, but rarely
did so. Glater, supra note 35, at 40 & n.139.
When student loan rates were variable, the most commonly used reference
rate was the 91-day (3-month) Treasury bill rate, although the 52-week (1 year)
Treasury bill rate was also used. The interest rate the borrower actually paid
might have in some instances been lower because of interest subsidies described
in 20 U.S.C. § 1078. Students can convert their variable-rate loans into fixedrate loans through consolidation.
The same terms and conditions generally apply to loans made under the
FFELP and DLP. 20 U.S.C. § 1087E(a)(1).
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IV. Higher Education and Labor Market Coordination Problems
Resources are increasingly allocated to U.S. educational
institutions through a market-based process.102 Students with
admissions offers from multiple schools resemble customers who
pay for the education they receive and can choose from several
different options. Educational institutions, like suppliers in any
competitive market, offer discounts to preferred customers.103
Students with financial resources or access to credit decide where
they will study, and what they will study. This market-based
approach is consistent with values that emphasize autonomy for
individual students and political independence for academic
institutions.
However, this freedom may come at a steep price to
employers, lenders, and ultimately to the students themselves. As
discussed above, government support for mass higher education
has always been intended to supply skilled labor, boost economic
growth, and encourage social mobility through increased wages
and employment.104 However, skewed incentives and information
asymmetries have increasingly shifted educational resources
away from human capital investment and toward present
consumption.
A. Students as Customers Create Pressure to Reduce Academic
Standards
The student-as-customer approach creates pressures toward
grade inflation and lower educational standards.105 Because
102. See David D. Dill, Allowing the Market to Rule: The Case of the United
States, 57 HIGHER ED. Q. 136 (2003) (noting the United States’ distinctly
market-based approach to higher education, and expressing concerns that the
United States’ market-based approach may lead to inefficiency because of
information asymmetries and reliance on reputation as a gauge of quality).
103. Warren, Baum & Sitaraman, supra note 65, at 128 (“Over the past
decade, the federal government, state governments, and colleges and
universities have all directed increasing portions of their funds toward highachieving middle- and upper-income students in order to influence their choices
about where to go to college.”).
104. See generally supra Part II.
105. See infra notes 107–10. The same dynamic observed in U.S. higher
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universities depend on enrollments for revenue, and students
decide where to enroll, administrators and faculty have strong
incentives to ensure that students enjoy their time at the
university. Universities can and do cater to students’ appetites by
offering amenities such as luxury dorms and athletic facilities—
amenities many students appear to value more than good
instruction.106 Emphasis on keeping the student-customer happy
also extends into the classroom.
One of the ways that universities can encourage faculty to
focus on student enjoyment is by linking departmental funding
and professors’ promotion to student enrollment numbers and
course evaluations.107 Professors can increase enrollments and
education—competition for enrollments contributing to grade inflation and
reduced standards—has been observed in Sweden at the secondary-school
level after the introduction of school choice. See Jonas Vlachos, Firskolor i
förändring, 66, in Laura Hartman, SNS FÖRLAG, Konkurrensens Konsekvenser:
Vad Händer Med Svensk Välfärd? (2011); Richard Orange, Doubts Grow Over
the Success of Sweden’s Free Schools Experiment, GUARDIAN (UK), Sept. 10,
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/10/sweden-free-schools-experi
ment?INT CMP=SRCH (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); cf. Gabriel H. Sahlgren, Opponents of School Choice Are
Misinterpreting the Data, INST. OF ECON. AFFAIRS (June 20, 2012),
http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/opponents-of-school-choice-are-misinterpreting-the-d
ata (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
106. See BRIAN JACOB, BRIAN MCCALL, & KEVIN STANGE, THE CONSUMPTION
VALUE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION 33 (2011), http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/www/external/labor/seminars/adp/pdfs/2011/stange.pdf (presenting
evidence from student enrollment decisions of the high school classes of 1992
and 2004 that most students are more willing to pay for spending on
amenities like student activities, sports, and dormitories than on college
instruction, but noting that high-achieving students tended to focus more on
academic quality).
107. David Dill, Will Market Competition Assure Academic Quality? An
Analysis of the UK and US Experience, 20 HIGHER EDUC. DYNAMICS 47, 66–67
(2007)
[T]he effects of market competition on academic behavior
compromise the capacity of universities to maintain and improve
academic standards. . . . Many universities have responded to the
more competitive market by linking academic promotion to student
evaluations of teachers and tying departmental budget allocations
to student enrolments [sic]. [This] provides the opportunity for
instructors to increase the demand for their individual courses and
programmes by inflating grades and/or lowering academic
standards rather than by actually improving student learning.
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boost course evaluations by assigning better grades for less work.
Students actively shop for classes with professors who give
generous grades.108 Students also give better course evaluations
to professors who grade more generously and who flatter
students—and worse evaluations to professors who demand more
work and more substantive learning.109
Presumably, many professors respond to such incentives by
reducing the rigor of their classes and inflating grades.110 The
result is that student-customers study less, learn less,111 and are
more satisfied with the experience—at least until it is time to
108. Talia Bar, Vrinda Kadiyali & Asaf Zussman, Grade Information and
Grade Inflation: The Cornell Experiment, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 101–02 (2009)
(presenting evidence “that the provision of [average] grade [and grade
distribution] information [to Cornell students] led to increased enrollment into
leniently graded courses” and that students of high ability were less likely than
students of lower ability to pursue courses with more lenient grading).
109. See Scott E. Carrell & James E. West, Does Professor Quality Matter?
Evidence from Random Assignment of Students to Professors, 118 J. POL. ECON.
409, 412, 430 (2010); Clifford H. Edwards, Grade Inflation: The Effects on
Educational Quality and Personal Well Being, 120 EDUC. 538 (2000).
110. See Donald L. Crumbley et al., What Is Ethical About Grade Inflation
and Coursework Deflation?, 8 J. ACAD. ETHICS 187, 187 (2010) (arguing that
course evaluations have “caused grade inflation, coursework deflation, and a
reduction in student learning as a result of unethical behavior of professors and
administrators”); Kiridaran Kanagaretnam et al., An Economic Analysis of the
Use of Student Evaluations: Implications for Universities, 24 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 1, 1–13 (2003) (stating that excessive weight on student
evaluations can have negative consequences); David A. Love & Matthew J.
Kotchen, Grades, Course Evaluations, and Academic Incentives, 36 E. ECON. J.
151, 151 (2010) (modeling professor behavior and suggesting that increased
emphasis on course evaluations can lead to grade inflation); Charles E. Snare,
Implications of Considering Students as Consumers, 45 C. TEACHING 122, 122
(1997) (stating that the student-as-customer approach leads to grade inflation,
reduced rigor, and less substantive learning); James J. Wallace & Wanda A.
Wallace, Why the Costs of Student Evaluations Have Long Since Exceeded Their
Value, 13 ISSUES IN ACCT. EDUC. 443, 445 (1998) (same); see also Brenda S.
Sonner, A is for “Adjunct”: Examining Grade Inflation in Higher Education, 76
J. EDUC. BUS. 5, 7 (2000) (presenting evidence that adjunct instructors give
higher grades than full-time faculty and suggesting that this may be because
adjuncts face greater pressure to obtain high course evaluations so that their
teaching contract will be renewed).
111. See generally Philip Babcock, Real Costs of Nominal Grade Inflation?
New Evidence from Student Course Evaluations, 48 ECON. INQUIRY 983 (2010)
(providing evidence that higher nominal grades (i.e., grade inflation) can
dramatically reduce student effort and study time).
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enter the labor market. Potential employers may not be so
satisfied with the quality of the education job applicants have
received, and recent graduates may not be very satisfied with the
employment opportunities that are available to them.112
B. Educational Institutions May Have Incentives to Funnel
Students into Areas That Do Not Maximize Students’
Future Incomes or Employment Prospects
Some college majors are more challenging than others. Grade
inflation is generally more prevalent in humanities and social
sciences and less prevalent in science, technology, engineering,
and mathematical subject areas (STEM).113 STEM majors spend
112. BYRON AUGUSTE ET AL ., MCKINSEY GLOBAL I NST ., AN ECONOMY THAT
W ORKS: J OB CREATION AND AMERICA’S FUTURE 57 (2011) (“[E]mployers still
have trouble finding workers with specific skills. And many students lack a
clear picture of which jobs and skills will be in high demand.”); ERIN SPARKS
& MARY J O W AITS , NAT ’L GOVERNORS ASS ’N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES ,
DEGREES FOR W HAT J OBS ? RAISING EXPECTATIONS FOR UNIVERSITIES AND
COLLEGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 8 (2011)
Currently, businesses and states are not getting the talent they
want—and students and job seekers are not getting the jobs they
want. There are problems with quality. For instance, employers
responding to a recent survey estimated that 40 percent of college
graduates available to them do not have the necessary applied
skills required to meet their needs.
113. See VALEN E. J OHNSON, GRADE I NFLATION: A CRISIS IN COLLEGE
EDUCATION (2003) (reporting the most generous grading at Duke University
in the humanities, intermediate grading in the social sciences, and the most
stringent grading in sciences and engineering); Alexandra C. Achen & Paul
N. Courant, What Are Grades Made Of?, 23 J. ECON. PERSP . 77, 81–82, 90
(presenting evidence that science and math classes at the University of
Michigan generally offer lower average grades than social science and
humanities classes, particularly for introductory level, required classes);
Patrick D. Larkey, Comment: An Alternative to Traditional GPA for
Evaluating Student Performance, 12 STAT. SCI. 269, 270 (1997) (“The few
studies that have been done all indicate that there has been relatively more
grade inflation in ‘softer’ subjects.”); Kevin Rask, Attrition in STEM Fields
at a Liberal Arts College: The Importance of Grades and Pre-collegiate
Preferences, 29 ECON. EDUC. REV. 892, 894 (2010) (“Grades given in the
sciences are often among the lowest.”); Richard Sabot & John WakemanLinn, Grade Inflation and Course Choice, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 161–63
(1991) (presenting data from Williams College showing that humanities
departments generally give the highest grades while science, math, and
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more hours studying and have fewer hours for paid work or
leisure,114 and often take longer to complete their degrees.115 Yet
STEM majors receive lower grades. A large proportion of
incoming students report that they intend to study a STEM field.
But before graduation, many students switch from STEM to the
humanities or social sciences.116 Students switch even though
their future employment prospects and wages might be higher if
they majored in certain select STEM fields.117 This flight from
economics departments generally give lower grades); see also, e.g.,
ARCIDIACONO ET AL., supra note 17, at 19 (presenting additional evidence
from Duke University that grades are higher in the humanities and social
sciences than in natural sciences, engineering, and economics).
114. See NATIONAL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, ANNUAL RESULTS 15
(2011) (reporting that engineering and science majors study more hours per
week than humanities, education, or business majors, and that business, social
science, and humanities majors spend more hours per week working).
115. See Sylvia Hurtado et al., Degrees of Success Bachelor’s Degree
Completion Rates Among Initial STEM Majors, HIGHER ED. RES. INST. RES.
BRIEF, Jan. 2010, at 3 fig.3, http://www.heri.ucla.edu/nih/ downloads/2010%20%20Hurtado,%20Eagan,%20Chang%20-%20Degrees%20of%20Success.pdf
(“[S]tudents who initially enter undergraduate STEM programs have
substantially lower degree completion rates than their same-race peers who
enter other academic disciplines.”).
116. See Paul M. Romer, Should the Government Subsidize Supply or
Demand in the Market for Scientists and Engineers?, in INNOVATION POLICY AND
THE ECONOMY 221, 237 (Adam B. Jaffee et al., eds., 2001); Ben Ost, The Role of
Peers and Grades in Determining Major Persistence in the Sciences, 29 ECON.
EDUC. REV. 923, 923–34 (2010); Rask, supra note 113, at 892–900.
117. See Mark C. Berger, Cohort Size Effects on Earnings: Differences by
College Major, 7 ECON. EDUC. REV. 375, 381 (1988) (reporting that wages for
science and liberal arts majors are depressed more by an increase in the size of
their college cohort than are wages for engineering or business majors); Mark C.
Berger, Predicted Future Earnings and Choice of College Major, 41. INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 418, 426 (1988) (reporting relatively high earnings for U.S.
business and engineering graduates and relatively low earnings for liberal arts
and education graduates); Black et al., supra note 18, at 365 (finding that
engineers earn more than economics majors, who earn more than most other
social science, business, and humanities majors, and that MBAs with chemical
engineering undergraduate majors earn more than other MBAs and that “the
measured differentials reflect in part real differences in the market returns to
different fields of study”); Charlotte Christiansen et al., The Risk Return Tradeoff in Human Capital Investment, 14 LABOUR ECON. 971, 984–85 (2007)
(reporting relatively high risk-adjusted returns for engineering and health
sciences degrees and relatively low risk-adjusted returns for humanities and
education degrees for a sample of Danish graduates); Scott L. Thomas, Deferred
Costs and Economic Returns to College Major, Quality, and Performance, 41
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STEM is likely due at least in part to university-created grading
incentives.118
RES. HIGHER EDUC. 281, 301–02, 304–06 (2000) (reporting relatively low debt-toincome ratios for recent U.S. college graduates who majored in engineering,
health science, or business and relatively high debt-to-income ratios for
graduates who majored in education, humanities, or social sciences, primarily
because of much higher incomes for majors in engineering, business, or science);
infra note 162 (discussing substantial financial sacrifices by humanities and
education students); cf. Morton Paglin & Anthony M. Rufolo, Heterogeneous
Human Capital, Occupational Choice, and Male-Female Earnings Differences, 8
J. LAB. & ECON. 123, 140–41 (1990) (arguing that wage differences across majors
are due in part to innate differences in mathematical ability and self-sorting by
students).
However, not all STEM graduates fare well. There is evidence of an
“oversupply” of science Ph.Ds seeking professorships within universities, and
declining pay and working conditions for Ph.Ds in many fields. See B. Lindsay
Lowell & Hal Salzman, Into the Eye of the Storm: Assessing the Evidence on
Science and Engineering Education, Quality and Workforce Demand 2 (2007),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411562_salzman_Science.pdf
(presenting
evidence that there are three times as many U.S. science and engineering
graduates as available job openings in these fields); B. Lindsay Lowell et al.,
Paper Presented at the Annual Meetings of the Association for Public Policy:
Steady as She Goes? Three Generations of Students through the Science and
Engineering Pipeline 31–32 (Nov. 7, 2009) (presenting evidence that starting in
the early 1990s, top performing students increasingly opted out of science and
engineering employment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Beryl Lieff Benderly, The Real Science Gap, MILLER-MCCUNE, July/Aug. 2010,
at 30, 33 (“[B]ecoming a scientist now entails a penurious decade or more of
graduate school and postdoc positions before joining the multitude vainly vying
for the few available faculty-level openings.”); Romer, supra note 116, at 241
(arguing that there is a glut of scientists within universities but a shortage of
scientists who can work in industry).
118. See Valen E. Johnson, An Alternative to Traditional GPA for
Evaluating Student Performance, 12 STAT. SCI. 251, 251 (1997) (“[D]ifferences in
grade distributions result in a substantial reduction in the number of courses
taken by students in subjects like mathematics and the natural sciences, as well
as other challenging upper-level undergraduate courses.”); Sabot & WakemanLinn, supra note 113 (providing evidence that students respond to grades as
incentives and choose to study humanities rather than science and math, even
though there is likely to be greater employment opportunity in STEM fields,
because universities offer higher average grades and a narrower grading
distribution in humanities classes); Larkey, supra note 113, at 270
[T]here has been relatively more grade inflation in “softer” subjects.
Grade inflation has become an important edge for some fields in
competing for students as core curricula have waned and student
choices have waxed. It is a perverse form of price competition; they
have been able to offer higher grades for equivalent or lesser amounts
of work.
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Figure 5.1: Compared to Other High-Income Countries, the U.S.
Produces Relatively Few STEM Degrees
STEM college degrees as percent of total by country, 2008
Percent of total college graduates

Korea

33%

Luxembourg

33%
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27%

Finland

27%

Japan

24%

Sweden

24%

Switzerland

23%

United Kingdom

23%

Italy

22%

Canada

22%

Ireland

22%

Belgium

20%

New Zealand

20%

Denmark

19%

Australia

19%

Norway
United States

15%
15%

Netherlands

14%

Iceland

14%

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Graduates by Field of Education.

See also Ost, supra note 116, at 923–34 (presenting evidence that science majors
are pushed away by low grades in their major and pulled away by higher grades
in classes in other fields); Rask, supra note 113, at 892–900 (estimating that
roughly 2% to 4% more students would complete STEM education if the grading
distribution in STEM fields and liberal arts were equal).
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Figure 5.2: Students Who Take Courses in High Value Fields
Receive Lower Grades, Especially in the Early Years of College
When They Select a Major, Even Though . . .

Grades by course type and school year for a sample of Duke undergraduates
Noncumulative within-year grade point average
Humanities / Social Sciences (excluding economics)
4.0

Natural Science / Engineering / Economics

3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Freshman

Sophomore

Junior

Senior

Source: Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban M. Aucejo, & Ken Spenner, What Happens
After Enrollment? An Analysis of the Time Path of Racial Differences in GPA
and Major Choice (2011) Table 10.
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Figure 5.3: Students in High Value Fields (Other Than Business)
have slightly higher ability levels and …

SAT scores by pre-college intended major and completed major for a sample
of Duke undergraduates
Mean SAT points
Humanities / Social Sciences (excluding economics) degree completers
Natural Science / Engineering / Economics degree completers

1600
1400

1379

1434

1362

1406

1389

1434

1200
1000
800
600
400
Students who persist Studens who switch
in their intended major
majors

Students who did not
have an intended
major

Source: Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban M. Aucejo, & Ken Spenner, What Happens
After Enrollment? An Analysis of the Time Path of Racial Differences in GPA
and Major Choice (2011) Table 11.
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Figure 5.4: Students in High Value Fields (Other Than Business)
Spend More Time Studying
Hours per week spent preparing for class by full time college seniors, by major
Hours per week preparing for class
19

Engineering
18

Physical sciences
Biological sciences

17

Arts & humanities

17

Education

15
14

Social sciences

14

Business

Source: Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research, National
Survey of Student Engagement 15 (2011) Figure 7.

Percent of full time seniors who spend more than 20 hours per week preparing
for class, by major
42%

Engineering
36%

Physical sciences
Biological sciences

34%
31%

Arts & humanities
26%

Education
Social sciences
Business

23%
19%

Source: Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research, National
Survey of Student Engagement 15 (2011) Figure 8.
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Figure 5.5: Students Who Initially Intend to Major in High Value
STEM Fields Switch to Less Demanding Fields Prior to
Graduation
Percent of bachelors degrees conferred each year versus percent of college-bound
students who intended to major in field four years ealier
-14%-12%-10% -8% -6% -4% -2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8%

BUSINESS

ENGLISH

BIOLOGY
2010
2008
COMPUTER SCIENCE

2006
2005

ENGINEERING

HEALTHCARE

Source: College Board; National Center For Education Statistics.

Why might universities wish to use high grades and low
workloads to channel students away from fields that are in
demand in the labor market? In some cases, it may not be a
university policy so much as a series of decisions by individual
departments or professors.
One less than completely satisfying explanation is that
professors who teach “softer,” more subjective material find it
more difficult to distinguish between students of high and low
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ability.119 A higher cost to professors of sorting students by ability
would explain a narrower grading distribution, but not
necessarily higher average grades or lower workloads. Some
STEM professors might wish to “weed out” weaker students
because of concern about the harm such students might cause if
they graduate with satisfactory grades and then err on the job—
imagine a poorly designed bridge—whereas liberal arts professors
may be less concerned about the quality of graduates engaged in
nonlethal endeavors. Of course, low grades, large class sizes, and
limited academic support may deter even some high-ability
students from pursuing STEM educations, and many STEM
careers involve little risk to public safety.
Another possibility is that humanities and social sciences
professors feel compelled to compete for student enrollments by
offering better grades for less work, because they cannot compete
by offering equally attractive post-graduation employment
opportunities.120 STEM professors may feel less pressure than
humanities professors to compete for student enrollments
because STEM professors can generate revenue for the university
by bringing in research grants or developing commercially useful
patents.121
But why do universities tolerate such interdepartmental
grade-based competition for enrollments? Universities could
standardize grading by creating a mandatory grading curve
across disciplines or requiring professors to rank students on a

119. See Achen & Courant, supra note 113, at 78 (“[D]epartments that
evaluate student performance using interpretive methods will tend to have
higher grades, because using these methods increases the personal cost to
instructors of assigning and defending low grades.”); id. at 87–88; Larkey, supra
note 113, at 270 (“[T]here is apparently more resistance to [grade] inflation in
domains with more sharply and logically defined right and wrong answers.”).
120. See Achen &. Courant, supra note 113, at 78 (“Grades can be used in
conjunction with other tools to attract students to departments that have low
enrollments and to deter students from courses of study that are congested.”);
Larkey, supra note 113, at 270.
121. BOK, supra note 10, at 74 (“[T]eaching loads . . . have dropped
furthest . . . in scientific disciplines, such as mathematics and experimental
physics, where the interests of undergraduates have steadily given way to the
demands of pure research.”); id. at 140–42 (discussing efforts to commercialize
university-developed technologies).

RISK-BASED STUDENT LOANS

579

percentile scale.122 Universities could make grading even more
meaningful by using rankings adjusted for the difficulty of the
course and the level of competing students. Indeed, one such
proposal—complete with a workable methodology—was put forth
by a professor of statistics at Duke University, considered, and
ultimately rejected by his university.123
One possibility is internal university politics and
interdepartmental rivalries.124 Another possibility is that such
changes are simply not in the overall interests of universities.125
122. Larkey, supra note 113, at 270 (“There are many possible measures of
aggregate performance for comparing students that are superior to GPA. They
are superior in that they better represent comparative performance and remove
incentives for students to choose courses and instructors based on their relative
difficulty.”).
Similarly, universities could reduce the number of credits granted for each
hour of instruction in humanities or social sciences, compared to each hour of
instruction in STEM subjects, because the STEM subjects require more out-ofclass work for each hour of instruction.
123. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 266–68 (explaining the benefits of
using academic indexing for grade calculation instead of the traditional GPA
approach); Charlie Mehl, Book: Grade Inflation Exists at Duke, CHRON. (Duke
Univ.), Apr. 4, 2003, http://www.dukechronicle.com/article/book-grade-inflationexists-duke (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (reporting that Valen E. Johnson’s
academic indexing proposal was rejected by the Duke Arts and Sciences Council
in 1997) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
124. See Jessica Lichter, No Easy Solution for Grade Inflation Exists, Some
Say, CHRON. (Duke Univ.), Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.dukechronicle.
com/article/no-easy-solution-grade-inflation-exists-some-say (last visited Feb. 3,
2013) (noting that the Duke academic departments that voted against Valen E.
Johnson’s grade indexing proposal all gave higher than average grades, while
the departments that voted in favor almost all gave lower than average grades)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
125. See Romer, supra note 116, at 237
A liberal arts university that has a fixed investment in faculty who
teach in areas outside of the sciences and that faces internal political
pressures to maintain the relative sizes of different departments may
respond to this pressure by making it more difficult for students to
complete a degree in science. Faculty in the departments that teach
the basic science courses will be happy to “keep professional
standards high” and thereby keep teaching loads down. Faculty in
other departments will be happy to make study in their departments
more attractive, for example by inflating the average grade given in
their courses.
Donald G. Freeman, Grade Divergence as a Market Outcome, 30 J. ECON. EDUC.
344, 344 (1999) (arguing that universities adjust their grading distributions to
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Instruction in any area with attractive career opportunities
outside academia—whether in medicine, law, business, or certain
STEM fields—will be relatively expensive. Those with talent in
such fields have attractive employment opportunities in the
private sector or government, and those who agree to forgo those
opportunities to teach at universities must therefore be offered
higher wages than other professors.126
Undergraduate students usually pay the same tuition price
per credit regardless of what they study,127 so students who are
willing to study subjects with limited value in the labor market
channel students away from classes that are overcrowded relative to supply of
qualified instructors and toward courses in which teaching capacity is
underutilized).
126. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN, THE MARKET FOR COLLEGE-TRAINED
MANPOWER: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF CAREER CHOICE 165–67 (1971)
(documenting shortages of faculty in high-demand fields in the United States in
the 1960s when academic norms called for roughly equal pay across disciplines);
GARY RHODES, MANAGED PROFESSIONALS: UNIONIZED FACULTY AND
RESTRUCTURING ACADEMIC LABOR 75 (1998) (“The pattern of salary dispersion by
field suggests that academic managers have been willing and able to respond to
field-defined labor markets.”); Ronald Ehrenberg, Hirschel Kasper & Daniel
Rees, Faculty Turnover at American Colleges and Universities: Analyses of
AAUP Data, 10 ECON. EDUC. REV. 99, 99–110 (1991) (presenting data confirming
the importance of salary to faculty retention); Faculty Salaries Vary by
Institution Type, Discipline, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 11, 2011 (presenting
data showing that faculty salaries are highest in law, business, economics,
computer science, engineering, and health science, and lowest in performing
arts, education, and the humanities); MIKE HORSLEY, ET AL., DEP’T OF EDUC.,
EMP’T & WORKPLACE RELATIONS, Salary Relatives and the Academic Labour
Market 47–79 (2003) (documenting Australian universities’ difficulty hiring
faculty when candidates were qualified for more highly paid private sector work,
especially in finance and business, science, engineering, and information
technology).
127. A few public universities charge a higher price for courses or majors in
high cost, high value areas such as business or engineering, in part because
these areas are expensive and state legislatures have refused to approve general
tuition increases. There is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that differential
tuition has reduced the likelihood that low-income students will study toward
high value degrees. Universities that charge differential tuition or fees include
the University of Wisconsin, Rutgers, the University of Illinois, the University of
Kansas, and the University of Nebraska. See Jonathan D. Glater, Certain
Degrees Now Cost More at Public Universities, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/29/education/29tuition.html?pagewanted=all&
_r=0 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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may be more profitable to teach than students who insist on
instruction with higher value in the labor market (i.e.,
engineering, business, or health science).128 Universities can use
grades or higher student-to-faculty ratios to channel students
away from fields in which instruction is expensive.129
Higher student-to-faculty ratios in STEM fields detract from
the quality of instruction in these fields. Students in STEM
majors are less likely to complete their degrees in four or five
years, and frequently complain about inadequate academic
support.130
As discussed in greater detail below, the government could
counteract these perverse incentives through risk-based pricing,
which would create constructive financial incentives for both
students and universities. Students who persisted in challenging,
high-value majors would be rewarded with lower interest rates
and a lower total cost of education. Universities that channeled
more students toward fields with high value in the labor market
would find their “institutional interest rate” decrease, which
would encourage prospective students to matriculate and
increase university revenues. By contrast, students or
universities that devoted resources toward low-value instruction
would find their interest rates increase and their resources
shrink.
128. See BOK, supra note 10, at 41 (“Universities may offer worthless
instruction because of . . . financial pressure.”).
129. See Achen & Courant, supra note 113, at 78, 89 (arguing that
universities adjust their grading distributions to channel students away from
classes that are overcrowded relative to supply of qualified instructors and
toward courses in which teaching capacity is underutilized); Freeman, supra
note 125, at 344 (same).
130. See Hurtado et al., supra note 115 (stating that STEM majors have
lower rates of degree completion than other college majors); Assia Boundauli,
Why Would-be Engineers End Up as English Majors, CNN (May 21, 2011, 10:16
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/05/17/education.stem.graduation/index.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (“Science and math programs are designed and taught
to winnow down the number of students. University tenure systems often
reward professors who conduct research and publish their work, but not those
who teach well.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Christopher Drew, Why Science Majors Change Their Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
2011, at ED16 (citing difficult coursework, intense competition, and grade
inflation in non-STEM majors as reasons for the high attrition rate in STEM
degree programs).

582

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527 (2013)

The federal government could also help universities obtain
the resources they need to hire more qualified instructors in high
demand, labor-market-relevant fields by boosting federal student
loan limits. At a minimum, loan limits could be increased for
students who are studying toward high-income, low
unemployment careers, so that universities can obtain the
revenues they need to offer competitive salaries to qualified
instructors in these fields.131
But if universities are student-customer driven, why do
students not already demand more instruction in fields that will
prepare them better for the labor market? One possibility is that
students prefer to enjoy a leisurely college experience and are
relatively indifferent to the long-term financial consequences.132
A second possibility is that liberal arts majors correctly perceive
that maximizing their undergraduate GPA will improve their
chances of admission to an elite graduate program that will
ultimately boost their long term income, and are more willing or
able than STEM majors to delay entering the labor force.133 And
indeed, some labor economists have suggested that studies
131. Cash-strapped colleges have already started to charge students more
for high-demand classes. See Jordan Weissman, The Future of College: The
Biggest Classes Are the Most Expensive, ATLANTIC, Mar. 16, 2012,
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/the-future-of-college-the biggest-classes-are-the-most-expensive/254589 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
132. See supra note 97 (presenting evidence that many students place high
value on leisure and personal enjoyment both during and after college).
133. Eric Eide & Geetha Waehrer, The Role of Option Value of College
Attendance in College Major Choice, 17 ECON. EDUC. REV. 73, 73 (1998)
(“[A]necdotal evidence suggests that many students choose to major in fields
never intending to terminate their education with an undergraduate degree, but
rather they intend to enroll in professional or academic graduate programs.”);
Kimberly A. Goyette & Ann L. Mullen, Who Studies the Arts and Sciences?
Social Background and the Choice and Consequences of Undergraduate Field of
Study, 77 J. HIGHER EDUC. 497, 524–27 (2006) (reporting that lower
socioeconomic status students are more likely to choose vocational majors and
more likely to be employed in higher paying jobs four years after graduation,
while higher socioeconomic status liberal arts majors are more likely to enroll in
graduate school, which may lead to higher long-term incomes); Johnson, supra
note 118, at 251–52 (“For those students whose primary objective is to gain
admittance to medical school or law school . . . ‘grade shopping’ may represent
an optimal career strategy.”).
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focusing on wages and employment at graduation undervalue
humanities and social science degrees relative to engineering and
business degrees because they ignore the option value
nonvocational degrees confer by facilitating enrollment in
graduate school.134 A third possibility is that students do not have
good information about the labor market until it is too late.
C. Many Students May Not Understand the Connection Between
Their Chosen Course of Study and Future Income and
Employment Prospects
Students—who are by definition still learning about their
chosen field—may not have accurate information about postgraduation employment prospects and wages in their own or
other fields. Empirical studies have documented systematic
mistakes in undergraduate students’ perceptions about
prospective wages by college major and occupation. According to
134. Eide & Waehrer, supra note 133, at 74, 77 (arguing that humanities
and social science degrees may prepare students for a wider range of graduate
schools than engineering, computer science, or business degrees and therefore
have higher option value). The investigators only analyzed the probability of
attending graduate school conditional on a certain choice of major, not the type
of graduate school attended or wages after completion of graduate school.
The assumption that social science and humanities degrees are
undervalued on a relative basis may not hold in the absence of grade inflation
(which may improve chances of admission to elite programs) or with more
nuanced analysis of different types of graduate degrees or post-graduate-school
wages. At least with respect to professional schools, graduate students with
undergraduate backgrounds in business, economics, or STEM seem to have
considerable advantages. See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 18, at 365–66 (finding
that economics majors make more money than most other majors when they
enter the work force directly after graduation, and economics majors who attend
law or business schools have higher wages than those who majored in other
fields, except for MBAs with undergraduate degrees in Chemical Engineering).
Law students with technical backgrounds may find it easier to specialize in
high-wage, high-demand areas of legal practice, such as patents, tax,
bankruptcy, commercial law, healthcare regulation, energy regulation, financial
regulation, or other technical fields. Business students who can manage
engineers, evaluate technical companies, or analyze large data sets seem to be
in higher demand than those with soft skills such as communications or
marketing. And medical school requires that students have scientific
backgrounds.
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one study of undergraduates at the University of California at
San Diego, students typically mistake expected wages by 20%.135
According to another study of male undergraduates at Duke,
students typically overestimate wages in their own field, and
7.5% of students would switch majors if they optimally forecasted
wages.136 It should be noted that this study controlled for the
influence of students’ abilities and career preferences on choice of
major.137
Studies also suggest that students generally learn about
labor market prospects a year or so before graduation—too late to
easily change majors.138 Students are better informed of starting
salaries than about potential increases,139 and might
overestimate the importance of starting salary relative to lifetime
earnings. Disconcertingly, there is evidence that the students
who know the least about major and occupational wage
differences are those from poor families.140 This is not due to
lower ability levels of less wealthy students; the investigators
suggest it may be because such students have fewer collegeeducated relatives and friends who can inform them about the
135. Julian R. Betts, What Do Students Know About Wages? Evidence from a
Survey of Undergraduates, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 27, 49 (1996).
136. See Peter Arcidiacono, V. Joseph Hotz & Songman Kang, Modeling
College Major Choice Using Elicited Measures Expectations and
Counterfactuals, 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
15729, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15729.pdf
[S]tudents think the market premium is higher for their own major
compared to those for majors they did not choose. . . . We estimate
that over 7.5% of students would switch majors if this forecast error
was not present. Thus, our results suggest an important role for
informational differences in modeling the choice of college major.
137. See id. (“Our model-based estimates clearly indicate that expected
earnings do matter for student’s choice of major, even after controlling for
ability and career preferences.”).
138. See Betts, supra note 135, at 47–48 (reporting that students do not
acquire most of their knowledge about wages until their final year of education).
139. See id. at 39 (“Students’ knowledge of salaries of younger workers is
quite good, but becomes progressively worse as the experience of the worker in
question increases.”).
140. See id. at 37–38, 43. All students surveyed were enrolled at UCSD. Id.
at 29. The authors controlled for ability as measured by GPA, and even after
controlling for GPA, students from lower income families were less
knowledgeable about occupational wages. Id. at 35–36, 43.
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labor market for college-educated workers. Students are not
simply uninformed, but in some instances, they are actively
misled by aggressive and deceptive recruiting efforts.141
Studies have demonstrated that students choose their major
based largely—but not exclusively—on expected post-graduation
wages.142 Many students would switch to majors linked to higher
141. See Braucher, supra note 71 at 471 (noting market failures caused by
information asymmetries and aggressive sales and marketing tactics by forprofit higher education institutions); Frontline, College, Inc.: The Sales and
Marketing Story, PBS (Apr. 4, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
teach/collegeinc/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (detailing the marketing practices of
for-profit higher education institutions and the debt accrued by their students)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Frontline, Educating
Sergeant
Pantzke,
PBS
(June
28,
2011),
http://www.
pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/educating-sergeant-pantzke/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2013) (describing for-profit colleges’ efforts to recruit military veterans) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also GREGORY D. KUTZ, GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., FOR PROFIT COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS
COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE
MARKETING PRACTICES 1 (2010) (“Undercover tests at 15 for-profit colleges found
that 4 colleges encouraged fraudulent practices and that all 15 made deceptive
or otherwise questionable statements to GAO’s undercover applicants.”). But cf.
Nick Anderson, GAO Revises its Report Critical of Practices at For-Profit
Schools, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/12/07/AR2010120707412.html?sid=ST2010120800393
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (noting that the report was revised to correct errors
and softened) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
It is unclear if marketing abuses also occur at non-profit institutions. Sales
and marketing efforts appear to be more aggressive in the for-profit sector,
which spends an average of 23% of revenue on sales and marketing compared to
0.5% in the nonprofit sector. See Emma Roller, Senate Bill Would Bar Colleges
from Using Federal Student Aid for Marketing, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr.
18, 2012.
A study by the Government Accountability Office suggested that after
controlling for student characteristics, graduates of for-profit institutions
generally have worse outcomes, although some for-profit programs performed
well. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: STUDENT
OUTCOMES VARY AT FOR-PROFIT, NONPROFIT, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5–8 (2011)
(comparing graduation rates, employment outcomes, student loan debt, default
rates, and licensing exam results of students graduating from for-profit,
nonprofit, and public institutions).
142. See Richard J. Cebula & Jerry Slopes, Determinants of Student Choice
of Undergraduate Major Field, 19 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 303, 303 (1982) (presenting
evidence that “earnings differentials among fields and differences in the rate of
change in earnings among fields are the most important factors in the student’s
decision”); Claude Montmarquette, Kathy Cannings & Sophie Mahseredjian,
How Do Young People Choose College Majors?, 21 ECON. EDUC. REV. 543, 554
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post-graduation wages if students had more accurate and timely
information.143 Expected wages play a particularly important role
in major choice for students from low socioeconomic status
backgrounds.144 Choosing the right major could help poor
students use education to achieve upward socioeconomic mobility.
Recently, there have been several attempts to make the
education and labor markets more transparent. These include
data supplied for free by the U.S. Departments of Labor and
Education,145 new “scorecards” and “shopping sheets” for
educational institutions,146 and entrepreneurial efforts to make
labor market information more accessible.
As discussed in greater detail below, risk-based pricing of
student loans could help make wages and employment prospects
more transparent and salient to students at an earlier stage in
their educational careers.

(2002) (“[C]hoice of college concentration depends decisively on the expected
earnings in a particular concentration.”). But see Peter Arcidiacono, Ability
Sorting and the Returns to College Major, 121 J. ECONOMETRICS 344, 372 (2004)
(finding that the wage premium for certain college majors does not drive
students of higher ability to select those majors as much as student subject
matter preferences).
143. See Arcidiacono, Hotz & Kang, supra note 136, at 2–3 (stating that
many students would switch their majors if they had more accurate salary
information).
144. See Kimberly A. Goyette & Ann L. Mullen, supra note 133, at 524–27
(reporting that low socioeconomic status students are more likely to choose
vocational majors and more likely to be employed in higher paying jobs four
years after graduation, while higher socioeconomic status liberal arts majors are
more likely to enroll in graduate school); Yingyi Ma, Family Socioeconomic
Status, Parental Involvement, and College Major Choices—Gender,
Race/Ethnic, and Nativity Patterns, 52 SOC. PERSP. 211, 211 (2009) (finding that
lower socioeconomic students favor more lucrative majors compared to higher
socioeconomic status students).
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.,
145. See
Research
and
Statistics,
U.S.
http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/landing.jhtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing
links to research and statistics on educational programs and job markets) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
146. What College Students Need to Know, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012, at
A18.
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D. Skilled Labor Markets Suffer from Periodic Booms and Busts
Students generally do not have good information with which
to forecast the likelihood of employment in a given field.147
Without a good forecast of decisions by employers (the demand
side) and knowledge of how many other students are studying
toward a particular field (the supply side), such prediction is
difficult if not impossible. Instead, students appear to assume
that the future will resemble the present.
This assumption and the long production lag for skilled labor
leads to boom and bust cycles in the labor market known as
“cobweb” cycles.148 At the start of the cycle, many students seek to
study toward a high-income occupation. Years later, when they
all simultaneously try to enter the labor force, the large supply of
labor causes wages to crash in their occupation. In the second
stage of the cycle, students choosing an occupation at the time of
the crash then avoid training for the newly low income
occupation, and years later, there will be a shortage of labor for
that occupation, causing wages to rise and the cycle to repeat.
Cobweb cycles have been demonstrated in a wide range of
skilled labor markets, including markets for engineers, lawyers,
scientists, and professors. The number of years in the cycle is
147.
148.

See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 132 (2003) (explaining the concept of cobweb cycles); FREEMAN, supra
note 126, at 22–26 (outlining the cobweb cycle theory); Richard B. Freeman,
Supply and Salary Adjustments to the Changing Science Manpower Market:
Physics, 1948–1973, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 27, 38 (1975) (“[L]arge numbers of
physics graduates create a market setting likely to reduce enrollments and
future degrees in the field in accord with the cobweb scenario.”); Richard B.
Freeman, Legal Cobwebs: A Recursive Model of the Market for New Lawyers, 57
REV. ECON. & STAT. 171, 173–75 (1975) (applying the cobweb model to the legal
market); Richard B. Freeman, A Cobweb Model of the Supply and Starting
Salary of New Engineers, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 236, 248 (1976) (applying
the cobweb model to the market for engineers); Christoph Engel & Hanjo
Hamann, The Hog-Cycle of Law Professors (Max Planck Inst. for Research on
the Collective Good, Working Paper No. 2012/8, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2046484 (documenting an
eight-year cycle for German law professors); cf. Gary A. Zarkin, Cobweb Versus
Rational Expectations Models: Lessons from the Market for Public School
Teachers, 13 ECON. LETTERS 87, 87 (1983) (arguing that “cobweb” effects can be
explained within a rational expectations model of occupational choice).
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typically proportional to the number of years of advanced
training required to enter the profession.
E. Skills Mismatches Reduce Employment and Output
Mismatches between skills and employment opportunities
lead to an inefficient reduction in productivity and higher
unemployment.149 Economists at the Federal Reserve have
estimated that the mismatch between worker skills and employer
needs accounts for more than one-fourth of unemployment in the
United States.150 When employment opportunities are available
but workers lack the required skills, the resulting reduction in
employment is called “structural unemployment.”
As will be discussed below, even educational institutions
themselves may not always have good information about the
labor market or the resources to acquire that information. Some
of the best information, such as confidential tax or social security
records—which may have more accurate wage data than
surveys—may only be available to or acquirable by the
government.
Because the U.S. government’s role in the higher education
market is primarily as a lender,151 risk-based pricing of federal
student loans may offer the best approach to reconcile traditional
academic values with the goals of a more transparent and
149. See AUGUSTE ET AL., supra note 112, at 57 (“[E]mployers still have
trouble finding workers with specific skills. And many students lack a clear
picture of which jobs and skills will be in high demand.”); Robert Shimer,
Mismatch, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1074, 1074 (2007) (arguing that geographic
attachment and skills mismatch contribute to structural unemployment).
150. See Narayana Kocherlakota, President, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis,
President’s Speech at Missoula, Montana: Back Inside the FOMC (Sept. 8,
2010), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news_events/pres/speech_
display.cfm?id=4532 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (“How much of the current
unemployment rate is really due to mismatch? The answer seems to be a lot.
[With better matching] we would have an unemployment rate closer to 6.5
percent, not 9.6 percent. . . . [O]ver 2.5 percentage points of the current
unemployment rate is attributable to mismatch.”).
151. See ANNE PRISCO ET AL., THE ALLIANCE FOR INT’L HIGHER EDUC. POLICY
STUDIES, FEDERAL POLICIES AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 12
(2002) (“Student financial assistance is at the core of federal strategies for
influencing higher education priorities and outcomes.”).

RISK-BASED STUDENT LOANS

589

efficient labor market, higher wages, and lower structural
unemployment.
V. The Theory of Risk-Based Credit Pricing
Lenders are not like ordinary retail merchants. Whereas a
merchant can complete a transaction at the time of sale, a lender
will have an ongoing relationship with the borrower for the entire
duration of the loan. The lender continues to bear risk that at
some point the borrower will become unable to repay and will
default on the debt.152
Risk-based credit pricing involves adjusting the interest rate
on loans so that the interest rate compensates the lender not only
for the time value of money,153 but also for the risk that borrowers
will default on their debts and cause the lender to incur losses.
152. Default refers to late payment or partial or complete failure to repay.
Defaults can be distinguished from one another by their severity, or the losses to
the lender in the event of default, which can range from 0% to 100% of the loan
value. See Understanding Default, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.
gov/repay-loans/default (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (defining and explaining
default and its consequences) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
153. The time value of money is the idea that the value of money is higher in
the present than in the future, either because money today could be invested to
produce profit in the future, or because people tend to prefer instant
gratification and would generally rather consume the same good or service now
rather than in the future. See Michael Simkovic & Benjamin Kaminetzky,
Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit
Default Swap Solution, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 188, 188 n.214 (explaining the
time value of money concept).
The time value of money is a broader concept than inflation, which refers to
general changes in price levels, so that a dollar at one point in time will not
purchase the same basket of goods and services in the future. Inflation is
generally positive (i.e., the value of money declines over time). However, even
with zero inflation, there would still be a positive time value of money because
of the prospect of real (after-inflation) profitable investments and because of
preferences for present consumption.
The time value of money is typically measured as the interest rate charged
to a hypothetical debtor with no risk of defaulting, also called the risk-free rate.
Although no debtor is completely risk-free, the risk-free rate for dollardenominated loans is typically assumed to be the rate of interest on U.S.
government securities. See id. at 188–89; Joost Driessen, Is Default Event Risk
Priced in Corporate Bonds?, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 165, 169 (2005) (noting that U.S.
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From the perspective of risk-based credit pricing, uniform
student loan pricing is a redistributive policy. Uniform pricing
subsidizes the riskiest borrowers while profiting from the safest
borrowers. In the student loan context, uniform credit pricing is a
subsidy to students who are studying fields with the lowest value
in the labor market and a tax on students who are studying fields
with the highest value in the labor market and the best
employment prospects.154 This subsidy creates perverse
incentives—discouraging the most able students and most
economically valuable programs, while encouraging the highest
risk and least economically valuable programs.
Risk-based student loan pricing should reduce moral hazard
by forcing student borrowers to internalize the risks created by
their own decisions, encouraging students to study toward highvalue occupations. Risk-based student loan pricing should reduce
adverse selection by discouraging students with poor prospects
from borrowing heavily to attend expensive education programs
of dubious value, while encouraging the most promising students
to borrow what they need to complete valuable degrees.
Moreover, risk-based pricing would clarify the differential
economic value of different courses of study, and help students
make choices that are in their own long-term best interests.
Over time, risk-based student loan pricing should cause
colleges to shift educational resources toward teaching subjects

Treasury bonds are assumed to be default-free); Francis A. Longstaff, Sanjay
Mithal & Eric Neis, Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity? New
Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market, 60 J. FIN. 2213, 2223 (2005)
(“[T]he Treasury curve . . . is the standard benchmark riskless curve in most
empirical tests in finance.”); Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt:
The Risk Structure of Interest Rates, 29 J. FIN. 449, 449 (1974) (noting that
government bonds are essentially default-risk-free). For example, for a 10-year
student loan, the yield on a 10-year Treasury bond might be used as the riskfree rate.
154. To be more precise, uniform pricing is a subsidy to those with the
highest risk of default and a tax on those with the lowest risk of default.
However, because students who need to borrow generally come from middle
class backgrounds, and will therefore rely on their future labor income (or their
spouse’s labor income) to repay their student loans, risk will in practice
generally turn on career prospects. See JAQUELINE E. KING, FINANCING A
COLLEGE EDUCATION: HOW IT WORKS, HOW IT’S CHANGING 27 (1999).
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and skills that are most valued in the labor market.155 This
should improve the risk profile of borrowers, and reduce student
loan defaults and structural unemployment.
Some may argue that wages in the labor market do not
reflect the social value of certain occupations.156 For example,
progressives
frequently
claim
that
teachers
are
undercompensated relative to their education levels and social
contribution.157 Indeed, the original NDEA158 emphasized the
importance of training more teachers as well as STEM
specialists, and current student loan programs include special
loan forgiveness provisions for teachers.159 By contrast, many
economists have suggested that an individual’s willingness to
sacrifice income to pursue less lucrative education and linked
career paths suggests that such education or career paths may be
more enjoyable and constitute a form of nonmonetary
compensation.160
155. The transition may be gradual because the institution of tenure limits
the flexibility of academic staffing. However, to the extent that untenured
faculty, adjunct faculty, or graduate students teach classes in low-value fields,
universities could adjust and reallocate resources toward higher value fields
fairly rapidly.
156. See, e.g., EILIS LAWLOR, HELEN KERSLEY, SUSAN STEED & MARTIN
COTTINGHAM, NEW ECON. FOUND., A BIT RICH: CALCULATING THE REAL VALUE TO
SOCIETY OF DIFFERENT PROFESSIONS 27–28 (2009) (arguing that not all highly
compensated occupations generate social value); Warren, Baum & Sitaraman,
supra note 65, at 132–36 (advocating the value of military and civil service).
157. See LAWRENCE MISHEL, SYLVIA A. ALLEGRETTO & SEAN P. CORCORAN,
ECON. POL’Y INST., THE TEACHING PENALTY: AN UPDATE THROUGH 2010 (2011)
(arguing that teacher salaries are too low to attract top-performing graduates).
There is little controversy that teacher compensation in the United States is not
sufficient to attract and retain many top-performing college graduates. Whether
the current workforce of teachers is “undercompensated” relative to its
contributions is a separate question.
158. See National Defense Education Act of 1958, Title VIII, § 802, Pub. L.
No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580, 1597–98 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
20 U.S.C.) (“Funds paid to a State under this title for area vocational education
programs may be used, in carrying out such programs . . . for . . . maintenance of
adequate programs of administration, supervision, and teacher-training . . . .”).
159. See Teacher Loan Forgiveness, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://student
aid.ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/charts/teacher#what-are-the-eli
gibility (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
160. See Annette Alstadsæter, Measuring the Consumption Value of
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However, if public sector workers are undercompensated,
questions remain about whether public sector compensation
should be increased through taxpayer-funded loan subsidies or
through a taxpayer-funded increase in starting salaries for
college graduates entering public service.
Risk-based pricing does not demand a rigid embrace of
laissez-faire. In every developed economy, both markets and
governments set wages. If wages for public sector occupations are
below socially optimal values, then this reflects a failure by
governments to set taxes and spending at appropriate levels. If
wages in socially destructive occupations are high, this reflects a
failure of regulation and taxation to punish socially destructive
behavior and channel profits toward productive activity. Riskbased student loan pricing does not create any of these failures—
it simply reflects the current reality of U.S. political economy,
and provides information and incentives to help college students
navigate a challenging labor market.
To reject risk-based pricing outright in favor of uniform
student loan pricing, one would have to believe that all low
compensation occupations have positive externalities, all high
compensation occupations have negative externalities, and that
these externalities precisely match differences in wages and
employability. In other words, one would have to believe that
wage differentials are not only inefficient, but are the exact
opposite of the efficient distribution of wages, and everyone with
a college degree should earn the same income.
Furthermore, one would have to assume that supply-side
subsidies such as low student loan interest rates are preferable to
targeted demand-side subsidies such as higher taxpayer-funded
wages for specific occupations.161
Education, 57 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 458, 468 (2010) (measuring the consumption
value of education based on the expected income sacrificed by high ability
students who attended teachers college in Norway in the 1960s instead of
business school, and finding that students typically were willing to sacrifice 10–
30% of their lifetime incomes); Annette Alstadsæter & Hans Henrik Sievertsen,
The Consumption Value of Higher Education, (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2871,
2009) (finding that after controlling for ability, U.S. liberal arts college majors
sacrifice 46% of their potential income in order to enjoy the consumption value
of a liberal arts education).
161. Whereas demand-side subsidies would help workers to capture the
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There are many reasons to favor demand-side subsidies
(higher wages) over lower interest rates. Loan subsidies would
effectively increase public sector pay only for workers with
student loans. Public sector employers might try to capture part
of this subsidy by reducing entry-level base salary, thereby
making public sector careers relatively less attractive to
graduates who have no debts. Loan subsidies could
unintentionally funnel the children of the poor into low paying
public sector careers and affluent graduates into private sector
careers with better long-term earnings. Such career sorting risks
exacerbating class divisions and reducing social mobility.
By contrast, increased public service starting salaries would
equally encourage students with debts and those without to enter
public service. This could improve the quality of public service
personnel by making such jobs attractive to a wider range of
qualified applicants, increasing competition for public service
jobs. It could also help prevent public service careers from
becoming segregated along class divisions.
If certain occupations are “undercompensated,” then
governments should increase compensation using the tax and
spending power.162 Risk-based student loan pricing simply
reflects
the
willingness—or
unwillingness—of
market
participants and governments to pay for services, and channels
human capital to where it is valued most. Indeed, governments
may have no choice but to increase public sector compensation if
college students become savvier about prospective wages in
different occupations and refuse to accept low-wage (but
supposedly valued) positions.

social benefits they arguably provide, subsidies that increase the supply of
workers entering particular occupations help maintain low wages in those
fields. See Douglas S. Massey, The Social and Economic Origins of Immigration,
510 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 60, 64 (1990).
162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”).
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A. A Simple Risk-Based Credit Pricing Model

Consider the following simplified example of risk-based
credit pricing, adapted from Michael Simkovic & Benjamin
Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the Problem of
Hindsight Bias and the Credit Default Swap Solution.163
Assumptions are listed below.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Each group wants to borrow $100,000
Each borrower borrows the same amount
of money
There are no transaction costs or
administrative costs
All payments and defaults are made at
the end of year 1
The relevant risk-free rate is 3% per year
The lender is risk-neutral and not
subject to liquidity risk
6+
The lender can borrow at the risk-free
rate
Group A
o Borrowers in Group A will repay
their loans in full.
Group B
o Ten percent of the borrowers in
Group B will default on their loans in
the first year, while 90% of the
borrowers in Group B will repay
their loans in full.
o The Group B borrowers who default
will repay 70% of the balance of their
loans.

Group A is risk-free. If the lender were to lend to Group A
borrowers at 3%, the lender would end the year with $103,000
($100,000 in principal repayment plus $3000 in interest
payments). This would exactly match the lender’s cost of capital
and—in the absence of any administrative costs—would cause
163.

2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 188–94, 218–21 (2011).
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the lender to break even. At any price above 3% interest, the
lender would make a profit, and at any price below 3%, the lender
would lose money.
Lending to Group B involves credit risk, but there is an
interest rate at which the lender should be indifferent between
lending to Group A or Group B. Specifically, there is an interest
rate at which the lender would expect to have the same $103,000
at the end of the year after lending to Group B. The expected value
of the loan to Group B is the sum of the repayments by the 90% of
creditors who will repay their loans in full and the repayments by
the 10% who will default on their debts and only repay 70% of
their loans. For the 90% who will repay, the lender will receive
$90,000 (1 + the interest rate). For the 10% who will default, the
lender will receive $10,000 0.7 (1 + the interest rate). Solving
for the interest rate that will enable the lender to earn $103,000,
we get ($103,000 - $97,000) / $97,000 = 6.19%.
Under simplified assumptions,164 the formula for calculating
the break-even interest rate could be rewritten as:
1
1

1

in which:
i = break-even interest rate
r = risk-free rate
D = probability of default in year 1
(1 – D) = probability of no default in year 1
L = loss rate given default; (1 – L) = recovery rate165

(Eq. 1)

164. In practice, the formula for calculating the break-even interest rate will
be somewhat more complicated for a number of reasons. First, every loan
program will entail some administrative and other transactions costs, and these
costs must be recovered either through fees, interest spreads, or some other
source of revenue. Second, student loans last for more than one year. The
probability of default may be higher in some years than in others, and the loss
rate given default for any given loan will generally go down over time as the
borrower repays the principal. Third, there is an interaction between the
interest rate charged and the probability of default; all else being equal, a
higher interest rate will increase the probability that the borrower will default,
while a lower interest rate will reduce the probability of default by making
payments more affordable.
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The break-even interest rate is an important concept because
it helps us understand whether a student loan, priced at a
particular level, is a budget-neutral transaction, a profit center
for the government/taxpayer, or a subsidy to the student
borrower. Risk-based pricing does not rely on perfectly accurate
predictions for individuals, but rather predictions that more or
less hold statistically true for groups of borrowers.
B. Data-Driven Risk-Based Pricing
At a technical level, the question is as follows: what
readily observable characteristics can be used, individually or
in combination with one another, to explain variation in loan
defaults and loss rates? Multivariate statistical methods such
as ordinary least squares regression (OLS) can be used to build
a model that predicts loan losses.166
An analyst would load panel data consisting of individual
loans into statistical software. Each loan would be associated
with observable characteristics of the borrowers at the time the
loan was extended, called predictors—for example college
major, class rank, standardized test scores, geographic
location, type of school attended, expected debt-to-income
ratios at graduation—and the eventual outcome—that is, did
the borrower default on the loan, and if so, what percent of the
loan did the lender lose.
The result of OLS is a mathematical equation of the
following form:
...

(Eq. 2)
165. The Department of Education estimates its recovery rate on defaulted
loans, after taking into account collection costs and the time value of money, as
between 75% and 82%. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW, FISCAL YEAR
2013 BUDGET REQUEST, at R-31 (2012). This high recovery rate may be due in
part to the limits on bankruptcy discharge and extensive mechanisms available
to collect defaulted federal student loans. In Equation 1, L therefore can be
assumed to be between 0.18 and 0.25.
166. Alternately, a logit or probit model could be used because the value of
E(DL) should always be between 0 and 1.
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in which:
E(DL) is the predicted loss as a percent of the loan (after
taking into account the time value of money)
x is the value of each predictor (1 through n)
n is the number of predictors
b is the value of each coefficient (1 through n) which
describes the direction and magnitude of the relationship
between the predictor and losses.
e is the error term.
The value determined in equation 2 can be plugged into
equation 1 as (
to price the interest rate on the loan. This
analysis is purely technical and data driven. The only assumption
is that the future will look like the period of time during which
the loans in the panel data were extended and tracked.
Empirically validated predictors, and ethical considerations
regarding the use of certain predictors, are discussed in detail in
Part V. Because some predictors of default are beyond students’
control, or relate to hallmarks of disadvantage, using them to
price student loans would undermine the federal student lending
programs’ policy goals of providing equal opportunity and upward
mobility.
C. Risk-Based Pricing Is Not Necessarily the Same as MarketBased Pricing
Risk-based pricing as used in this Article has a precise
definition that mathematically connects pricing to risk; it is not
simply the price that a private lender would charge in an
unregulated market. The goal of private lenders is to maximize
profit, and this entails charging the highest price possible
without losing too much volume or taking on too much risk. To
the extent that consumer credit markets are less than perfectly
efficient and price competitive, and demand for credit is inelastic,
private lenders should have opportunities to charge prices that
are higher than those required to compensate them for risk. This
is what Alan M. White refers to as “opportunity pricing.”167
167.

Alan M. White, Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing: Present and Future
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Consumer credit markets may be less than perfectly efficient
because of complicated contractual terms or fee structures,
information asymmetries, limited mathematical skill of
borrowers, liquidity issues, or transaction or search costs.168
Empirical studies have demonstrated limited price competition in
the mortgage and credit card markets,169 and it is probably safe
to assume that pricing is also less than perfectly competitive in
the private student loan market.
Journalists have documented efforts by some private student
lenders to pay college financial aid officers to steer students
toward specific lenders—that is, efforts to compete other than by
providing credit to borrowers at the lowest price and on the best
terms.170 Complaints collected by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau suggest that some debtors who borrowed from
private student lenders were not aware that they were eligible for
lower cost federal loans.171

Research, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 503, 504–05 (2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1012445 (arguing that subprime
mortgage lenders engage in “opportunity pricing” rather than efficient risk-based
pricing and have exploited market inefficiencies to charge fees and interest rates
that exceed what can be justified based on risk-related costs).
168. See id.; Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based
Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123 (2007) (arguing that application fees in subprime
mortgage markets can prevent comparison shopping and reduce price competition);
Alan M. White & Cathy L. Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 233, 266 (2002); see also infra note 193.
169. See, e.g., Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential
Mortgage Default: Evidence from U.S. States, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3139, 3139–86
(2011) (finding that although mortgage default rates are lower in states with lender
friendly collections laws, mortgage interest rates are not any lower in such states);
Michael Simkovic, The Effect of BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and
Prices, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 7–22 (2009) (finding that although lender friendly
bankruptcy reforms reduced losses to credit card lenders, credit spreads and fees on
credit cards increased, likely because of industry consolidation and market
inefficiencies).
170. See Glater, supra note 35, at 48–51 (describing the student loan scandal of
2007).
171. See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau Publishes Private Student Loan Borrower Comments (June 13,
2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financialprotection-bureau-publishes-private-student-loan-borrower-comments/ (last visited
Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Because opacity and limited price competition create a
favorable business environment for lenders, private lenders may
not volunteer transparent, simple information that would make
credit markets more efficient and price competitive. And without
such clear, simple disclosures, risk-based pricing may not
influence students’ behavior.
Even in relatively efficient credit markets such as corporate
bond markets, credit spreads will typically exceed default risk
because credit spreads also incorporate factors such as liquidity
risk, systemic risk, and investor risk aversion.172 However, the
U.S. government is generally not subject to such risks—the U.S.
government’s borrowing costs actually go down during financial
crises as investors flood into Treasuries,173 and the Federal
Reserve can provide liquidity in the event that investors are
unwilling to do so. The U.S. government can therefore safely lend
at lower interest rates than private lenders, and by lending
directly to students, avoid leaky subsidies to private lenders such
as guarantees and liquidity injections in times of crisis.174
D. Government’s Incentives Are Uniquely Well Aligned with
Students’
The discussion in Parts IV.A–B above considers only the role
of government as student lender, and ignores the role of
government as tax collector and provider of social insurance.
Taking into account the broader role of government suggests that
the government should be more risk-tolerant. Under some
scenarios, the government might even benefit by running a riskbased student loan program at a loss—that is, as a subsidy
program.

172. See Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 153, at 194–99 (discussing the
components of credit spreads in the corporate bond market).
173. See id. at 198 (noting that banks’ funding costs increase relative to the
federal governments’ in times of crisis).
174. See Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, supra
note 70, at 61–64 (arguing for direct mortgage lending by the federal government to
avoid moral hazard and subsidies to private lenders in times of crisis).
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If the government were only a lender, its interests would
diverge from those of student borrowers, who resemble equity
holders. However, as a tax collector, the government is in effect
an equity investor in the student borrowers’ future income, and
the government’s interests are therefore more closely aligned
with those of student borrowers.
Pure lenders wish to minimize defaults and loan losses; they
are sensitive to downside risk, but indifferent to upside potential,
because any upside will go to the borrower, not the lender.175
Student loan losses depend not only on average occupational
income levels, but also on income distributions.176 Lenders prefer
narrower income distributions, because lenders face asymmetric
payoffs—the best lenders can hope for is full repayment of each
loan.177 If an income distribution widens, a larger fraction of
borrowers will have low incomes and will default on their loans,
but the borrowers with higher incomes will not pay the lender
any more than they are contractually required to pay.178
In other words, there is a difference in interests between
student lenders—who should prefer lower risk occupations—and
student borrowers, who should be more willing to take greater
educational and occupational risks in return for higher expected
returns.
Unlike a private lender, the government can benefit from
student borrowers’ upside potential because the government
collects payroll and income taxes. The government—like student
175. See Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 153, at 214–18 (discussing the
differing interests of equity and debt investors).
A private lender, Lumni, is currently experimenting with “human capital
contracts,” or equity-like student loans, for a select handful of borrowers who
have funding needs that exceed their eligibility for federal student loans. David
Bornstein, Op-Ed., Instead of Student Loans, Investing in Futures, N.Y. TIMES
OPINIONATOR
(May
30,
2011,
8:25
PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/30/ instead-of-student-loans-invest
ing-in-futures/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). Lumni provides relatively small amounts of money at what
appear to be rates substantially higher than federal student loans, perhaps
because of adverse selection problems and high risks, or small scale and high
startup costs, or because of opportunity pricing. Id.
176. Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 153, at 214–18.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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borrowers and unlike private lenders—should therefore be more
willing to trade off greater risk (in the form of a wider
distribution of incomes) in return for greater rewards (in the form
of higher average income).
The extent to which the government should embrace risk will
depend on a variety of factors, including labor tax rates,179 loanto-income ratios,180 the likelihood of emigration,181 and social
insurance levels.182
Under some scenarios, the government can improve public
finances and overall welfare by intentionally running a student
loan program at no profit, or even at a loss when measuring
direct revenue against direct costs. This is because a subsidy may
cause more workers to pursue education that will increase their
lifetime incomes and therefore their lifetime tax contributions.
Higher tax revenues from the additional student borrowers who
succeed may more than offset higher loan losses from the
additional student borrowers who fail. A subsidy is most likely to
be welfare-enhancing when individual students are risk-averse—
for example, because they cannot easily diversify their
investment in human capital—and the government is risk
neutral because it is more diversified.
The government should ideally view itself not as a mere
lender, but rather as a diversified investor in the global
competitiveness of the United States labor force.183
179. All else being equal, the government should be more risk-tolerant if
labor tax rates are higher or more steeply progressive because tax revenue will
be higher as average income increases and the distribution of incomes increases
(more income will be taxed at higher rates).
180. All else being equal, the government should be more risk-tolerant if the
size of the loan is smaller relative to the average lifetime income because the
government’s potential loan losses will be smaller relative to the government’s
potential tax revenues.
181. All else being equal, the government should be more risk-tolerant if the
probability of skilled emigration is lower because expected future tax revenue
will be higher.
182. All else being equal, the government should probably be more risk
tolerant if social insurance levels are lower because downside risk for the
student borrower will have less of an impact on public finances. However, to the
extent that education can raise incomes or reduce unemployment, higher social
insurance levels may weigh in favor of a larger subsidy for education.
183. The U.S. government should promote the interests of the U.S. work
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Operationalizing such a view would require a complex behavioral
and financial model that is beyond the scope of this Article.
For our purposes, it should simply be noted that credit
spreads calculated using the methods described in Part IV.B do
not take into account positive externalities associated with higher
education, and could therefore be interpreted as an upward
bound on the interest rate that the government should charge
student borrowers.
E. Forecasting Change Is Both Necessary and Perilous
A purely data-driven analysis of student loan performance
and labor markets is appealing because it is objective and
ameliorates concerns about political influence or corruption. Any
labor market forecasts used to price student loans might face
political pressure.184 Employers in many industries may wish to
channel students toward their field to drive down labor costs and
upgrade their workforces.185 Conversely, skilled workers might
wish to channel students away from their own fields to reduce
competition and keep wages high.186 Employers may claim labor
force because the U.S. government cannot tax the work forces of other countries.
The U.S. government is also elected to represent the interests of U.S. citizens,
most of whom depend on wages as their primary source of income.
184. See Richard B. Freeman, Labor Market Imbalances: Shortages,
Surpluses or What? 159, 171–73 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. Conference Series
Working Paper, 2006), http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf51/conf51d.pdf.
185. Several scholars and journalists have claimed that business interests
made empirically unsupported claims of labor shortages of scientists and
engineers in the 1980s to drive down wages in those fields, and have continued
in recent years to make empirically dubious claims of shortages. See id. at 171–
73; Richard B. Freeman, Is A Great Labor Shortage Coming? Replacement
Demand in the Global Economy 1, 10–11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 12541, 2006); Eric Weinstein, How and Why Government,
Universities, and Industry Create Domestic Labor Shortages of Scientists and
High-Tech Workers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper), available
at http://www.nber.org/~peat/PapersFolder/Papers/SG/NSF.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Benderly,
supra note 117, at 31; Lowell et al., supra note 117, at 1–2.
186. The “scamblog” literature, in which ostensibly disgruntled lawyers and
doctors advise others not to follow in their career footsteps, may reflect efforts
by the shrewdest and most highly paid skilled workers to reduce competition
and increase wages in their own fields. Department of Labor and Census data
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“shortages” and workers may claim “surpluses,” but these claims
are amorphous in a market system in which supply-and-demand
imbalances can be corrected by changes in wages.187 Risk-based
lending policies should be based on hard numbers such as real
wages and unemployment rates in different occupations, not on
empirically unverifiable claims by interested parties. As
suggested by the data in Figure 6 below, long-term historic wages
by major are often a reasonably good predictor of future wages by
major.

on wages and unemployment rates, and Department of Education data on
student loan default rates, overwhelmingly suggest that attorneys and medical
doctors remain among the highest paid and most secure of all workers in the
United States. Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Million Dollar Law
Degree (Jan. 21, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID,
http://studentaid. ed.gov/about/data-center/student/default (last visited Feb. 3,
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Default Rates Rise for
Federal Student Loans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.
ed.gov/news/press-releases/default-rates-rise-federal-student-loans (last visited Feb.
3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); First Official ThreeYear Student Loan Default Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 28, 2012),
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/first-official-three-year-student-loan-de faultrates-published (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/ooh/home.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Wages, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/index.htm#. UHWUgRXA-AY (last visited Feb. 3,
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
187. As discussed above, labor and education markets are not perfectly
efficient competitive markets that flawlessly and quickly adjust to reach
equilibrium. See supra note 188. However, there is evidence that students
respond to changes in starting salaries and that labor markets can thereby
adjust, however imperfectly. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN, THE OVEREDUCATED
AMERICAN 62–63, 98–108 (1976) (explaining that the surplus of doctorate
students in the 1970s led to a market drop in job prospects, which led to a
decline in the number of students seeking a Ph.D. in the 1980s).
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Figure 6: Past Starting Salary for Graduates with a Certain
Major Is a Reasonably Good Predictor of Future Starting Salaries
by Major
Median salary one year after graduation by major for 2000 and 2008 graduates
2011 USD Thousands
First year salary for wokrers who received their bachelor’s degree in 2008

2000 vs. 2008 regression line
[salary2008] = 0.93*[salary2000] - 898
R² = 0.85

$65
$60

Engineering
$55
Mathematics and
Computer Science

$50
Healthcare
$45
Business and
Management

$40
$35

Social Sciences
Public Affairs and
Social Services

Biological and
Physical Sciences
History
Psychology

$30

Humanities

Education
$25
$25

$30

$35

$40

$45

$50

$55

$60

$65

First year salary for workers who received their bachelor's degree in 2000
Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics
2011, Table 404.
Note: Bachelor’s degree recipients only.

Unfortunately, the assumption that the past accurately
predicts the future in the student loan and labor markets—the
continuity assumption—might not always be the wisest,
especially during periods of rapid technological change or crisis.
The introduction of risk-based pricing could itself alter labor
markets by channeling students toward certain occupations and
away from others.188 Forecasting change based on leading
indicators rather than historic data could be critical to avoid an
188.

Id. at 62–63.
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overshoot.189 For example, there is some evidence that labor
market policies to encourage more students to study science in
the 1960s may have contributed to high unemployment rates and
low wages for scientists such as physicists in the 1970s.190
The continuity assumption could be relaxed by incorporating
additional information about the labor market to forecast
changes, for example, by using a cobweb model including data
about future labor supply (i.e., the total number of students in a
city or state, across the United States or around the world
studying toward each occupation and the number of years until
they complete their training) and future demand (the number of
job openings for each profession according to employer surveys or
industry growth estimates combined with input-output tables).
The Department of Education could be offered limited
discretion—that is, it could be permitted to use a forecasting
model to set an interest rate within a range of the rate suggested
by the historic data.191 Or perhaps the Department of Education
should establish the historic baseline and the discretionary
forecast should be under the aegis of the U.S. Department of
Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Ideally, risk-based pricing could be used to help labor
markets adjust more quickly and with less volatility than seen in
traditional cobweb cycles. Reliable, detailed, and timely data is
essential. Forecasting would benefit from greater integration of
dispersed data sources and timelier reporting.
Existing data sources include government data—U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Occupational Employment Statistics
(OES), the BLS National Compensation Survey (NCS), the BLS
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), the Bureau
of the Census Current Population Survey (CPS), Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) data, Social Security Administration (SSA)
data, and a variety of surveys compiled by the National Center
189. Id.
190. Id. at 62–73, 98–108.
191. For a discussion of limitations of existing employment forecasting
models, see Richard B. Freeman, supra note 185, at 13 (arguing that global
rather than national or local labor markets, market and technological changes,
factor substitution, and other issues dramatically limit the accuracy of
employment forecast models).
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for Education Statistics (NCES); foundation data such as the
College and Beyond Database (C&B) and Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID); and proprietary data from payroll processors or
the National Association of Colleges and Employers (NACE).192
F. Private Lenders Could Be Enlisted to Correct Forecast Errors
The government could provide an additional safety-valve to
correct for erroneous forecasts by providing private employers or
other investors an opportunity to fund student loans at lower
interest rates than the government if the investors believe that
government forecasts are too conservative for particular fields of
study.193 Such an approach would be less susceptible to
192. See e.g., College and Beyond Database: Andrew W. Mellon Foundation,
1994, DUKE UNIV. SANFORD SCHOOL OF PUB. POL’Y: PHILANTHROPY CENTRAL,
http://cspcs.sanford.duke.edu/sites/default/files/descriptive/college_and_beyond_
database.pdf; Current Population Survey (CPS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/cps/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey,
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/jlt/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); NACE – Salary
Survey, NAT’L ASSOC. OF COLLEGES AND EMP’RS, http://www.naceweb.org/salarysurvey-data/?referal=research&menuID=71&nodetype=4 (last visited Feb. 3,
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); National
Compensation Survey , U.S BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/eci/
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Occupational Employment Statistics, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/oes/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Panel Study of Income Dynamics, INST. FOR SOC. RES.,
http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Publications and Products—Annual Reports
Program, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/
getpubcats.asp?sid=091 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Social Security Data, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/open/data/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Tax Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
193. For price competition to be most effective, it would probably be
necessary to create a standard student loan contract that could vary only with
respect to one or a few numeric price terms (i.e., the interest rate) and feature
clear and easy-to-understand disclosures. Complex pricing schemes and varied
contractual terms can reduce price competition in consumer credit markets by
exploiting bounded rationality or cognitive biases, confusing borrowers, and
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manipulation than forecasts based on surveys of employers,
because private lenders would face loan losses if they used overly
optimistic forecasts.194
Indeed, two small lenders are already engaged in “cherry
picking,” funding loans to low risk students at elite MBA
programs at slightly below the federal government’s rates.195
G. Limited Dischargeability of Student Loans in Bankruptcy
Reduces Lender Incentives to Monitor Students and RiskAdjust Student Loan Pricing
Any investment, including education, involves some risk of
failure and loss. Although investment risks are typically shared
in part by lenders and in part by borrowers,196 risk sharing is
limiting their ability to comparison-shop. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren,
Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2008); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction
by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1415–20 (2004); Susan Block-Lieb & Edward
J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and
the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1528–48
(2006); Simkovic, The Effect of BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and
Prices, supra note 169, at 21; Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing:
A Consumer’s Guide 3–6 (Univ. of Chi., Olin Law & Econ. Program, Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 253, 2006), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=772186.
194. The incentive to make accurate forecasts could be enhanced by making
student loans more readily dischargeable.
195. One lender, Social Finance (or SoFi), initially funded Stanford Business
School students and is now expanding to other elite schools. The other,
CommonBond, is starting at the University of Pennsylvania Wharton School of
Business. Both offer in-school loans at 6.24%, slightly below the 6.8% and 7.9%
rates charged by the federal student loan program. See Ann Carrns, SoFi
Tapping Alumni to Help with Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES BUCKS BLOG (Apr. 3,
2012, 12:12 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/sofi-tapping-alumnito-help-with-student-loans/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); COMMONBOND, http://www. commonbond.com/ (last visited
Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Roberto Vargas,
SoFi Loans Popular with GSB, STAN. DAILY (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://www.stanforddaily.com/2012/04/11/sofi-loans-popular-with-gsb/ (last visited
Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Erin Zlomek, To
Fund Your MBA, Borrow From Alums, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 5, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-07-05/to-fund-your-mba-borrow-fromalums (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
196. See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 6–10 (1986) (discussing rationales
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limited in U.S. education finance. Instead, risks are imposed
primarily on student borrowers.197 Risks are shifted from lenders
to student borrowers by restricting student-loan debtors’ access to
a bankruptcy discharge and curbing exemptions from collections
for income sources such as social security retirement and
disability benefits.198
This risk-shifting toward student borrowers implicitly
reflects an assumption that individual student borrowers are in a
better position to assess and bear the risks of education than is
the government or a private lender.199 However, as discussed
above in Parts III and IV, there are strong theoretical and
practical reasons to believe that the government as creditor may
often be in a better position to evaluate the risk of education and
spread that risk, and risk should therefore be shared more
equally.200
for limited liability); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW 229–30 (1986) (analogizing the bankruptcy discharge for individuals to
limited liability for corporate investors); Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock &
Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law,
30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 127 (1980) (explaining risk sharing in the corporate
context); Richard Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 507–09 (1976) (arguing that limited liability for corporations
is desirable because it enables shareholders to share risks of losses with
creditors).
197. Understanding Default, supra note 152; see also infra notes 210–24 and
accompanying text (discussing limits on dischargeability in bankruptcy); cf.
Section V.H. (discussing a recent shift toward greater debt forgiveness for
federal student loan borrowers through income based repayment plans).
198. Facing Loan Default, supra note 197.
199. See JACKSON, supra note 196, at 229 (“Recent scholarly treatments of
discharge law have focused on whether the debtor or the creditor is the superior
risk bearer and whether discharge should be presumptively available.”);
Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 982
(arguing that debtors are more able to control their financial activities and
judge their financial circumstances than lenders, thus debtors are presumably
more able to bear risks); id. at 981 (“A discharge system provides a technique for
allocating the risk between a debtor and his creditors.”); id. at 982 (arguing that
a debtor is presumably better able to bear risks than creditors because a debtor
is “in greater control of [his] financial activities than any particular lender” and
therefore a better judge of his own circumstances).
200. See, e.g., Barr-Gill & Warren, supra note 193, at 69–74 (discussing the
need for safety regulation in various consumer credit markets because of
limitations on information and rationality); Katherine Porter, College Lessons:
The Financial Risks of Dropping Out, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE
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Thomas Jackson explains the policy goals behind the
bankruptcy discharge as one of nuanced paternalistic regulation
of credit.201 The goal is to protect debtors by enlisting
sophisticated creditors:
In each case [of risky activities] society decides—or should
decide—at what point the expected costs of a given activity
outweigh the prospective benefits to the individual and society.
Borrowing, however, cannot be regulated by means of the
rough and general rules . . . . Discharge policy provides an
alternative . . . . Discharge . . . heightens creditors’ incentives
to monitor: by providing for a right of discharge, society enlists
creditors in the effort to oversee the individual’s credit
decisions . . . . The availability of the right of discharge induces
creditors to restrict the individual’s credit intake and thus to
assist in ensuring that he does not seriously underestimate his
future needs. 202

In theory, restricting access to discharge for student borrowers
should reduce (though not eliminate) lenders’ risk of loss203 and
thereby reduce lenders incentives to monitor borrowers and to
ration and price credit according to risk.204
MIDDLE CLASS 97 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (discussing advantages of risk
sharing through a more generous discharge and higher interest rates for
student loans); Kenneth Ayotte, Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship: The Value of
a Fresh Start, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 161, 164 (2007) (arguing that it is efficient
to grant entrepreneurs more generous debt relief in bankruptcy to maintain expost incentives that reward effort by the entrepreneur); John A. E. Pottow,
Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 431–
32 (arguing that credit card lenders who lend to those who are unlikely to be
able to repay should face legal liability because of their “competitive advantage
in determining the repayment capacity of individuals”); John A. E. Pottow,
Ability to Pay (U. Mich. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 237, 2011) available at
http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1844570 (arguing in favor of the requirement under
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 that mortgage lenders only lend to borrowers who
they believe have the ability to repay the loans).
201. JACKSON, supra note 196, at 248–52.
202. Id. at 248–49.
203. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit
Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 379–81 (arguing that delaying bankruptcy
discharge benefits creditors by extending the time period during which they can
collect); Simkovic, supra note 169, at 1 (finding that bankruptcy reforms that
restricted consumer borrowers’ access to a Chapter 7 discharge reduced credit
card lenders’ losses).
204. See also Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed
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These predictions hold true with respect to the student loan
market. Government and private lenders could protect
themselves from losses due to default by engaging in good
underwriting205—that is, by assessing the riskiness of different
student borrowers and different courses of education, adjusting
the pricing and availability of credit accordingly, and
subsequently accepting and spreading losses. However, rather
than undertake the socially useful task of evaluating students’
career and income prospects based on their academic
performance and chosen field of study—and sharing this
information with students through disclosures of differential loan
pricing—lenders price loans uniformly and transfer as much of
the risk as possible to student borrowers.206
There are few credit-market signals to warn students of
danger when they decide where to enroll and what to study. The
government does not restrict loans to students who wish to
attend relatively high-risk educational institutions.207 Nor does
the government differentially price student loans according to
borrower-specific or program-specific risks.208 Student borrowers,
however, are sorely in need of good information. The

Case for Special Treatment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 61, 62–64 (2009) (arguing that
special protections in bankruptcy for derivatives reduce banks’ incentives to
monitor derivatives counterparties and contribute to financial instability);
Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 319,
331–32 (2010) (same); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities
as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 550–51 (2011) (same);
Jackson, supra note 196, at 248–49 (same); Simkovic, Secret Liens and the
Financial Crisis of 2008, supra note 70, at 262 (same).
205. See Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, supra
note 70 (explaining the underwriting process for mortgages).
206. Although many private student lenders purport to engage in “riskbased” pricing, they often do so based on credit scores, which may reflect the
credit history of the student’s parents rather than the future earning potential
and creditworthiness of the student. See Credit Scores, FINAID.ORG,
http://www.finaid.org/loans/creditscores.phtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also supra Part IV.C (discussing
“opportunity pricing”). There are, however signs that at least some private
lenders are beginning to price differences in earnings risks across programs. See
supra notes 160, 173.
207. See supra Part II.B.
208. See supra Part II.D.
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consequences to student borrowers of making the wrong choice
can be severe and lifelong.209
Whereas the U.S. Bankruptcy Code generally gives
individual borrowers an “insurance policy” against failure in the
form of a bankruptcy discharge,210 student loans are somewhat
more difficult to discharge than most kinds of debt.211 Student
loans have become more difficult to discharge through a series of
amendments enacted over the last forty years, ostensibly to
protect taxpayers by shifting risks onto students.
Federally-backed student loans have been available for many
decades, first under the NDEA in the late 1950s and early 1960s,
and subsequently under the HEA starting in 1965.212 Until 1976,
209. See Atkinson, supra note 9, at 5 n.13 (explaining that student loan debt
can have negative consequences); Porter, supra note 200, at 85–100 (arguing
that educational debt is risky because, although completing a four-year college
degree reduces the risk of bankruptcy by increasing income, attending college
without completing a four-year degree exacerbates financial distress by
increasing debt without significantly increasing income); id. at 96–97
The burdens of student loan debt have consequences for people’s
financial futures [including] a lower rate of saving . . . retarding
opportunity for other family members . . . defer[ing] entry into the job
market, losing seniority and reducing the number of working years
they have to save for retirement.
See also Warren, Baum & Sitaraman, supra note 65, at 130 (discussing the
impact of educational debt on life decisions).
210. See Barry Adler et al., Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical
Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 591 (2000) (analogizing bankruptcy discharge to
a form of social insurance, both in terms of its ability to mitigate poverty and in
terms of ex-ante moral hazard concerns); JACKSON, supra note 196, at 230–32
(same).
211. In spite of formal language in the Bankruptcy Code limiting discharge,
some student borrowers have received relief from their loans in bankruptcy. See
Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue
Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 188 (2009) [hereinafter
Pardo & Lacey, Real Student-Loan Scandal].
According to one scholar, relief is often offered to those who seek it, but too
few bankruptcy lawyers attempt to discharge student loans in bankruptcy. See
Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the
Bankruptcy Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495 (2012).
212. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the
Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational
Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 420–21 (2005) [hereinafter Pardo & Lacey, Undue
Hardship] (exploring the dischargeability status of federally insured and
guaranteed student loans during the 1960s and 1970s) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)
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these loans were dischargeable in bankruptcy, the same as credit
card debt or any other unsecured loan.213
In the early 1970s, salacious stories began to circulate in
Congress about young graduates discharging their debts en
masse in bankruptcy shortly after completing their educations.214
According to the rumors, young professionals with few hard
assets to lose and a lifetime of high future incomes around the
corner were opportunistically trying to discharge their student
loan obligations.215
The rumors of strategic default were largely unfounded.
According to research by Professor Rafael Pardo, strategic default
by high-income student debtors was extremely rare.216 Professor
Pardo supports this assertion with both a contemporary study by
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)217 and comments by
members of the House of Representatives.218 Similarly, empirical
studies of student debtors in Canada have found that bankruptcy
(1976) (repealed 1978)).
213. See id.
214. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 137, at 140 (1973); Pardo & Lacey, Real Student
Loan-Scandal, supra note 211, at 419–24.
215. See JACKSON, supra note 196, at 250–51
As a general rule, college and graduate students have few current
assets but large future income streams. Using bankruptcy is
relatively painless to them, as they have few assets to lose, and
obtaining a discharge offers a substantial benefit, as it frees up the
future income stream from the substantial obligation of repaying a
student loan.
216. Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship, supra note 212, at 420
Despite evidence presented to the Commission [on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States] that less than one percent of federally
insured loans were discharged in bankruptcy, its recommendation
essentially sought to preempt “potential abuses,” defaults that
industry representatives of the student loan system anticipated
would occur. The Commission thus reacted viscerally to anecdotal
evidence.
217. Id. The General Accounting Office (GAO) was renamed the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) in 2004. Id. at 423 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595
(1997) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6094, 6100–08).
218. Id. at 422–23 (quoting Representative James O’Hara’s critique of
nondischargeability of student loans as treating student debtors like criminals
or frauds).
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abuse by high-income professionals is rare, and a recent study
has found extremely low student loan default rates among former
U.S. law students.219
Nevertheless, tales of student opportunism may have
persuaded Congress to tighten the rules for student loans. In
1976, a time delay was imposed so that debtors could not
discharge student loans that were incurred within five years
before the bankruptcy filing, unless denial would constitute an
“undue hardship” for the debtor or his or her family.220 Over the
next several decades, Congress further restricted dischargability
of student loans221 and some bankruptcy courts interpreted this
as a cue to raise the bar in their interpretation of “undue
hardship.”222 In 1990, the time-bar was extended from five years
to seven, and in 1998 it became indefinite (i.e., a debtor would be
required to demonstrate “undue hardship,” no matter how long
ago the student loan debts were incurred).223 In 2005, restrictions
on dischargability were extended to fully private loans, not just
guaranteed or direct loans.224
Although various judicial tests have been advanced to clarify
the meaning of “undue hardship,” Professor Pardo’s research
suggests that hardship remains in the eye of the beholder: in
practice, discharge depends more on the particular bankruptcy
judge than on the objectively measurable financial condition of
the student debtor.225
219. Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Government Student Loans, Government Debts
and Bankruptcy: A Comparative Study, 44 CAN. BUS. L.J. 211, 237–38 (20062007) (reviewing the Canadian literature); Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 186
(showing very low student loan default rates among former law students who
entered repayment from 1990 to 2010).
220. Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship, supra note 212, at 420–21 (citing
Higher Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90 Stat.
2081, 2141 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976), repealed by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 316, 92 Stat. 2549, 2678 (effective Oct.
1, 1979))).
221. Id. at 427; John A.E. Pottow, The Nondischargeability of Student Loans
in Personal Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CAN. BUS. L.J.
245, 249–50 (2006); Braucher, supra note 71, at 473.
222. Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship, supra note 212, at 428.
223. Braucher, supra note 71, at 473–74.
224. Id. at 473–74.
225. Pardo & Lacey, Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 211, at 185;
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Many scholars have questioned whether these special
restrictions on discharge of student loans were needed to prevent
abuse of the bankruptcy system by strategic defaulters. Most
scholars conclude that special protections for student loans are
unnecessary, empirically or theoretically unjustifiable, or that
other factors weigh heavily in favor of a shift toward greater
dischargeability.
For example, Thomas Jackson,226 Rafael Pardo,227 Katherine
Porter,228 John Pottow,229 and Abbye Atkinson,230 have all pointed
out that student loan abuse would be curtailed through other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In 1984, the Bankruptcy Code
was amended so that a bankruptcy court could dismiss a case
without granting a discharge if the petitioner’s debts were
“primarily consumer debts” and if granting a discharge “would be
a substantial abuse” of the bankruptcy system.231 These antiabuse provisions were strengthened in 2005.232 Perhaps Congress
was concerned that some student loans would not meet the
threshold test as “consumer debts” because they were incurred
with a “profit motive”—that is, the student borrower expected the
degree to boost future income by more than direct educational
costs and opportunity costs.233
Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship, supra note 212, at 411, 478–509; cf. Iuliano,
supra note 211.
226. See JACKSON, supra note 196, at 251.
227. See Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship, supra note 212, at 430–31.
228. See Porter, supra note 200, at 98.
229. See Pottow, supra note 221, at 251–55.
230. See Atkinson, supra note 9, at 34–37.
231. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006); see also id. § 1325(a)(3) (requiring that a
Chapter 13 plan be “proposed in good faith”).
232. The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA) changed the standard for dismissal of a Chapter 7 petition from
“substantial abuse” to “abuse” and eliminated a presumption in favor of
granting the debtor relief. Id. § 707(b)(1); 6-707 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 707.4
(16th ed. 2011).
233. See In re Dickerson, 193 B.R. 67, 70 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (finding
that student loans were not consumer debt); In re Gentri, 185 B.R. 368, 373
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding that medical school loans were not consumer
debts); In re Hill, No. 94-01881, 1994 WL 738663, at *1 (Bankr. D. Idaho Dec.
22, 1994) (finding that student loan debt was not consumer debt); In re Groves,
160 B.R. 121, 123 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993) (finding that student loans were not
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However, if the concern is that student loans might be
profitable investments, then why should a legitimate investment
in human capital subject the student investor to unique risks
that do not apply to investors in any other form of capital?
Conversely, why should a “substantial abuse” standard not apply
equally to other unsecured business debts?234 The Bankruptcy
Code already limits discharge of debts obtained by fraud or false
pretenses, regardless of whether those debts are business or
consumer debts.235 So why is greater protection required for
student loans?
John Pottow explores several possible theoretical
justifications for the special limitations on the discharge of
student loans, and finds all of them wanting.236 Professor Pottow
considers the possibility that student debtors are particularly
dishonest and student loans presumptively fraudulent and the
similar possibility that the inalienability of an education and
higher future wages incentivizes opportunistic behavior.237 He
finds both theories consistent with the treatment of student
debtors under U.S. law,238 but empirically doubtful in light of
research by Professor Pardo and the GAO.239 Professor Pottow
“consumer” debts for purposes of classification under a Chapter 13 plan). But see
In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796, 806–07 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that medical school
loans that were used for living expenses rather than tuition and books were
consumer debts); In re Millikan, No. 07-01759-AJM-7, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4696,
at *7–17 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Sept. 4, 2007) (finding that student loans were
consumer debts notwithstanding debtor’s profit motive).
234. See Pottow, supra note 221, at 254 (“In fact, in business, far from being
disparaged as fomenting ‘opportunism,’ the bankruptcy discharge is styled as
fostering “entrepreneurialism.”).
235. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A); Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship, supra
note 212, at 430.
236. See Pottow, supra note 221, at 276 (“[T]he most attractive [theories for
restricting student loan discharge] seem to be the ones least reflected in many of
the current bankruptcy laws, just as the ones most recognizable in today’s
statutes seem grounded in confusion and myth.”).
237. Id. at 251–55.
238. Id. (“The theory that comes closest to persuasion as to why student
loans should have restricted dischargeability in bankruptcy is that of the
opportunistic debtor, ‘softly’ defrauding the system if she walks away from
publicly subsidized debt that enables a high-income career.”).
239. Id. at 255 (“T]here seems to be a documented lack of empirical evidence
supporting routine abuse by rich-career students using bankruptcy just out of
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suggests that much of the opposition to dischargability of student
loans stems from a kind of class envy—a vision of student debtors
as individuals who became rich at the expense of the public.240
Pottow therefore argues for income-contingent repayment to
reduce the burdens on debtors who have lower incomes.241
Apparently in agreement with Professor Pottow, several
scholars argue for greater student loan forgiveness toward those
for whom education does not produce a private financial benefit.
Abbye Atkinson presents evidence that African Americans receive
less financial benefit from education than whites, and argues that
the
nondischargeability
of
student
loans
therefore
disproportionately harms college-educated African Americans.242
Kathryn Porter presents evidence that those who receive
some college education but do not complete a four-year degree—
either because they pursue a two-year associate’s degree or
vocational program, or because they drop out prior to completing
a four-year degree—will often be in a worse financial position
than those who never attended college at all.243 Porter argues for
greater forgiveness for those who fail to complete their educations
because of family or financial misfortune.244

school.”).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 276–78.
242. See Atkinson, supra note 9, at 2–5; id. at 5–6
Congress has largely placed the burden and risk of paying for college
firmly on the shoulders of the student . . . . [T]hese educational loan
policies may reveal a judgment, however inadvertent, about who, as a
practical matter, should and who should not be going to college. More
troubling is that this judgment seems to track racial divisions.
243. See Porter, supra note 200, at 85–100 (arguing that educational debt is
risky because, although completing a four-year college degree reduces the risk of
bankruptcy by increasing income, attending college without completing a fouryear degree exacerbates financial distress by increasing debt without
significantly increasing income); id. at 96–97
The burdens of student loan debt have consequences for people’s
financial futures [including] a lower rate of saving, . . . retarding
opportunity for other family members, . . . defer[ring] entry into the
job market, losing seniority and reducing the number of working
years they have to save for retirement.
244. Id. at 98–100.
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Jean Braucher questions the nondischargeability of student
loans for those who attend low-quality institutions that do little
to enhance their students’ career prospects, particularly given the
governments’ limited efforts to police educational quality and
protect students from deceptive sales and marketing practices.245
Professor and now Senator Elizabeth Warren argues that
college-educated individuals who forgo a higher paying job in the
private sector to pursue public service after graduation should
receive more generous loan forgiveness.246 Professor Warren
bases her argument in part on an assumption that individuals
who work in public service are undercompensated relative to the
value they contribute to society.247
H. Income-Based Repayment Plans
The scholarly arguments for greater student loan forgiveness
have been partially successful. Although the Bankruptcy Code
continues to restrict student loan discharge, debt forgiveness has
been advanced through recent changes to federal student loan
programs known as income based repayment plans (IBR),
introduced in 2007 through the College Cost Reduction and
Access Act.248 Under IBR, federal student loan payments are
capped at a percentage of the student debtor’s income, typically
around 10%.249 The payment decreases as the number of people in
the debtor’s household increases.250 After the student debtor
245. Braucher, supra note 71, at 462–65.
246. Warren, Baum & Sitaraman, supra note 65, at 131–36, 142.
247. Id. at 142 (“By tying debt forgiveness to public service, Americans
would have the chance to say that everyone who does this kind of work deserves
a substantial reward from the rest of us. No longer would public service
opportunities be limited to a few poorly funded programs.”).
248. For an overview of the new Income Based Repayment Plan, see Philip
G. Schrag & Charles W. Pruett, Coordinating Loan Repayment Assistance
Programs with New Federal Legislation, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 583, 590–97 (2010).
249. The annual payment is 15% multiplied by the amount by which the
debtor’s adjusted gross income exceeds 150% of the poverty level for a household
the size of the debtor’s family. This will usually work out to around 10% of the
debtor’s adjusted gross income. Id. at 590–91.
250. Id. at 594 (“A larger family entitles the borrower to a larger deduction,
and therefore permits a smaller monthly payment.”).
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makes all payments for a number of years, any remaining debt is
forgiven.
Consistent with Professor Warren’s views,251 IBR is more
generous to student debtors who work in the public sector. Public
sector workers need only work and make payments for ten years
prior to forgiveness of the balance of their federal student loans,
whereas private sector workers must work and make payments
for twenty to twenty-five years.252 If the debtor’s income rises so
that payments would be lower under a traditional (non-IBR) tenyear repayment plan, debtors may instead make the lower
traditional ten-year payment.253
IBR is less attractive than discharge in bankruptcy. IBR debt
forgiveness may result in taxable income to student debtors who
work in the private sector,254 whereas a bankruptcy discharge is
not treated as income.255 Whereas a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
discharge would provide immediate relief,256 and a Chapter 13
bankruptcy discharge would provide relief after a three-to-fiveyear period of income-based repayment,257 IBR requires ten to
251. For Warren’s views generally on student loans and public sector
employment, see supra notes 246–50 and accompanying text.
252. Schrag & Pruett, supra note 248, at 591–92; see also Alison Damast,
Obama’s New ‘Pay as You Earn’ Plan a Windfall for MBAs, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 2, 2012 (describing a new federal plan that provides
student loan forgiveness after 20 years); Philip G. Schrag, Failing Law Schools:
Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Missile, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming
2013) (same).
253. Schrag & Pruett, supra note 248, at 591.
254. Id. at 593; see also 26 U.S.C. § 108(f) (2006) (describing the income from
discharge of indebtedness with respect to student loans). Debt forgiveness is
treated as taxable income to the extent the student is balance-sheet solvent or
rendered balance-sheet solvent by the forgiveness, that is, the debtors’ assets
exceed the debtors’ liabilities at the time of the forgiveness. See id. § 108(d)(3))
(defining “insolvent”); id. § 108(a)(1)(B) (providing for exclusion of discharge
income if “the discharge occurs when taxpayer is insolvent”); id. § 108(a)(3)
(defining the limitation on the insolvency exclusion).
255. Id. § 108(a)(1)(A).
256. Post-petition wages are not property of the estate under 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(6) for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Hellums, 772 F.2d 379,
380 (2nd Cir. 1985) (per curiam). A Chapter 7 discharge will therefore leave the
debtor’s future wage income unencumbered.
257. A five-year repayment plan is required in Chapter 13 for above-median
income debtors. The payments are based on the debtor’s income, less minimal
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twenty-five years of repayment. The lengthy repayment period
under IBR may mitigate moral hazard.258 IBR is formulaic, and
may therefore be less expensive to administer and more
consistently applied than the “undue hardship” standard in
bankruptcy.259
IBR reduces the downside risk of education, and may provide
welcome relief to student debtors who are in a difficult financial
position. However, IBR only provides relief ex-post. It does not
generate information or establish incentives that lead to a more
efficient allocation of educational resources ex-ante.
Risk-based pricing is compatible with IBR and could
incorporate risk of loss due to borrowers entering IBR. To the
extent that IBR is intended as a back-door wage subsidy for
public service workers, losses from IBR for students entering
public service could be excluded from risk-based pricing.

living expenses. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(d), 1325(b) (2012).
258. See D. Bruce Johnstone, Conventional Fixed-schedule versus Income
Contingent Repayment Obligations: Is there a Best Loan Scheme?, 34 HIGHER
EDUC. EUR. 189, 190–91 (2009) (describing a proposed hybrid of incomecontingent and traditional loans in which reduction in payments due to low
incomes would be deferred over longer repayment periods, not necessarily fully
forgiven at earlier stages); Pottow, supra note 221, at 267–68 (indicating that
the use of longer time periods in loan forgiveness programs serves to “smoke out
the false debtor”); Bruce Chapman, Income Contingent Loans for Higher
Education: International Reform (Austl. Nat’l Univ. Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y
Research, Discussion Paper No. 491, 2005), http://cbe.anu.edu.au/
research/papers/ceprdpapers/DP491.pdf; cf. SHILLER, supra note 148, at 140–46
(attributing the failure of Yale’s Tuition Postponement Option—a voluntary
program in the 1970s that linked repayment obligations to wages and reflects
general problems encountered by such programs—to moral hazard and adverse
selection problems, exacerbated by a failure to distinguish between students
with different majors); Marc Nerlove, Some Problems in the Use of Incomecontingent Loans for the Finance of Higher Education, 83 J. POL. ECON. 157,
160–65, 180 (1975) (noting that previous IBR programs have suffered from
moral hazard and adverse selection problems).
259. See Pottow, supra note 221, at 268 (describing the application of “the
U.S. ‘undue hardship’ test” as “an unpredictable and expensive way” to “backend income-contingency into the American system”).
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VI. Ethical Considerations and the Limits of Risk-Based Pricing
A. Factors That Predict Student Loan Defaults
The most important predictor of default is probably the
student borrower’s employment prospects and whether postgraduation income is adequate to service educational debts.260
Studies have also found that students are less likely to default if
they are employed in a field that is related to their major.261 Some
studies report that defaults are lower for STEM majors.262
Students who drop out are much more likely to default, and
attrition can be predicted from poor academic performance both
before college and during college. 263
260. See Thomas A. Flint, Predicting Student Loan Defaults, 68 J. HIGHER
EDUC. 322, 344 (1997) (noting that in contrast to other factors, “the borrowers’
own disposable incomes do significantly influence default”); Jacob P. K. Gross et
al., What Matters in Student Loan Default: A Review of the Research Literature,
39 J. STUDENT FIN. AID, no. 1, 2009, at 23 (“Most students who default do so
because their personal income is inadequate to keep up with their payments.”);
Laura G. Knapp & Terry G. Seaks, An Analysis of the Probability of Default on
Federally Guaranteed Student Loans, 74 REV. ECON. & STAT. 404, 410 (1992)
(noting that graduation correlates strongly with lower default, perhaps because
it increases job and wage prospects); Kirk Montverde, Managing Student Loan
Default Risk: Evidence from a Privately Guaranteed Portfolio, 41 RES. HIGHER
EDUC. 331, 336, 350–52 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of the individual
student’s ability to attain employment); J. Fredericks Volkwein et al., Factors
Associated with Student Loan Default Among Different Racial and Ethnic
Groups, 69 J. HIGHER EDUC. 206, 223, 228 (1998) (“[E]ven though student
borrowers with advanced degrees emerge from college with higher levels of debt,
their investment generally enables them to enter careers that . . . make loan
repayment more likely.”).
261. Flint, supra note 260, at 346.
262. See id. at 330; Volkwein et al., supra note 260, at 222; see also J.
Fredericks Volkwein & Bruce Szelest, Individual and Campus Characteristics
Associated with Student Loan Default, 36 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 41, 41–72 (1995)
(suggesting that while type of major is “not itself significantly influential in
default,” a science or technology major may have “an indirect influence”).
263. See Flint, supra note 260, at 330 (higher grade point average and
graduation both decrease the probability of nonpayment of loans); Knapp &
Seaks, supra note 260, at 408 (noting that “[t]he single variable with the
greatest statistical and economic significance is the occurrence of the student’s
graduation”); Montverde, supra note 260, at 336 (noting that studies had found
“degree completion” and “college GPA” as “significantly predictive of default
risk”); Volkwein et al., supra note 260, at 222 (“[D]egree completion has a
dramatic influence on lowering the rate of loan default.”).
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Other individual characteristics that have been shown to
predict default include race,264 age,265 parental education
264. Student borrowers who are members of racial minority groups are more
likely to default than white students, and African Americans are the most likely
to default, and this relation holds true even after controlling for post-graduation
income. Gross et al., supra note 260, at 21–22; see also MATT STEINER & NATALI
TESZLER, TEX. GUARANTEED & TEX. A&M UNIV., THE CHARACTERISTICS
ASSOCIATED WITH STUDENT LOAN DEFAULT AT TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 48 (2003),
http://www.tgslc.org/pdf/tamu_default_study.pdf (finding that white borrowers
at Texas A&M in College Station “[had] default rates below the average,” while
minorities had above-average rates, with “black borrowers hav[ing] the highest
default rate”); J. Frederick Volkwein & Alberto Cabrera, Who Defaults on
Student Loans? The Effects of Race, Class, and Gender on Borrower Behavior, in
CONDEMNING STUDENTS TO DEBT: COLLEGE LOANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 105, 109
(Richard Fossey & Mark Bateman eds. 1998) [hereinafter Volkwein & Cabrera]
(“African and Native American borrowers from all institution types have high
default rates.”); Dana E. Christman, Multiple Realities: Characteristics of Loan
Defaulters at a Two-year Public Institution, 27 COMMUNITY COLL. REV. 16, 23–25
(2000) (noting a study in which “default rates were found to be higher for
minority students” and data to support the notion that “Non-Whites” are more
likely to default); Laura L. Greene, An Economic Analysis of Student Loan
Default, 11 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 61, 61–68 (1989) (noting that
African American status correlates with higher default and higher default
amount); Elizabeth Herr & Larry Burt, Predicting Student Loan Default For
The University Of Texas at Austin, 35 J. STUDENT FIN. AID, no. 2, 2005, at 37
(2005) (noting the results of the study “impl[y] that minority students,
particularly Blacks and Hispanics, are at a greater risk of default); Knapp &
Seaks, supra note 260, at 408 (noting that African Americans are more likely to
default); Volkwein & Szelest, supra note 262, at 51–52 (showing data that
indicates higher default rates for African Americans and Native Americans);
Wellford W. Wilms, Richard W. Moore & Roger E. Bolus, Whose Fault Is
Default? A Study of The Impact of Student Characteristics and Institutional
Practices on Guaranteed Student Loan Default Rates in California, 9 EDUC.
EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 41, 46 (1987) (“Blacks have the highest
propensity to default . . . .”). This may be due to higher dropout rates, higher
divorce rates, lower wealth levels, and larger numbers of dependents. Volkwein,
et al., supra note 260, at 224–25. A risk-based approach that focused on
expected income as the sole proxy for ability to pay would probably under
predict defaults by minority borrowers and help maintain educational access for
students from diverse backgrounds.
265. Older students are more likely to default. See, e.g., JENNIE H. WOO,
CLEARING ACCOUNTS: THE CAUSES OF STUDENT LOAN DEFAULT 6 (2002),
http://cdm16254.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p178
601ccp2/id/29 08/rec/3 (“Older students default more often than younger ones.”);
Christman, supra note 264, at 23 (noting that “being over 25 years old [was a]
characteristic associated with high default rates’’); Flint, supra note 260, at 347
(noting that it is uncertain why “older borrowers constitute a greater risk for
default”). But see STEINER & TESZLER, supra note 264, at 48 (finding that for
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levels,266 family income levels,267 family structure,268 debt
burdens, and (for law students) credit scores.269
Characteristics of educational institutions may not provide
much additional predictive accuracy. Although two-year
community colleges have higher default rates than traditional
nonprofit four-year institutions—and wealthier institutions tend
students at Texas A&M in College Station that “[b]orrowers between the ages of
23 and 26 have the lowest default rate (3.2 percent), with both younger
borrowers and older borrowers representing increased levels of default risk”);
Herr & Burt, supra note 264, at 39 (noting that while students “over 40 have
higher loan default rates than borrowers in their late twenties and thirties,” so
do younger borrowers, i.e., “between the ages of 20–24”).
266. Students whose parents are less educated are more likely to default.
See SANDRA BARONE, MATT STEINER & NATALI TESZLER, TEX. GUARANTEED
STUDENT LOAN CORP., MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF STUDENT LOAN DEFAULTERS AT
TEXAS
A&M
UNIVERSITY-KINGSVILLE
23–24
(2005),
available
at
http://www.tgslc.org/pdf/tamu_k_multivariate_analysis.pdf
(indicating
that
parental education level, if sufficiently high, “may reflect a borrower’s previous
exposure to responsibilities such as repaying a student loan”); STEINER &
TESZLER, supra note 264, at 49, 51 (finding that for students of Texas A&M in
College Station, parental education attainment generally relates inversely to
rate of default); Volkwein, et al., supra note 260, at 215 (noting that one of the
features “associated with low levels of loan default include . . . a collegeeducated parent”); Volkwein & Szelest, supra note 262, at 51–52 (showing tables
indicating higher default rates for those whose parents have lower education
levels); Herr & Burt, supra note 264, at 35 (showing higher rates of default for
lower mother and father educational attainment levels).
267. Students whose parents have lower incomes are more likely to default.
See STEINER & TESZLER, supra note 264, at 57 (finding that for students at Texas
A&M in College Station, “[i]n general, default rates decrease as income
increases”); WOO, supra note 265, at 5 (“[A]mple family resources, either higher
incomes or assets, significantly lowered the probability of default.”); Knapp &
Seaks, supra note 260, at 406 (indicating that parental income level is a
significant factor and correlates negatively with default); Volkwein et al., supra
note 260, at 221 (highlighting “parent income below $17,000” as one of three
factors resulting in “significant increases in the probability of loan default”);
Volkwein & Szelest, supra note 264, at 51–52 (showing higher rates of default
for lower parental income levels); Wilms et al., supra note 264, at 42 (indicating
that previous studies had shown that “[l]ow family income [is] also associated
with high defaults”); Herr & Burt, supra note 264, at 37 (noting that, in line
with the results of other studies, “students whose parents have higher incomes
are less likely to default”).
268. Students who are divorced or separated or who have dependents are
more likely to default. See Montverde, supra note 260, at 336; Volkwein &
Szelest, supra note 262, at 57.
269. Montverde, supra note 260, at 340–44.
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to have lower default rates—studies suggest that higher default
institutions’ loan performance may be due to these institutions
disproportionately
serving
students
whose
individual
characteristics make them more likely to default—for example,
students who are from lower income or less wealthy families.270
B. Preserving Equal Opportunity, Social Mobility, and Individual
Choice
Although risk-based pricing involves technical analysis of
data, it also implicates important ethical considerations. As
discussed above, risk-based pricing reduces the transfer of value
from low-risk borrowers to high-risk borrowers by forcing all
borrowers to internalize their own risks.
In some situations, differences in relative risk levels may be
driven by choices and behaviors that can be changed, and that we
might affirmatively wish to encourage borrowers to change. In
such situations uniform pricing creates moral hazard—that is,

270. Gross et al., supra note 260, at 21; see also Flint, supra note 260, at 348
(noting that “[l]arge numbers of low-income and minority students enroll in
proprietary schools,” which also tend to have higher rates of default); Knapp &
Seaks, supra note 260, at 406–07, 410 (finding the variables of two-year versus
four-year institution not statistically significant and concluding that “individual
characteristics, and not institutional characteristics, [that] are key determinates
of default”); Montverde, supra note 260, at 351–52 (indicating that personal
characteristics like the “borrower-based credit effect” overcome institutional
factors in determining default probability, and underlying factors that affect
individual capacity to repay such as “location” or the “prevailing . . . labor
market” are what “may actually lie behind the apparent school effect”);
Volkwein & Cabrera, supra note 264, at 109–13 (finding, inter alia, that
incidences of default at certain institutions are primarily attributed to certain
minority groups and “organizational characteristics of institutions” do not have
a significant effect on default); Volkwein et al., supra note 260, at 226, 231–33
(indicating that in controlling for student characteristics, institutional
characteristics had no significant impact on probability of default and certain
institutions tend to attract students with greater default risk that is beyond the
control of the institution, dependent instead on personal characteristics); cf.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: STUDENT OUTCOMES
VARY AT FOR-PROFIT, NONPROFIT, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5–8 (2011) (finding worse
outcomes at proprietary institutions after controlling for student
characteristics).
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uniform pricing encourages high-risk behavior.271 Risk-based
pricing could improve efficiency by forcing borrowers to
internalize risk and thereby cause them to make more
responsible choices. The most obvious example would be choice of
courses and major, which is almost entirely under the student’s
control. Indeed, students from disadvantaged backgrounds
already disproportionately choose fields of study linked to higher
post-graduation wages.272 Risk-based pricing would benefit these
students by reducing the total cost of their educations.
In other situations, relative risk levels may be driven by
factors that are beyond the borrower’s control. In such cases, we
might question the propriety of compounding misfortune by
charging the unfortunate a higher interest rate than the
fortunate. In such situations, risk-based pricing is unlikely to
improve efficiency because borrowers cannot reduce their risk
levels by making different decisions.
The most obvious examples of factors that are outside the
realm of choice and may predict default risk include race273 and
parents’ socio-economic status.274 Parental financial resources are
271. See Sam Ramsey Harking & M. Rashidian, Student Loan Default:
Borrower Characteristics, Institutional Practices, and the Business Cycle, 20 J.
EDUC. FIN. 449, 463 (1995).
272. See supra note 133 and accompanying text; see also WILLIAM G. BOWEN
& DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 70–72 (1998)
(finding that black and white students at selective colleges were equally likely to
major in engineering, natural science, and economics); id. at 99–103 (finding
that black graduates of selective colleges were more likely than white graduates
of selective colleges to attend law schools and medical schools, and also more
likely to attend top programs in law, medicine, or business); cf. ARCIDIACONO ET
AL., supra note 17, at 3 (“Although blacks and whites initially have similar
interests regarding whether to major in the more strictly graded fields [of
natural science, engineering, and economics], the patterns of switching result in
68% of blacks choosing humanities and social science majors compared to less
than 55% of whites.”).
273. Black male college graduates earn less than white male college
graduates, even after controlling for socioeconomic status, SAT scores, high
school grades, college selectivity, college major, college class rank, graduate
school, and sector of employment. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 272, at 144–48.
274. Students from higher socioeconomic status backgrounds earn more
than those from low socioeconomic status backgrounds. BOWEN & BOK, supra
note 272, at 136. The relation is partly due to higher socioeconomic students
being more likely to attend graduate school. Id. However, higher SES students
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strong predictors of the likelihood of default, but students do not
get to choose their parents.275 Even credit scores of students will
sometimes reflect the credit histories of their parents rather than
choices made by the individual student.
C. Risk-Based Pricing and Choice of Major
As discussed above, risk-based pricing reduces the transfer of
value from low-risk borrowers to high-risk borrowers by forcing
all borrowers to internalize their own risks. Choice of major or
field of graduate study probably represents the clearest example
of student loan risk driven by a borrower’s personal decision. The
data suggests that there are certain majors that are much lower
risk than others, as measured by post-graduation wages and debt
to income ratios—specifically, engineering, certain science and
technology majors, and business majors are relatively low-risk.276
By contrast, humanities and education majors are relatively high
risk.277 Many of the differences in wages across majors and
related occupations persist even after controlling for differences
in student ability. Risk-based pricing of student loans would
encourage more college students to choose majors that would
better prepare them for post-graduation employment
opportunities, could reduce unemployment rates, and reduce
default rates on student loans.
Some may be concerned that risk-based pricing would
channel too many students who are incapable of succeeding in
STEM or business into these majors and produce a surplus of
low-quality scientists or engineers. The data does not support this
view. Although there are differences in average standardized test
scores across majors, there is substantial overlap in the
distribution of abilities across majors, and many students in
earn more even after controlling for race, gender, SAT scores, high school
grades, college selectivity, college major, college class rank, graduate school, and
sector of employment. Id. at 136–38.
275. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also supra note 232 and
accompanying text.
277. Supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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majors with low value in the labor market should be capable of
succeeding in fields that are more highly valued in the labor
market. Indeed, business majors have among the lowest
standardized test scores, but have above-average labor market
outcomes.278 Figures 7.1 and 7.2 below highlight the overlapping
distribution of abilities of students in different fields.
Specifically, the charts show what percent of GRE test-takers
intent on graduate study in various fields scored higher on the
quantitative portion of the GRE than the median test taker
intent on studying business (7.1) or engineering (7.2).

278. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text; see also EDUC. TESTING
SERV., GRE GUIDE TO THE USE OF SCORES 2010–11, at 17–19 (2010),
http://www.ets.org/s/gre/pdf/2010-11_gre_guide.pdf (providing in Table 4 GRE
scores by intended major of those taking the test); Arcidiacono, supra note 142,
at 344 (“Even after controlling for selection, large earnings premiums exist for
certain majors.”); STEPHEN D.H. HSU & JAMES SCHOMBERT, UNIV. OF OR. DEP’T OF
PHYSICS, DATA MINING THE UNIVERSITY: COLLEGE GPA PREDICTIONS FROM SAT
SCORES (Apr. 15, 2010), http://arxiv.org/pdf/ 1004.2731v1.pdf (studying a sample
of University of Oregon graduates and finding that SAT scores predict academic
success, but even students with relatively low SAT scores are capable of
succeeding in most college majors—including economics, chemistry, biology, and
computer science).
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Figure 7.1: Many Students Who Currently Choose Lower Value
Fields Have the Ability to Succeed in Higher Value Fields,
Such as Business
Percent of GRE test takers who have quantitative GRE scores that are above the
average scores of students who intend to study business in graduate school, by
intended graduate major, Aug. 2011 - Apr. 2012
Percent of students with high quantitative GRE scores

Physics and Astronomy

90.9%

Mathematical Sciences

90.5%

Economics

81.7%

Chemistry

73.1%

Philosophy

53.8%

Biological Sciences

52.3%

Architecture and Environmental…

50.9%

Agriculture

42.4%

Political Science

41.2%

Religion and Theory

37.7%

Foreign Languages and Literatures

36.8%

Natural Sciences — Other

36.5%

Arts — Performance and Studio
Arts — History, Theory, and Criticism
Anthropology and Archaeology
English Language and Literature

35.0%
31.4%
30.7%
28.7%

Health and Medical Sciences

28.1%

History

28.1%

Education

27.5%

Psychology

27.3%

Sociology

26.9%

Public Administration

26.7%

Library and Archival Sciences
Communications

26.2%
24.6%

Note: Most graduate business students take the GMAT rather than the GRE. Those
taking the GRE may intend to pursue a Ph.D. in business rather than an MBA.
Source: Educational Testing Service, GRE Guide to the Use of Scores (2012), Table 4.
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Figure 7.2: Many Students Who Currently Choose Lower Value
Fields Have the Ability to Succeed in Higher Value Fields, Such
as Engineering
Percent of GRE test takers who have quantitative GRE scores that are above the
average scores of students who intend to study engineering in graduate school, by
intended graduate major, Aug. 2011 - Apr. 2012
Percent of students with high quantitative GRE scores
Mathematical Sciences

66.1%

Physics and Astronomy

61.0%

Economics

49.2%

Chemistry

36.1%

Biological Sciences

17.3%

Architecture and Environmental…

17.1%

Philosophy

16.8%

Agriculture

12.5%

Natural Sciences — Other

11.8%

Political Science

11.4%

Arts — Performance and Studio

11.4%

Religion and Theory

10.8%

Foreign Languages and Literatures

7.8%

Arts — History, Theory, and Criticism

7.2%

Education

7.1%

Communications

7.1%

Public Administration

6.7%

Sociology

6.4%

English Language and Literature

5.9%

History

5.5%

Anthropology and Archaeology

5.3%

Health and Medical Sciences

5.2%

Psychology

5.1%

Library and Archival Sciences

4.9%

Source: Educational Testing Service, GRE Guide to the Use of Scores (2012), Table 4.

Risk-based pricing could make labor market data more
salient to college students by making the long-term consequences
of educational choices apparent the moment the student needs to
borrow. Prior to matriculation, when students have not yet begun
to specialize, students could be offered blended “institutional
rates” that reflect the distribution of majors among graduates of
their college programs. At the start of every subsequent
semester—when students are about to borrow additional money
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to pay tuition—students could be presented with a fixed interest
rate for their new loans279 that reflects the individual students’
course selections280 and developments in the labor market.
Students could also be given an explanation of the
implications of the interest rate for the long-term cost of their
education, and a list of actions they could take that would reduce
their interest rate, such as changing majors and/or courses.281
This could be especially helpful to students from low-income
backgrounds, who may be the least informed about occupational
279. It would be unfair and impractical to change the interest rate for
outstanding loans based on new information that was not available to students
at the time they borrowed. It may also be sensible to permit students to lock in a
rate for a certain number of semesters or years if providing predictability is
more important than encouraging mid-course adjustments.
280. It makes more sense to focus on observable behavior—such as the
courses students actually complete—rather than declarations of intent (i.e., a
declared major). For example, a student might receive the pre-med interest rate
after successfully completing a gatekeeper class such as organic chemistry.
Declarations of intent can more easily be gamed by students seeking a low
interest rate for the early years of a high-risk course of study.
281. Whether risk-based pricing of student loans or economically equivalent
grants would be more effective to change student behavior is an empirical
question. The empirical literature on whether borrowers react rationally to
interest rates is somewhat mixed. See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal, Souphala
Chomsisengphet, Chunlin Liu & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Consumers Choose the
Right Credit Contracts?, 15–17 (Working Paper, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=843826 (finding that a
significant proportion of borrowers make suboptimal choices when trading off
between upfront fees and interest rates, although mistakes become less common
as the amount of money at stake increases); Sumit Agarwal, Paige Marta Skiba
& Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and
Credit Scoring Puzzles?, in 99 AM. ECON. REV., PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
121ST MEETING OF THE AM. ECON. ASS’N 412, 416 (2009) (concluding that some
consumers will borrow using more expensive payday loans even when less
expensive credit card debt is available to them); Block-Lieb & Janger, supra
note 193, at 1535–48 (discussing limitations on consumer borrowers
comprehension of interest rates); David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do
Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior?
Evidence from Credit Card Data, 117 Q. J. ECON. 149, 150–52, 182 (2002)
(finding that borrowers react strongly to credit card interest rates by adjusting
their borrowing up when rates decrease and down when rates increase, and
arguing that previous studies that have found a limited impact of interest rates
suffered from inadequate data on household-specific interest rates). Much of the
literature has focused on subprime consumer debtors, and it is unclear to what
extent it can be generalized to college students.
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wages and the most likely to borrow. And by studying toward
higher wage and lower risk occupations, students from lowincome backgrounds might be able to maximize the economic
value of higher education and their own opportunities for upward
social mobility.
We need not assume that every student chooses a course of
study based purely on financial considerations. All that is
required for risk-based pricing to change behavior is that some
proportion of students are motivated at least in part by financial
considerations, and that monetary incentives coupled with
additional information could change those students’ behavior.
Over the long run, if risk-based pricing of student loans
succeeds in channeling enough students toward high-demand
occupations, the gap between wages in different occupations and
for different college majors could shrink, reducing inequality.
D. The Promise and Perils of “Meritocratic” Risk-Based Pricing
The distinction between risks driven by student choice and
risks driven by misfortune is not always clear-cut. Factors like
class ranking282 or standardized test scores283 may be driven in
part by choice—how much time to devote to studying and how
much to leisure—and in part by innate ability or advantages
related to being from a prosperous family.
However, the use of class ranking284 or test scores could help
channel students toward the areas in which they have the
greatest competitive advantage and therefore the greatest
opportunity for success. For example, notwithstanding the strong
average career prospects for engineers and doctors, it might be
282. Higher grades predict higher earnings, even after controlling for race,
socioeconomic status, gender, SAT scores, college selectivity, college major,
college class rank, graduate school, and sector of employment. BOWEN & BOK,
supra note 272, at 140–42.
283. SAT scores somewhat predict earnings, particularly between low scores
and moderate scores. Id. at 133–35.
284. GPA is a poor measure because of differences in grading distributions
across institutions, majors, courses, and professors. See supra notes 113–23 and
accompanying text. Standardized percentile rankings within each course and
aggregated by major would be more meaningful.
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preferable for great writers with limited spatial abilities to
pursue careers in law or journalism. Risk-based pricing that
incorporates some measure of field-specific ability would do a
better job of sorting students into areas that are the best fit for
the individual student’s talents.
The decision to use factors such as rankings and test scores
as predictors may involve a tradeoff between equality and
efficiency. On average, minorities and students from less
prosperous backgrounds tend to have lower test scores and
grades.285 Nevertheless, grades and test scores remain good
predictors of academic and financial success, even after
controlling for race and socioeconomic status.286 One possible
compromise would be to use class ranking or standardized test
scores that have been adjusted to remove differences that might
be explained by race or parental socioeconomic status.287 Such
an approach, however, would entail subjective and potentially
controversial judgments.288
285. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, REWARDING STRIVERS: HELPING LOW
INCOME STUDENTS SUCCEED IN COLLEGE 10–13 (2010) (noting significantly lower
predicted SAT scores for those who are disadvantaged and black as opposed to
advantaged and white, respectively).
286. Many studies that have questioned the predictive value of the SAT
have used statistically questionable techniques, such as over-controlling (by
using grades or other standardized test scores, which are meant to measure
academic ability and correlate with SAT scores), or truncating the range of
scores by only examining students who already have very similar SAT scores
because they attend the same caliber of institution. Some studies have also
failed to correct for differences in grading distributions. See, e.g., Christopher M.
Berry & Paul R. Sackett, Individual Differences in Course Choice Results in
Underestimation of the Validity of College Admissions Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI.
822, 822 (2009) (“[T]he validity of SAT scores and high school [GPAs] as
predictors of academic performance has been underestimated because of
previous studies’ reliance on flawed performance indicators . . . .”); Nathan R.
Kuncel & Sarah A. Hezlett, Fact and Fiction in Cognitive Ability Testing for
Admissions and Hiring Decisions, 19 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSCYHOL. SCI. 339,
340–44 (2010) (reaffirming the efficacy of standardized testing in predicting
future academic performance despite various studies that questioned the
validity of tests).
287. See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, supra note 285, at 167–75, 185–90 (describing
how a system of adjustment for socioeconomic factors at more extreme ends of
disadvantage may be implemented with respect to the SAT and ACT).
288. For example, in the late 1990s, Educational Testing Services attempted
to develop an alternative SAT “strivers” score that would flag students who
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E. Debt-to-Income Ratios and Paternalistic Borrowing Limits
Student debt levels probably primarily reflect external
circumstances—parental wealth, socioeconomic status, and extent of
parental support—but may also somewhat reflect factors within the
student’s control—whether to attend a more expensive college or
accept a scholarship at a less prestigious institution, whether to live
at home, whether to work during school, or whether to overload on
credits to graduate early. Because some debt-reducing choices might
adversely affect students’ academic performance and career
prospects, risk-adjusting student loans based on debt levels may
disproportionately harm high-ability students of limited means—
precisely the upwardly mobile clientele that federal student loans are
meant to serve.
The focus should not be exclusively on the cost of education—the
focus should be on whether education provides value that exceeds its
cost. Nonprofit universities with higher tuition prices generally spend
more on instruction per student, and, after controlling for student
characteristics, their graduates earn more money.289 Attempts to cap
tuition, including arbitrary limits on access to student loans,290 could
performed better than expected based on factors such as parental socioeconomic
status. The original strivers project was discontinued amid heated controversy.
Claire Barliant, Striving to Stay Alive, SALON (Oct. 18, 1999, 12:00 PM),
http://www.salon.com/1999/10/18/strivers/ (last visited on Feb. 3, 2013) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
289. Stacy Berg Gale & Alan B. Kruger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending
a More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and
Unobservables, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1491, 1524 (2002) (“We do find that students
who attend colleges with higher average tuition costs tend to earn higher
income years later, after adjusting for student characteristics. . . . [T]uition
matters because higher cost schools devote more resources to student
instruction.”).
290. William Bennett, former Secretary of Education under President
Ronald Reagan, claimed that student loans and other government aid increase
the cost of education, and have used these claims to justify budget cuts that
target government support for education. William J. Bennett, Op-Ed, Our
Greedy Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/
1987/02/18/opinion/our-greedy-colleges.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Most empirical investigations of the
“Bennett Hypothesis” have focused on grant aid rather than student loans, and
have found mixed results. None of these studies have established that funding
captured by universities does not ultimately benefit students through increased
educational quality, student support services, or access for low-income students.
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See, e.g., MICHAEL MCPHERSON & MORTON O. SCHAPIRO, KEEPING COLLEGE
AFFORDABLE: GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 72–73 (1991) (rejecting
the Bennett Hypothesis and finding that colleges tend to provide additional grant
aid in response to federal grant aid); LESLEY J. TURNER, COLUMBIA UNIV., THE
INCIDENCE OF STUDENT FINANCIAL AID: EVIDENCE FROM THE PELL GRANT PROGRAM
26 (2012), http://www.columbia.edu/~ljt2110/LTurner_JMP.pdf (“Across all
sectors, every dollar of Pell Grant aid reduces students’ effective prices by 84
cents, with institutions appropriating the remaining 16 cents through price
discrimination.”); Bridget T. Long, How do Financial Aid Policies Affect Colleges?
The Institutional Impact of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES
1045, 1062–63 (2004) (finding that private universities captured at most 30% of
new grant aid in Georgia’s HOPE program, which was viewed as not rising to “the
level of college exploitation insinuated by Bennett”); Michael S. McPherson et al.,
Recent Trends in U.S. Higher Education Costs and Prices: The Role of Government
Funding, in 79 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 255 (1989) (finding the Bennett Hypothesis
implausible because tuition increased the fastest at well-endowed, elite private
institutions that were the least dependent on government aid as a source of
revenues); Larry D. Singell, Jr. & Joe A. Stone, For Whom the Pell Tolls: The
Response of University Tuition to Federal Grants-in-aid, 26 ECON. EDUC. REV. 285,
291–94 (2007) (rejecting the Bennett Hypothesis for in-state tuition at public
universities, but finding that private universities adjust tuition to capture most
grant aid and public universities adjust out-of-state tuition); cf. Michael J. Rizzo &
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Resident and Nonresident Tuition and Enrollment at
Flagship State Universities, in COLLEGE CHOICES: THE ECONOMICS OF WHERE TO
GO, WHEN TO GO AND HOW TO PAY FOR IT 303, 338–39 (Caroline M. Hoxyby ed.,
2004) (finding that flagship public universities increase in-state tuition to absorb
grant aid, “[c]onsistent with the Bennett Hypothesis,” but do not increase out-ofstate tuition to absorb grant aid).
The empirical evidence for the claim that federal student loans increase
education costs is weak. ALISA F. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, 2 STUDY OF COLLEGE COSTS AND PRICES, 1988–89 TO 1997–98, at 80–
81, 10 (U.S. Dep’t Educ. 2001), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/2002158.pdf; see also
Glater, supra note 35, at 66 (“Empirical studies of changes in tuition do not
support the assertion that colleges raise prices in response to greater perceived
availability of funds to students.”); Warren, Baum & Sitaraman, supra note 65,
at 141 n.71 (“Some observers suggest that the increased availability of student
loans fuels increases in college prices. However, most empirical analyses fail to
find such an effect.”). One of the few studies that may provide limited support
for the Bennett Hypothesis focused exclusively on for-profit educational
institutions, and the results therefore cannot be generalized to nonprofit higher
education. The results may also be explained by grant aid rather than loans, or
by unobserved differences in institutional costs or quality. Stephanie Riegg
Cellini & Claudia Goldin, Does Federal Student Aid Raise Tuition? New
Evidence on For-Profit Colleges 1, 13–25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 17827, 2012), http://scholar.harvard.edu/goldin/files/does_federal_
student_aid_raise_tuition_new_evidence_on_for-profit_colleges.pdf.
There are more plausible explanations for rising costs of higher education,
such as an economy-wide increase in demand for educated labor and therefore
an increase in costs for all service industries that rely on highly educated labor,
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degrade the quality,291 availability,292 and value of education.
Borrowing limits are a heavy-handed approach to managing
risk, and impinge on the freedom of students and their access to
university education.293 There are less intrusive approaches
available, such as risk-adjusting interest rates to account for
default risk.294
In some extreme and rare situations, higher interest rates
may be inadequate to offset losses because default rates are
already very high and there are too few nondefaulting borrowers
in the same risk pool.295 In such rare situations, loan limits could
including medicine, dentistry, and legal services, as well as higher education.
Robert B. Archibald & David H. Feldman, Why Do Higher Education Costs Rise
More Rapidly than Prices in General?, CHANGE, May–June 2008, at 30–31. For a
discussion of factors contributing to the costs of higher education, see generally
ROBERT B. ARCHIBALD & DAVID H. FELDMAN, WHY DOES COLLEGE COST SO MUCH?
(2011).
Another explanation for perceived increase in costs is a shift in costs from
taxpayers to students and their families, as per-student real public support for
higher education has generally declined since the early 1980s. Evidence
suggests that the decline in government support for education is linked to the
growth of anti-taxation political movements. See Robert B. Archibald & David
H. Feldman, State Higher Education Spending and the Tax Revolt, 77 J. HIGHER
EDUC. 618 (2006). Tuition sticker prices also increase as universities charge
wealthy students more to fund need-based aid—and lower net cost—for poorer
students. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra at 150–53.
291. Caroline M. Hoxby, How the Changing Market Structure of U.S. Higher
Education Explains College Tuition 41–42 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 6323, 1997), http://static-71-166-250-129.washdc.east.
verizon.net/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/NBER_US/N971200H.pdf (arguing
that increased competition has led to an increase in both the cost and quality of
college education, and that price controls are inadvisable).
292. See Michael S. McPherson & Morton O. Schapiro, Does Student Aid
Affect College Enrollment? New Evidence on a Persistent Controversy, 81 AM.
ECON. REV. 309, 317–18 (1991) (indicating that federal aid appears to correlate
with increased enrollment by low-income students).
293. Glater, supra note 35, at 72–73 (arguing for higher federal student loan
limits to increase access and reduce the need for high-cost private loans).
294. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 193, at 1513–18 (explaining how
the growing use of risk-based pricing by lenders enables them to profitably
make more credit available to risky borrowers and mitigates the need for credit
rationing).
295. See William Adams, Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Liquidity
Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending, 99 AM. ECON. REV.
49, 65–83 (2009) for a study documenting the use of both risk-based interest
rates and loan limits in high-default subprime auto-lending.
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be used as a last resort. However, loan limits can only be fully
effective as a paternalistic measure if they apply to all debt
students might turn to if access to federal student loans is
restricted—including private student loans, credit cards, home
equity loans and other sources of credit.296
To the extent that loan limits are used at all, the following
risk-based principles should be applied: Education programs and
majors that are linked to higher post-graduation incomes and
higher employment rates should have higher loan limits than
programs and majors that are linked to lower post-graduation
incomes and lower employment rates. All else being equal,
educational programs that require fewer years to complete should
have higher borrowing limits per year, and higher total
borrowing limits. An educational program that can produce an
equally productive—and equally well-paid—skilled worker in
fewer years is worth more than an educational program that
takes longer to produce the same economic result. Expanding
loan limits for productive programs would enable students to pay
a premium for efficiency, and encourage universities to become
more efficient.
F. Risk-Based Pricing and Institutional Autonomy
Risk-based pricing could also be used to change the behavior
of educational institutions. As discussed above, educational
institutions currently have financial incentives to channel
students away from classes and majors that are expensive to
teach—because the instructors have skills that are valuable in
the labor market outside the universities—and toward classes
that are less expensive, because they are less valuable in the

296. See, e.g., Dilip Soman & Amar Cheema, The Effect of Credit on
Spending Decisions: The Role of Credit Limit and Credibility, 21 MARKETING
SCI. 32, 32 (2002) (arguing that borrowers rely on credit limits imposed by
consumer lenders as an indicator of the borrowers’ own future income). Limiting
private student loans would be especially important because these loans are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy except for showing of “undue hardship.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(8) (2006).
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labor market and the instructors have few employment
alternatives.297
If risk-based pricing emphasized the market value of
different majors, and students responded accordingly by shifting
toward majors linked to higher-income employment and better
job prospects, universities would feel pressure to shift more
resources toward teaching marketable skills.
The government could dissuade colleges from using grades to
channel students away from expensive majors by requiring any
educational institution that accepts federal student loans to
disclose percentile class rankings298 on any documents that
disclose grades or GPA. If percentile ranking data became widely
available and well understood, graduate schools, employers, and
students themselves would likely turn away from letter grades
and toward more meaningful and standardized percentile
rankings. Because every class would be subject to the same
percentile distribution scheme, grading distributions could not so
readily be used to alter enrollments to the benefit of universities
and the detriment of students, employers, and taxpayers.
Risk-based pricing could also make the allocation of
educational resources more salient to prospective students. For
example, entering freshmen, who will not yet have declared a
major or taken any classes suggesting a specialty, could be
offered an interest rate that reflects a weighted average based on
the majors of upper level students or graduating seniors at their
college—a reasonable proxy for the allocation of educational
resources at that particular institution. These “institutional
rates” could be made publicly available to help prospective
students choose between the institutions to which they have been
admitted, and to help shift students toward the institutions that
are most responsive to the needs of the labor market.
Shifting resources toward courses of study that are in
demand and have a high value in the labor market will entail
real and substantial costs for universities. To offset these costs, it
may be necessary to increase student loan limits and to accept
297. See supra notes 108–20 and accompanying text.
298. Or possibly a variant such as the weighted measures developed by
Valen E. Johnson. See supra notes 113–23 and accompanying text.
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tuition increases, with the understanding that although the cost
of higher education may increase, the value of higher education
will increase by even more.
Some may object to risk-based pricing on the grounds that it
is likely to shrink enrollment in, and resources dedicated to, the
humanities in order to increase enrollment and resources
dedicated to STEM and business fields. We might also be
concerned about the use of risk-based pricing as a cover for
politically motivated interference with university research. The
ability to target particular universities or particular departments
within universities might raise such concerns. The more tightly
risk-based pricing is tied to objectively verifiable loan loss data or
data on occupational wages and employment—as opposed to
forecasts or any other subjective criteria—the lower the risk of
veiled attacks on academic freedom and impartial research.
Some have argued that the humanities pay off economically
in the long run, even if humanities graduates do not do as well in
the short run.299 Better data would be needed to evaluate these
claims—most studies of income by major rely on a few years of
post-graduation data. Risk-based pricing can and should consider
not just employment and income at graduation or the first few
years thereafter, but longer-term economic outcomes. Such longterm data could be gathered by a cooperative effort between
government and universities to match schooling records with
student loan performance data and federal income tax and Social
Security Administration records.300 It is perfectly plausible that
at least some humanities graduates go on to have successful,
stable, and lucrative careers, for example, as lawyers or other
professionals.301 Risk-based pricing is not inherently in favor or
299. See, e.g., Jim Pollock, Are Liberal Arts Degrees Worth Anything?, DEP’T
POLITICAL SCI., UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, http://www.uta.edu/pols/
files/AreLiberalArtsDegreesWorthAnything.pdf.
300. Student and taxpayer privacy concerns could be addressed by releasing
only aggregate data, or obscuring information that could be used to identify
individuals.
301. See Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 186 (finding that average lifetime
earnings of law degree holders, discounted to present value at the start of law
school, are approximately a million dollars greater than earnings of similar
workers whose highest degree is a Bachelor’s).
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against any particular discipline—it is in favor of allocating
resources according to the needs of a dynamic labor market.
Figure 8.1: Some Majors May Provide Better Opportunities to
Boost Earnings with Additional Work Experience or
Graduate Education
Median earnings by college major, age, and education attainment 2009-2010
Real 2011 USD thousands
Graduate Degree Holder (age 30-54)
Experienced College Graduate (age 30-54)
Recent College Graduate (age 22-26)
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2009 & 2010; Anthony P. Carnevale, Ban
Cheah, & Jeff Strohl, Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, Hard Times,
College Majors, Unemployment, and Earnings: Not All College Degrees Are Created Equal (Jan. 2012).
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Figure 8.2.1: Workers with Undergraduate Degrees in Some
Fields with Low Starting Salaries Are Likely to Attend Law
School or Medical School
Propensity for Pursuing Professional Degrees by Undergraduate Major, 1993
Percent of workers aged 35 to 55 from the 1993 National Survey of College Graduates
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Source: 1993 National Survey of College Graduates; Dan A. Black, Seth Sanders &
Lowell Taylor, The Economic Reward for Studying Economics, 41 ECON. INQUIRY 365,
371 Table 4 (2003).
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Figure 8.2.2: Workers with Undergraduate Degrees in Some
Fields with Low Starting Salaries Are Likely to Attend Law
School or Medical School
Propensity for Pursuing Professional Degrees by Undergraduate Major, 2009
Percent of college graduates aged 18 and over with professional degree

0%

5%

10%

15%

Natural sciences
Liberal arts, humanities
Health care, health
sciences

Law
Medicine

Social sciences, history
English, literature
Foreign languages
Philosophy
Psychology
Mathematics, statistics
Engineering, drafting
Art, architecture
Business
Communications
Agriculture, forestry,
horticulture
Education
Computer and
information science
Source: Stephanie Ewart, U.S. Census Bureau, What It’s Worth: Field of Training and
Economic Status in 2009, 3 Table 3 (Feb. 2012); Survey of Income and Program
Participation 2008.
Note: Preprofessional majors, not shown, have the highest rates of professional school
attendance, at 23.4% law degrees and 26.8% medical degrees.
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Figure 8.3: The Most Valuable Graduate Degree Fields Are
Medicine, Computers, Engineering, Law, and Business
Annualized median earnings by advanced degree field, 2009
Population age 18 and over where highest degree is an advanced degree
2011 USD thousands
Full time workers
All workers with earnings
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Panel, Table 4H.
Note: Annualized earnings calculated by multiplying monthly earnings by 12.
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Figure 8.4.1: Among Those with a Law Degree, Workers with
High-Value Undergraduate Degrees Earn the Most
Earnings of workers with a law degree, by undegraduate major
Earnings as a percent of earnings for economics majors, workers aged 35 to 55
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Source: 1993 National Survey of College Graduates; Dan A. Black, Seth Sanders
& Lowell Taylor, The Economic Reward for Studying Economics, 41 ECON.
INQUIRY 365, 374 Table 7 (2003).
Note: * No statistially significant difference compared to economics majors.
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Figure 8.4.2: MBAs with High-Value Undergraduate Majors
Generally Earn More Than MBAs with Low-Value
Undergraduate Majors
Earnings of workers with a master’s degree in business, by undegraduate major
Earnings as a percent of earnings for economics majors, workers aged 35 to 55
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Source: 1993 National Survey of College Graduates; Dan A. Black, Seth
Sanders & Lowell Taylor, The Economic Reward for Studying Economics, 41
ECON. INQUIRY 365, 373 Table 6 (2003).
Note: * No statistially significant difference compared to economics majors.
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A rather more parochial argument is that, notwithstanding
relatively poor job prospects of humanities graduates, the
humanities have spiritual or moral value that makes them
inherently superior to STEM or business or social science majors
and therefore deserving of subsidies at every other field’s
expense. There are few empirical studies to support this view—
much of the literature on “over-education” suggests that
education that does not enhance employment prospects produces
cynicism and dissatisfaction among graduates.302 Many of those
who subscribe to the view that the humanities should be
privileged simply hold it as an article of faith.
Assuming arguendo that the humanities are spiritually
sacred but economically marginal, then who should make the
economic sacrifice to ensure that the humanities are taught?
Should students of limited means be forced to mortgage their
futures to pay for a humanities education of limited monetary
value? Should poor students in more challenging and less
spiritually rewarding disciplines be forced to overpay for their
loans so that other students—generally from wealthier families—
can enjoy the humanities? This is the way the economic burden is
allocated under the current system, and even the most ardent
supporter of the humanities would be hard-pressed to defend it.
If four years of postsecondary cultural edification really is a
fundamental human right, shouldn’t higher education be funded
through taxation and provided free at the point of service to every
citizen? Perhaps, but where should such an expenditure rank in
voters’ list of priorities? In a world of limited resources, choices
must be made and priorities established.
Most European and Asian governments that fund higher
education through taxation have not treated the humanities as
sacred—they have generally prioritized STEM instruction and
labor market needs to a greater extent than have U.S. students

302. See, e.g., Val Burris, The Social and Political Consequences of
Overeducation, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 454, 459–61 (1983) (finding that overeducation
results in a statistically significant but small reduction in job satisfaction); id. at
463–64 (finding that overeducated workers are less likely to believe that success
is the result of hard work rather than luck, have a less positive view of labor
unions, and are more likely to be status-conscious).
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and universities.303 More direct government funding of
postsecondary education in the United States would probably
accelerate a shift away from the humanities, away from
education as consumption, and toward education as investment.
Risk-based student loan pricing could be understood as a
compromise—an attempt to promote educational alignment with
labor market needs while respecting U.S. cultural and political
preferences for decentralized decision making.
For better or worse, the United States has opted not to make
higher education a basic human right paid for at public expense,
but rather an economic investment primarily paid for by students
and their families. The federal student loan program was
established with clear policy goals: to provide skilled labor to
meet the needs of a growing economy and to provide upward
mobility by enhancing the earnings and employment prospects of
young adults. It is inappropriate for the federal student loan
program to subsidize programs that cannot meet these goals at
the expense of programs that can.
Other options remain for funding the humanities. Colleges
can still try to convince students that the spiritual splendor of a
humanities degree really is worth the financial sacrifice. With
risk-adjusted pricing, students will be more likely to be fully
informed of the financial risks of their decisions, and must be
willing to internalize them, including the upfront cost of tuition,
the foregone future income, and the long-term risk-adjusted
student loan interest. With better information and proper
incentives, students remain free to make whatever decision they
think best.
If colleges are truly dedicated to the proposition that
everyone should have access to the humanities regardless of
resources, colleges could make difficult budgetary decisions to
reduce net tuition charges for humanities students of limited
means. Or, colleges could admit more students from wealthy
backgrounds who may prefer a leisurely and spiritually
303. See, e.g., CAROLINE KEARNEY, EFFORTS TO INCREASE STUDENT’S INTEREST
IN PURSUING SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS STUDIES
AND CAREERS 7–10 (2011) (discussing national strategies of several European
countries that include promotion of STEM learning).
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rewarding college experience, and can pay for it without
borrowing.
The concept of higher education as primarily a spiritual
experience comes from a time when higher education was a
luxury available only to the wealthy.304 It may not suit a world of
democratized access in which loans have become the funding
mechanism of choice.
VII. Conclusion
Federal student loan programs were established to provide
skilled labor to employers, to facilitate higher wages and
economic advancement for students, and to promote human
capital development and economic growth within the United
States. These programs have successfully increased college
degree attainment rates, boosted the incomes of millions of
graduates, and benefited employers as well as the federal budget.
Unfortunately, limited labor market transparency and
skewed incentives have contributed to a mismatch between the
allocation of educational resources and the demands of the labor
market. Many students do not know which majors and programs
are the best investment until they have nearly completed their
studies, and many universities find it more convenient to channel
students toward whatever can engage them at the lowest cost
rather than whatever is most valuable to students and
employers. Perversely, uniform pricing of student loans
subsidizes the subject areas that are least economically valuable,
while penalizing those that are most valuable.
Risk-based pricing of student loan interest rates would help
clarify the links between educational choices and employment
opportunities. It would force students to internalize the risks
created by their own decisions, and would pressure universities to
become more responsive to employers’ needs. Ideally, it would
channel educational resources to where they are valued most,
reduce structural unemployment, reduce student loan loss rates,
and boost wages and tax revenues. In the long run, it may even
304.

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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reduce wage inequality by channeling more workers toward the
highest wage areas, fewer toward the lowest wage areas, and
thereby causing wages to compress.
Risk-based student loan pricing preserves a considerable
degree of autonomy for students and educational institutions.
Students remain free to study whatever they wish—they need
only internalize the risk. Educational institutions remain free to
allocate resources as they see fit, subject only to the constraints of
a better-informed and more market-savvy population of students.
Risk-based pricing does not require an assumption that the
existing allocation of wages and employment opportunities is fair
or even fully efficient. It simply rests on an assumption that
market prices contain useful information about the extant
allocation of resources, that is unfair to channel indebted
students into lifelong financial sacrifices they may not fully
understand (and in so doing, exacerbate those sacrifices by
driving down wages in already low wage fields), and that possible
inefficiencies in the wage structure are best corrected through the
normal workings of a mixed economy—regulation and taxes
designed to curb socially harmful activity,305 and wage subsidies
and public sector employment designed to provide public goods.
Risk-based pricing does not create the allocation of resources in
the U.S. economy—it merely reflects political and economic
reality.
Within the umbrella framework of risk-based pricing, there
remain a variety of possible solutions and tradeoffs. Should riskbased pricing attempt to channel students toward their areas of
competitive advantage by incorporating some measure of fieldspecific ability? If so, what “meritocratic” measures are most
predictive and least likely to undermine the goals of equal
opportunity? Should risk-based pricing take into account debt
levels to reward institutions that are cost efficient and students
who are price conscious? Or would focus on debt levels
305. The suggestion is not that the government should directly set wages in
the private sector. Rather, if there is a specific industry or activity in which
wages are too high because of negative externalities, then the appropriate
solution would be to regulate or tax the harmful industry or activity, which
would increase noncompensation costs and indirectly reduce wages or
employment in fields associated with negative externalities.
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disproportionately harm the poorest students who have the
greatest need to borrow? To what extent should risk-based
pricing reflect historic data, and to what extent should it deviate
based on forecasts? Which data sources are the most reliable?
This Article introduces the basic concept of risk-based pricing
in the student loan context, and outlines some of the key
technical and ethical considerations. It is the beginning of a long
conversation, and hopefully, a path toward ameliorating some of
our nation’s greatest economic and social challenges.

